

ROLE OF THE CHURCH
AS AN INTERMEDIARY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT:
A THEOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the interface between conflict resolution theory and the theology and praxis of the church. One purpose is to demonstrate the value of theological ethics in the development of conflict resolution theory. A second purpose is to select and examine a particular conflict intervention role and assess its applicability as a potential model for the functioning of the church as an intermediary in the resolution of international conflict.

The particular theory selected comes from the problem solving school of conflict resolution. At the same time, principled negotiation, developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project of Harvard Law School, has a very pragmatic orientation.

This theory's applicability for the church is first assessed by examining two case studies, both examples of nonofficial third party intervention in some aspect of East-West relations during the Cold War. The first case is one where the authors of principled negotiation act as third party interveners. The second case examines the role played by a religious group, the Quakers, in a similar context.

The final section of the thesis develops a theology of conciliation with which to assess the applicability of principled negotiation for use by the church. The result is an affirmation of the model's general appropriateness for use by the church. However, various adaptations in both theory and practice are recommended, in order to reflect the theological context within which the church operates and in order to make a contribution to the general development of conflict resolution theory.

I affirm that this thesis, titled "Role of the Church as an Intermediary in International Conflict: A Theological Assessment of Principled Negotiation," is entirely my own composition.

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INTRODUCTION

For centuries international negotiation was almost exclusively in the political sphere. It was the domain of diplomacy. In this century there has developed a growing alliance between the art of diplomacy and social science. Conflict resolution theorist, Johan Galtung, compares this development with the nineteenth century alliance between the art of surgery and natural science. Art was no longer deemed sufficient as the sole approach, yet science could prevail only to the extent that it understood and incorporated valid insights of the former perspective.¹ Today there is considerable question regarding the state of the marriage between medical art and science. There is a growing sense that medical science has not provided a large enough unifying fabric with which to understand health and health care. Classification of observable phenomena as a means of improving medical technique does not always result in the best care, even of the body. The emotional and spiritual dimensions of health are becoming more evident and more basic. The same problem is, if anything, even more serious when social interaction, rather than the human body, becomes the object of research and action. Here, ethics is not simply related to the question of external treatments, of how to act upon the subject. Rather, the

question of ethics is integral to the internal dynamics of the subject itself. Therefore, it is my contention that theological ethics, among other disciplines, has an important role to play in providing a healthy foundation for the new field of peace studies and international conflict resolution.

While one purpose of this study is to demonstrate the value of theological ethics in the development of conflict resolution theory, a second equally important aim is to assess the value of this theory for church praxis. I intend to select and examine a particular conflict intervention role and assess its applicability as a potential model for the functioning of the church as an intermediary in the resolution of international conflict. Such a role must be informed by other disciplines, most notably social science, which have contributed to this emerging field. However, it is essential that any potential model must be adapted before its use by the church. In addition, it will need a rationale which is specifically theological in nature.

In the recent past, the intervention role most commonly used by the church has varied, depending on the context of the conflict. In societal and inter-societal conflict, the focus has been on advocacy with respect to issues, often accompanied by third party partiality with respect to the principal parties. The primary paradigm has been the

prophetic motif. In interpersonal relations, the focus has been on conciliation between the parties and impartiality on the part of the third party. The primary paradigm has been the pastoral counseling motif. This discrepancy of role, according to context, is one which became increasingly disturbing to me as a parish pastor who confronted both social and interpersonal conflict. As a result, I began to ask whether the insights of pastoral counseling could inform the role of the church in social conflict.

In the early 1960's, pastoral counselor, Wayne Oates attempted to relate the insights of pastoral counseling to the process of intervention in social conflict. Oates rejected an understanding of prophesy which depends on rigid position-taking, denies the validity of dialogical process, relies on excathedra pronouncements, exhortation or crusade mentality, and removes individual freedom of decision through authoritarian, monological communication. According to him, such "pseudoprophetic position-taking" clearly hurt any prospects for resolving social conflict. Instead, he emphasized the necessity of a dialogical process which seeks consultation, encourages negotiation between conflicting interests and intentions, and nurtures a willingness to be reconciled -- even when dealing with one's worst opponent. He allowed a place for position-taking, but was adamant that it could not replace dialogical process nor be used as a litmus test for determining faithfulness to the will of God. At the same time, he

warned against refusing to take a stand on important issues and "shilly-shallying" between two sides, in the name of reconciliation. The manipulator who plays both ends against the middle, speaking "smooth sayings" to the party with whom he is currently conversing, had no place in Oates' conception. However, this did not entail abandoning the counseling motif when addressing social conflicts. Instead, "Mr. Facing-both-ways" (referring to Bunyan's classical metaphor) could be avoided in much the same way that the marriage counselor functioned. For Oates, this meant entering a covenant to be pastor to both parties and not "choosing up sides" or allocating blame. Oates called upon both interpersonal and inter-societal conflict interveners to affirm the unique, yet complementary, character of each party, to open channels of communication with all parties, to see that accurate information and clear statements of the issues are made available to all, to aim for mutual gain, and to view the "truth" as existing "between" ² contending parties rather than with one side alone.

Since this pastoral care model has clearly been influenced by social science, it makes sense to assume that that discipline can also provide a comparable model to use as a basis for formulating a creative role for the church vis-a-vis social conflict. Such a model, along with its theoretical base, will need to affirm a dialogical process similar to that advocated by Oates. In the search for, and

utilization of, a social science model appropriate to a context of social conflict, one will confront numerous questions which must be addressed. Is it possible to speak of a generic theory of conflict which can be applied to both interpersonal and inter-societal settings? Where does a particular theory fit within the total spectrum of theories of conflict and why is this theoretical construct better than the alternatives? What are the primary issues which any theory must address? For example, what are the respective secular arguments for advocacy verses mediation (partiality verses impartiality) as roles for third party interveners in situations of social conflict? Finally, what are the methodological procedures (eg. data collection) used within this conceptual framework and can they be applied or adapted for use in this study? These questions will be addressed in detail in part I of the thesis. In chapter 1, I will present an overview of conflict resolution theory. In chapter 2, I will select one particular theory for special examination. Principled negotiation, as developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project of Harvard Law School, provides a pragmatic approach, as well as a theoretical framework, which I will use to structure the rest of the study.

Part II will move from the level of secular theory to praxis. This is essential in order to test out the adequacy of the proposed theoretical construct for the theological task of developing a role model and rationale for the

church as third party intervener in situations of social conflict. The case material will be used to identify gaps, inadequacies, or other problems in principled negotiation as a theory. In selecting the cases to be researched, I was concerned that they represent similar geographical and geopolitical contexts, in order that the distinctive results due to other variables may be more easily assessed. The context I selected was that of East-West relations during the Cold War. First, there is quite a wealth of Christian tradition on both sides of this divide, providing at least the potential for substantial church involvement. Second, when I began the study, the East-West schism was one which affected the whole world, dividing it into hostile camps. Now that the Cold War has ended, the relationship still has the potential for altering the course of history. Hence, a study of the role of the church in the context of East-West conflict offers a field where the long history of the church has a opportunity to influence the unfolding of events at a unique point in history.

I will develop two case studies. The first (chapter 3) will act as a kind of control case. Here, I will examine third party intervention as practised by the proponents of principled negotiation. The case will examine a relatively confined aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations, the development of nuclear risk reduction centers in Moscow and Washington. The second case (chapter 4) will be one where

a religious body has functioned as third party in some aspect of East-West conflict.

Before going further, it is necessary to address the question, "Why the church?," as opposed to some other social institution. I would argue that the church embodies a number of features which make it potentially effective as a third party intervener. First is the spiritual nature of the church. In its message of reconciliation, it has the potential to offer hope and the moral authority to challenge entrenched enmity. Second is the access to ordinary people within different substrata represented in a conflict. Within the church there is often a point of connection with basic feelings on various sides of a given dispute. Third is the relationship which the church has with the political community. As a social institution within any society, it has to have developed some relationship with political, and other, institutions which are instrumental in the dynamics of international conflict. Fourth, is the universal nature of the church. Since the church transcends racial, national, political, and ideological frontiers, it has the opportunity to provide crosscutting cleavages between conflicting parties. Its world-wide network of communication can become a channel of information or messages across lines of confrontation. As Hungarian Reformed Bishop Karoly Toth has written:

The church is metaphysical-spiritual; grass-rooted-popular; national-institutional; and ecumenical-institutional at the same time. This is why the very

nature of the church makes it possible to contribute to conflict resolution on every level of human society.³

I will now attempt to set the background for selection of a case study where the third party is a religious body. First, I must ask if there are any examples of religious groups which have consciously used such a role in a successful intervention process? If so, which case affords the greatest degree of comparison with principled negotiation and with the Harvard case in chapter 3? Consequently, I will now turn to an examination of church involvement in the resolution of Social Conflict. This will both assist in the selection of case material and provide a bit broader overview within which to contextualize the present study.

Although the church has dealt extensively with social conflict over many centuries, it has functioned as mediator/conciliator in a rather limited number of situations. As already indicated, the advocacy role has been a more common function for the church as third party intervener. This can be seen, for example, in the recent history of the international ecumenical movement, one place where there has been a conscious effort to intervene in international affairs. The stance adopted by the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) of the World Council of Churches (WCC), undoubtedly the foremost ecclesiastical body with extensive experience in international affairs, illustrates my point. Although an early study on the subject, commissioned by the WCC, lists negotiation,

consultation, and reconciliation as recommended actions for
the churches,⁴ the primary thrust of the organization's
peace activities has been advocacy oriented. The form which
this normally has taken is pronouncements and resolutions.
In this way, the commission has advocated on behalf of the
independence of third world nations following World War II,
and on behalf of the rights of poor and oppressed peoples
ever since. Similarly, the CCIA has, since 1975, taken
numerous stands opposing militarism and advocating disarmament.
At the Vancouver Assembly in 1983, where most of the
issues addressed had to do with problems of peace and
justice, a resolution passed which stated, "We stand in
solidarity across the world to call persistently, in every
forum, for a halt to the arms race." This assembly called
upon churches to "confront with new vigour the threats to
peace... and engage in struggles for justice and human
dignity."⁵ Over the past forty years there have been numerous
pronouncements or resolutions which indicate that the
CCIA has taken a stand on a specific case of international,
or inter-societal, conflict. These include: support for
the legal status of Jerusalem (1949), support for the legal
status of South West Africa (1949), support for UN intervention
in the Korean War (1950), condemnation of the
Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), support for the territorial
integrity and independence of Lebanon and Jordan⁶
(1958), condemnation of the U.S. intervention in the Domin-

ican Republic (1964), repeated condemnation of U.S. intervention in Viet Nam (1968-1972), support for liberation movements and sanctions in South Africa and opposition to western collaboration (early 1970's), condemnation of the Philippine government for misuse of power and repression (1974), condemnation of the Rhodesian government for oppression of blacks (1978), and condemnation of the U.S.⁶ invasion of Granada in 1983.

However, since the establishment of the CCIA, there have been a few attempts to focus attention on conflict resolution procedures. Between 1969-1980 three consultations took place under CCIA Auspices: "Alternatives to Conflict in the Quest for Peace" in 1969, "Peaceful Solutions of Conflicts" in 1979, and "Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts"⁷ in 1980. The report for the 1969 consultation, which included secular conflict resolution experts, indicated that the churches should have and promote a better knowledge of the conditions, dynamics and techniques for the resolution of conflict, noting specifically the dynamic nature of peace, the nature of structural violence, and the need for human dignity. Furthermore, it indicated a conviction that the national and international institutions of the church should explore ways in which they can influence political decision making through such means as forums where conflicts can be debated and on-the-spot investigations⁸ of trouble areas. The 1980 consultation went further, noting the need to identify various perceptions of

interest, articulate "common interests," promote a more critical public opinion, and encourage greater involvement in the conciliation process. As a result, there has been some involvement of the CCIA as an intermediary in conflict resolution efforts. Beginning with the Netherlands-Indonesia dispute of 1949 (where WCC members and staff represented their governments as advisors), and continuing through the Korean War (where the CCIA director served as an intermediary), the Viet Nam War (where CCIA officials held regular private consultations with all four delegations at the Paris Peace talks), the Sudanese Civil War (where the CCIA, along with the All Africa Conference of Churches, acted as the official mediation team in 1971-72), and concluding with ongoing efforts in Korea, Indochina, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Israel/Palestine, and Lebanon.⁹ These efforts, while commendable, and certainly informative with respect to the general topic, do not offer a case study where the major conflict was East-West, Cold War. In fact, CCIA Director, Ninan Koshy, advised me to look elsewhere, specifically recommending the Conference of European Churches (CEC).

CEC was conceived in the midst of the Cold War and served to bring together, in about equal membership, churches from East and West. It was, in many ways similar to the WCC in structure and outlook. It gained its legitimacy as a fellowship of member churches. It urged member

churches to fight for disarmament and against the use of atomic weapons, as well as to struggle for reconciliation between nations and against the climate of distrust between the two ideological camps. However, it had a lower profile, thus enabling it to do more things without the glare of public disclosure. CEC's most significant peace related goal has been the monitoring of the Helsinki Accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). CEC was, in fact, the first international organization to call for a conference of the heads of all European governments in order to create dialogue between East and West and¹⁰ dismantle the two blocks which divide the continent.

I considered using, as a case study, CEC's role in formulating the idea of CSCE and its role in monitoring and pointing out violations of the Helsinki Accords. However, after considerable research in their archives in Geneva, as well as numerous interviews with CEC staff and working group participants, I concluded that this case lacked some important criteria for which I was looking. First, although there was clearly input into the political process, CEC's efforts were primarily directed toward overcoming divisions between churches in the East and West. This is a very significant work, but does not fit the criteria for my study. Second, even where there was input into the political process, it was not constant and its effects were rarely measurable. These factor would have made it difficult to develop any kind of sustained case involving

the kind of third party intervention which I needed for the purposes of this study.

I briefly considered a variety of other ecumenical organizations, including the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Moral Rearmament, Aktion Suehnezeichen-Friedendienst, and the Christian Peace Conference. Each of these failed according to one of the following criteria: lack of clear involvement in East-West conflict, lack of adequate concern for specifically political goals, the primacy of advocacy over mediation roles, or too much identification with one side of the conflict. Finally, I also considered some denominational organizations, especially those of the traditional peace churches -- Brethren, Mennonite, and Quaker. Of these, the Quakers had both the longest record of third party intervention and the best case fitting my criteria as described above.

The Quakers have a three hundred year history of conciliation efforts in international conflicts. They have also contributed significantly to conflict resolution theory. Adam Curle, a Quaker and former Director of Peace Studies at University of Bradford, has written extensively on the role of the nonofficial peacemaker, or private diplomat. I will utilize some of his material in my theoretical assessment.

From the beginning there have been two strands in the Quaker peace movement, those attempting to convert world

leaders and those attempting to reform society and develop peaceful institutions. Robert Barkley represented the first type when he wrote "The Epistle of Love and Friendly Advice" to European leaders in 1677 in an attempt to avoid war. William Penn represented the second type in his efforts to seek conciliation between the Indian nations and the European settlers. Over the next couple^{of} centuries, Quakers were involved in numerous conciliation attempts, including the American Revolution (1776), a mission to Czar Nicholas I in an attempt to prevent the Crimean War (1854), and the conflict between Denmark and the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein (1864). Following World War I, the Quakers established the Committee for International Service in London and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in Philadelphia in response to a call by Carl Heath for the creation of "Quaker embassies" in the capitals of the world. These offices oversaw the formation, in many cities, of Quaker "centers," whose task it would be to help build international political institutions for peace. One of these centers was located in Geneva for the sole purpose of collaborating with the League of Nations.¹¹

Following World War II, the Quakers looked for better ways to influence world leaders. The purpose of the centers changed from spreading good will to developing concrete programs for bringing groups of potential leaders together across barriers of culture and national interest, exposing them to the new psychological and sociological

insights of conflict resolution theory. Two new programs were created -- the Washington Seminars in International Affairs and the Conferences for Diplomats. The former conducted monthly sessions for U.S. government officials, congresspeople, diplomats, and journalists. The latter conducted conferences in Europe and the U.S. for young foreign service officers. The European conferences focused more on East-West relations and included participants from the Soviet Union and most socialist countries.¹² Yet AFSC also sponsored numerous dialogues and seminars with the Soviets during the past forty years.¹³ In addition to these efforts, the Quaker United Nations Offices in Geneva and New York (QUNOs) were set up to serve as a center for Quaker influence on the world organization. Among its responsibilities, it was to submit memoranda on a variety of issues (including disarmament), seek out spokespersons of opposing sides in conflict situations and attempt to provide interpretation between the parties.¹⁴

Not all of Quaker peacemaking activity has been focused around the use of an impartial third party. In fact, many Quaker organizations have stressed advocacy rather than mediation/conciliation, as can be seen in some of the above mentioned activities. Friends Committee on National Legislation in Washington is one organization which has majored in advocacy work. For example, it has played a significant role promoting U.S. legislative action toward

disarmament. Yet, in the course of fulfilling its mission it also encouraged arms control negotiations and supported joint ventures and contacts between officials of each government.¹⁵ Another example of Quaker activity where advocacy prevailed took place during the Viet Nam War when there was intense confrontation with the U.S. government. Yet, even here, contacts were maintained with both sides. So, even when advocacy has been the primary purpose of an activity, the Quaker approach required some degree of openness to the offending party, in an attempt to create meaningful dialogue.

However, for the purposes of this study, it is important to take a case from the wealth of material available where the Quakers functioned as a quiet, unofficial, uninvited, off-the-record go-between. Such examples abound -- from the ongoing conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Middle East, to more time specific efforts such as the India-Pakistan War of 1965, the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70, and the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (1976-80). Fortunately, there is also an excellent example of the second type of conciliation efforts between the two Germanies during the period between 1962-73,¹⁶ which will be the focus of my examination in chapter 4.

For both of the cases in Part II, I have used extensive archival material and conducted in-depth interviews with all primary participants and some secondary ones. Furthermore, I have shared draft copies of the cases with

all persons interviewed, as well as the archivist at AFSC. In all cases I have edited the manuscript in light of the feedback I received. Therefore, I am confident that the studies reflect an accurate view of the cases presented.

Finally, in Part III, I will return to theoretical reflection. This time it will be theological in nature, as I prepare to draw conclusions about an appropriate model for the church. My initial aim will be to develop my own theological ethics regarding reconciliation as an organizing principle for the functioning of religious third parties in the resolution of international conflict (chapter 5). Following this, I will examine how the approach of principled negotiation can inform this theology and how a theological framework, drawn from the wider field of Christian social ethics, can be used to adapt principled negotiation to fit the needs of the church (chapter 6).

Conflict resolution theory and theology will interact in this section through a couple of prisms, one of which is the case material in part II. This empirical data will help either to confirm, or to question, theoretical generalizations (secular or theological). It will also serve as an objective measure against which to evaluate any potential theological adaptation of secular theory. On the other hand, both the theology of conciliation and the theoretical framework of principled negotiation, will be used to draw out the wider implications of the case materi-

al. The second prism is the discipline of Biblical exegesis. Although certainly academic in nature, this discipline still draws upon the experience of people of faith. It is praxis, though historically removed. As such, it becomes another testing ground for determining the adequacy of theory. The Biblical stories frequently provide a kind of case material which further enlightens the analysis. Moreover, it is my conviction that this Biblical material is normative for our understanding of faithful life and service. Hence, it becomes an essential prism through which my analysis must look.

The main body of theological analysis, from which I will draw, comes primarily from twentieth century theologians. It should not come as any surprise that theologians from this century have had the most to say about the ethical concerns which relate to international conflict resolution in the contemporary world. Furthermore, I shall utilize four diverse schools of theological thought (in addition to Quaker beliefs), a scheme which will provide considerable diversity of perspective. These schools include Christian realism (representing an establishment mentality), liberation theology (representing a disestablishment mentality), Anabaptist theology (representing a remnant, pacifist mentality, and Christian spirituality (representing a mystical mentality). The first two categories are typical political theologies which are concerned for how society is structured. The chief goal is either to balance

power (Christian realism) or redistribute it (liberation theology). Their audience is a particular class -- policy-makers in the case of Christian realism or the oppressed in the case of liberation theology. This tends to give them a partisan approach to the resolution of conflict. The second two categories are not typical political theologies. Their proponents are more concerned with the quality of witness than with alterations to the structure of society. The chief goal is to promote faithfulness and purity of both attitude and action. Power is either to be abandoned (Anabaptist) or transformed (mystical). Their audience is primarily the small group of the faithful (Anabaptist) or oneself (mystical). This tends to provide them with a measure of critical distance from protagonists in a conflict, making it less likely that they will develop a partisan approach.

As I draw upon these school^s of theology, I have made an effort to select those individual authors whose insights will be most informative. When presenting Christian realism, I will primarily refer to the father of contemporary realism, Reinhold Niebuhr, who has written extensively on the subject matter of this study, and whose work has influenced a whole generation of political theologians. When presenting liberation theology, I will refer to numerous authors (Jan Sobrino, Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, Jose Miguez Bonino, Juan Luis Segundo, George Pixley, Fer-

nando Belo, Sergio Rostagno, Paulo Freire, etc.), since I wish to create a dialogue with the school as a whole, and since no one individual has yet become the commanding figure. When presenting Anabaptist theology, I shall utilize both better known (John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas) and lesser known (Guy Hersberger and Duane Friesen) individuals. When presenting mystical theology, I will utilize those who have expressed great concern to integrate spirituality with social responsibility and avoid any pietistic retreat from the world (Henri Nouwen, Thomas Merton, and Matthew Fox). This cast of theologians gives a breadth of perspective which will provide greater depth and enhance the final result.

NOTES

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PART I

CONFLICT INTERVENTION THEORY

CHAPTER 1

THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT INTERVENTION

The study of peace and international conflict, as a separate discipline, is a modern occurrence, resulting from renewed interest in war and peace research. Following World War II, the concept of conflict began to emerge as a focal point for studies on war and peace. For the first time there were comparative studies being done where war was examined as merely one example of a wider social phenomenon. These studies were part of the early development of what is now called a generic theory of conflict.¹

Such a development presumes that the processes of conflict can be studied as a class of phenomena with certain common characteristics which are applicable in numerous contexts. The validity of this assumption underlies much of this study. Although the particular focus of my research is on international conflict, the issues raised in attempting to develop an intermediary role, and theological rationale, for the church will carry implications for the understanding and handling of conflict in a variety of circumstances. Therefore, I will begin my study with a brief examination of a rationale for a generic theory of conflict.

A Generic Approach

It is my contention that there is enough similarity among the different types of conflict situations to merit general theorization as a class of behavior. Drawing upon all disciplines and settings is essential in order to obtain the comparisons and contrasts which can continually sharpen and correct the general theory. Not only is it possible to cast a wide net; it is crucial to have a general framework from which to deviate. Effective international negotiation or mediation, as with any situational subset, must be built upon at least a tentative broad-based theoretical foundation.

There are two basic arguments against this generic view of conflict, the idiographic and gradualist perspectives. The idiographic approach holds that "true knowledge is of the particulars." Proponents claim that special theory, designed for particular settings, provides more accurate understanding of the unique properties. General theory risks overlooking or distorting critical aspects of each particular case. Yet, such idiographic arguments would rule out any generalization, including sub-categories of conflict such as international, industrial, racial, etc. Even the most limited theory attempts to generalize regarding shared characteristics within a given category of behavior. If the uniqueness of each incident does not preclude the development of limited

theory about a small set of circumstances, then the uniqueness of a small class of phenomena should not preclude the development of general theory with which to develop understanding of a number of such classes. The idiographic objection can be answered by developing theories which take into account the variables pertaining to a certain subset and set out appropriate sub-theories.²

The gradualist argument states that, while general theory is desirable, it is not attainable at this time. Instead one must aim for a "middle range" theory which is more general than the current theoretical understanding, but less broad than one's ultimate goal. The belief is that gradually one will broaden the theory, while having adequate time to empirically check each step along the way. Those who apply this argument to the study of conflict believe that the present level of understanding in this field only warrants the development of theory at the level of sub-units. However, the concept of "middle range" theory is rather ambiguous. What constitutes the middle? Is not a general theory of conflict but a midpoint in the quest for theories about general behavior? Furthermore, it is not clear why a "middle range" theory would necessarily be any more accurate than a general one. To concentrate exclusively on special theories would risk developing sets of hypotheses which are inconsistent with each other and, therefore, of limited value.³

In addition, there are positive reasons for developing and utilizing general theory. Having an overall framework helps to identify special classes within the larger unit, influence the formulation of special theories, and indicate possible directions for empirical investigation. Subgroupings, and their concomitant theories, may be quite different when they are developed in response to a general theory, instead of prior to it.⁴ For example, peace researcher Johan Galtung develops a classification of inter-system and intra-system conflict which is drawn along rather different lines of categorization than distinctions according to setting (eg. industrial, racial, international). In Galtung's schema the properties of interpersonal and international are compared rather than contrasted, an analysis made possible only by his comprehensive theory of conflict.⁵

Consequently, it seems valid to me to affirm the significance of a generic theory of conflict. This has implications, not only for the broad application of my conclusions, but also for the methodology of my investigation. In my argumentation and assessment I will utilize insights drawn from a variety of conflict situations. The particularities of international conflict will not be neglected. However, I will also take into account the findings of research in related fields, such as labor/management disputes, family counseling, race relations, etc.

A variety of disciplines have actively developed

models in an attempt to conceptualize adequately the multiple dimensions of conflict. Biological, mathematical, economic, political, sociological, and psychological models of conflict have all been used as starting points for the development of various theories of conflict and conflict intervention. In fact, models developed in each of the above fields have been applied specifically to the international arena. However, two fields in particular -- political and behavioral science -- have had special impact on the handling of conflict in the international context. Therefore, I will begin by examining various models arising within these disciplines. This will enable the attainment of as much insight as possible from interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. It will also serve to cast a wider net from which to select a specific model for evaluation and application to the church's involvement in international conflict.

Sources of Contemporary Models

In the 1950's, there was considerable controversy between theorists representing the disciplines of political and behavioral science. Each claimed that the other did not show enough interest in its contribution to the field and did not adequately understand the framework within which international conflict operated.⁶ Yet, as will be demonstrated in this section, there was considerable interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, in particular,

the influence of behavioral science on the development of the newest political model. Due to limitations of space, I will briefly address the contributions of each of these fields. However, I will give emphasis to the behavioral model due to its recent influence on political models and, in particular, the specific theory which I shall examine in the next chapter and which I will use as a basis for evaluation in the remainder of the study.

Political Models

Political models have grown out of a long history of classical statecraft, where analysis has focused on the historical record of unique events and personalities. Generalization is made only with great sensitivity to the context of the particular negotiation and its immediate history.⁷ However, years of precedence have still had a lasting effect on the development of general theory and practice of international negotiation. Over the last five hundred years, a conceptual framework and set of techniques has gradually developed, which still carries great influence in contemporary practice. The primary debate, arising out of this history, has been between liberals, who focused on mutual respect and cooperation between states, and realists who relied on the balance of power to produce stability and settlement of dispute. In addition, more radical structuralist perspectives advocated replacement of the sovereign state with other bases of group

identity. For example, Marxism proposed social class as the organizing principle, while anarchism championed the existence of a higher law with concomitant commitment to universal rights. The religious roots of the latter can be traced from the radical Christian communities of the Reformation to the influence of Tolstoi and Ghandi. In the West, during this century, it is the realist position, after a brief interlude of liberalism, which has dominated the political perspective on international negotiation. This has led to the advent of secret diplomacy, preoccupation with development of positions which will protect one's sphere of interest, and the central role of coercion and threat.⁸ The origins of the realist paradigm reach back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Clausewitz, while modern proponents include E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Thompson,⁹ and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.

Recently the realist perspective has been challenged by a new, pluralist school of political thought. Although in some ways reminiscent of liberalism, pluralism is based more on empirical findings of the behavioral revolution. It builds on the assumption that the world is highly complex, consisting of multi-centric, rather than state-centric, systems of relationships. Pluralists point to many anomalies within the realist paradigm which they claim can be addressed adequately by pluralism. They

question whether the behavior of states can be described accurately by the realists' billiard ball analogy, ie. as hard, uniform objects which bounce off one another, rather than a model reflecting interdependence. They assert that states are not unitary rational actors, nor are they the only actors in the international system. Finally, they challenge the use of confrontation, as a means of achieving security, in a changing international political system where it is not safe to let war be the final arbiter. All this leads to a proposed negotiating style which is based upon interdependence, integration, and collaboration.¹⁰

Proponents of this paradigm shift, and its ramifications for international negotiation, include John W. Burton, Christopher R. Mitchell, Michael Banks, and Anthony de Reuck.¹¹

Behavioral Models

Behavioral models of international negotiation were first developed in the late 1950's, but have generated a great deal of research in the intervening forty years. There is a now vast literature which has influenced the writings of many international theorists from outside the behavioral sciences. The most notable of these behavioral scientists include Herbert C. Kelman, Bert R. Brown, Dean G. Pruitt, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Daniel Druckman, and Morton Deutsch.¹²

Rather than investigate the essence of bargaining in

a particular milieu, behaviorists tend to compare specific characteristics of particular bargaining situations. This means that methodology utilized in the collection and systematization of data becomes a critical factor in the use of behavioral models. Therefore, I will first examine the methodology before exploring, in the rest of the chapter, the various schools of thought which have developed within this discipline.

There are three approaches to the collection and systematization of behavioral data --investigation, experimentation, and general social-psychological research. Systematic investigation of international negotiation is difficult because of restricted access to ongoing negotiations. Investigators are usually confined to collection of data from past negotiations through analysis of the historical record or interviews with the participants, a methodology which I will utilize in researching my own case studies in chapters 3 and 4. Yet the process of investigating international negotiation is slightly easier than that of intra-governmental decision making due to the more public nature of the former. Although the results of such research are not voluminous, they are rather broadly
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accepted as valid.

Experimentation involving intergroup and interpersonal conflict is a second source of behavioral data. Experimental studies with volunteer subjects are designed to demonstrate the effects of specific independent variables

on a particular process or outcome. In such a study, bargaining is no longer investigated as a process, but as a series of relations between outcome and variable characteristics. Consequently, these models concentrate more on predictive capability with respect to situational characteristics than on formulation of a complete process model.¹⁴ This research is often criticized for this very lack of an overall framework through which variables can be related in a coherent manner. Secondly, its applicability to the real world, especially the context of international negotiation, is questioned. Research done with students may say very little about the way statesmen interpret, or respond to, a similar situation. Even if the subjects are not students, it is unlikely that they will naturally function in accord with the non-face-to-face context and the representative nature of international negotiations,¹⁵ with its accountability to bureaucracy and constituency.

Despite these weaknesses, most theorists recognize a qualified role for experimental behavioral research as a way of testing the validity of specific components within a general model. Therefore, I will occasionally utilize such research, especially when assessing contradictory assumptions of competing theories of conflict resolution theory in chapter 6. However, it must also be noted that, certain conditions must be maintained in order for such research to be applicable to international conflict. The

laboratory setting must be structured so as to isolate variables crucial to the international setting and to incorporate significant conditions which are likely to effect the way these variables will be apt to function in the international context. In other words, structural similarity, but not exact replication, of the significant characteristics is sufficient to gain relevant insights. The experimental model needs only to operate, rather than look, like the international context in the respects relevant to the particular study. This is especially true if one's purpose is merely to exclude certain options or suggest potential ones. Furthermore, the opportunity afforded, in simulation, to keep extraneous factors under control makes it possible to discover or confirm some things which one could not observe in the actual setting. Such research can provide causal information, test theoretical propositions, and predict the effects of change in the international system.¹⁶

A final, but controversial, source of behavioral data is general social psychological research on the processes of negotiation taken from other settings of intergroup or interpersonal conflict, such as industrial, commercial, community, racial, and family. Critics warn that the dilemmas and rigidities inherent in negotiation increase in direct proportion to the size and complexity of the parties involved, making the international system the most resistant to constructive negotiation. Some specific

idiographic objections focus on factors unique to international negotiation. One alleged difference is the lack of a higher level of social organization. This implies that there is no regulatory power or authority, and no common body of law or accepted understanding of how to resolve conflict. Therefore, the ability to defer to third parties to resolve disputes is frequently diminished and the precedence of war as the final arbiter is strengthened. Other features of international negotiation, for which a claim of uniqueness is made, include: the high level of the stakes, the high public profile, the role of ideology in distortion of perceptions, the lack of decision making capability and negotiating flexibility on the part of negotiators, and the presence of a multicultural milieu¹⁷ with fewer common values and less natural trust.

Other critics draw the contrast more narrowly between war, as one context for international negotiation, and industrial or commercial negotiation, the settings which have produced the most research on domestic dispute settlement. The most significant difference between peace negotiation and labor or business negotiation has to do with the on/off nature of the former compared with the continuous nature of the latter. This is presumed to affect many aspects of the negotiation process when it is applied to peace negotiations -- for example, the necessity of pre-negotiation, a greater tendency to remember

previous losses and revoke previous offers, fewer common goals and less knowledge of opponents, less likelihood of subsequent decisions following from previous ones, greater potential for the negotiation process to be viewed as treason, and the constant presence of threat in diplomatic relations. Additional factors are also assumed to distinguish peace from labor/business negotiations -- the frequency of multilateral instead of bipolar negotiations, the multidimensional nature of power, the tendency to concentrate on specific aspects of the relationship instead of encompassing its entire scope, and the nature of weapons used (for example, length of range of the projectile and consequent attention given to defensive measures).¹⁸

Despite these divergent tendencies, most of the writers who note these distinctions also affirm the existence of common attributes in the essential character of the various conflict situations. International relations specialist, Oran Young, suggests that the various types of settings overlap substantially, with a large number of common variables. Dissimilarity exists only at the ends¹⁹ of the spectrum, with the peripheral variables. While admitting the need for great care in adaptation to the largest of intergroup contexts, with its greater complexity and impersonal character, Kelman points to racial, and even industrial, negotiations as comparable fields from which to gain insight for international negotiation. He notes that participants in these contexts also act as

representatives of larger constituencies, yet have the advantage of fewer participants in the negotiation process, greater availability for observation, quicker and more comprehensive identification of relevant elements.²⁰ Other writers list additional similarities, especially with industrial negotiations. Some of these, in fact, challenge the previously listed "unique characteristics" of international negotiation -- such as lack of any command structure or final arbiter, affirmation of possibilities for mutual gain, and increased willingness to accept outside assistance due to a growing awareness of the high cost of conflict. Other similarities with industrial negotiations include the presence of powerful organizations with considerable freedom to act and the need for internal negotiations within parties. Furthermore, many authors cite the presence of numerous factors common to all negotiating situations, such as vital interests, strong emotions, a large number of potential dilemmas, concern for future status, and the deterrent value of mutually threatening consequences. Finally, comparison between industrial and international negotiation increases if one eliminates the violence factor, a significant cause of emotional investment, and therefore entrenchment and inflexibility, in international conflict. Therefore, the more orderly, less complex, environment of peaceful, bilateral negotiations is even more comparable to industrial

negotiation.

Since its inception, the behavioralist approach to international negotiation has grown tremendously in quality and sophistication of research at all three levels of investigation, experimentation, and general theory. Coordination with the traditional foreign policy process is now seen as crucial. Consistent care is taken to fully explore the international context to which one wishes to generalize. Furthermore, there is a greater tendency to start with questions which arise out of international conflict and seek insights from behavioral science, rather than impose a ready made model.²² In light of this assessment, I will assume the validity of much of the social psychological research drawn from numerous negotiation and mediation contexts. In the evaluation of my own case material, I will utilize many of the above insights into both the unique and common nature of international negotiation and conciliation processes.

Now, having noted the dependence of the political pluralist model on behavioral science research, and having examined the methodology of behavioral science, I will explore the various behavioralist schools of thought with regard to the analysis of conflict. Three distinct topics are critical to this overview of alternate theories of conflict and conflict intervention -- the nature of conflict, the handling of conflict, and the place of third party intervention.

The Nature of Conflict

A common understanding among the various perspectives in the study of conflict is that it has to do with change. Sociologist Lewis Coser describes conflict as an essential component of socialization, without which any group would be devoid of process and structure.²³ International relations scholar Anthony de Reuck notes that conflict, with respect to social structure and resource allocation, always involves a process of adaptation to both the nature and costs of change.²⁴ Both analysts observe that conflict is not only the consequence of change, but often its cause as well.

Despite common acceptance of the relationship between conflict and change, one of the basic theoretical divides is over the understanding of conflict as positive or negative. This debate has a long history, as can be seen in an examination of ancient Greek philosophy. While Homer wishes that all conflict would vanish, Hesiod distinguishes between creative conflict and evil strife, and Heraclitus' doctrine of opposites affirms conflict as essential for the pursuit of true harmony.²⁵ Like the ancients, those in contemporary social science, who hold a negative view of conflict, attempt to avoid it or terminate it as soon as possible. They tend to view it as a disruption of the natural state of things. Humanity's basic nature is seen as good and harmonious. Conflict is

seen as akin to natural disasters, an aberration which can be avoided. It is to be overcome or prevented by learning²⁶ enough about the causes. Such perspectives can be found in the cognitive dissonance theories of psychology and social psychology, in the sociological theories of rank disequilibrium, and the conflict polarization theories of international affairs.²⁷ In fact, the sociology of the period between World Wars I and II is dominated by the avoidance of conflict and the promotion of the Durkheimian quest for social cohesion, equilibrium, and collaboration²⁸ in the face of social instability.

On the other hand, postwar sociology reflects a more positive view of conflict as inherent to human nature, as reflected in the writings of Coser and Georg Simmel.²⁹ Coser observes the positive value of conflict as a deterrent to social ossification and claims that a well integrated society will not only tolerate, but welcome it. If expression of tension and frustration is allowed, this will necessitate re-examination of behavior patterns, values and norms, resulting in creative innovation, and needed social restructuring. However, if such expressions are diverted or suppressed, the result will be further accumulation of tension and the eruption of "destructive unrealistic conflict." Coser's distinctions between latent and manifest conflict, as well as his attempts to demarcate positive from negative elements, have been the

subject of much recent study. Sociologist Galtung builds upon this work by distinguishing between conflict and the consequences of conflict, which are conflict attitudes and conflict behavior. Although he views basic conflict as a necessary challenge and motivating force within society, he sees the consequences as potentially negative. Both conflict attitudes and behavior can be either constructive or destructive, though empirical evidence points toward a preponderance of destructiveness. According to Galtung this is due to the frustration-aggression cycle, a conflict triangle where (C) a basic conflict, due to differences in parties' goal states, leads to (A) an attitude of frustration which tends, in turn to produce (B) negative, aggressive behavior, which results in an escalation of (C) the basic conflict, and the spiral of increasingly negative (A) attitude and (B) behavior, etc.³¹ The initial task, then, becomes one of distinguishing between conflict as a necessary and positive element of social interaction and the negative forms of behavior and attitude which may develop.

Advocates of this more balanced understanding of conflict are still divided between those who see the origins of aggression and conflict within the individual and those who see it within social structure. These have been referred to as microcosmic and macrocosmic theories of conflict. The microcosmic approach is usually the starting point for conflict theorists in the fields of

psychology, social psychology, biology, game theory and decision-making theory. The macrocosmic approach is the usual starting point for sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, organization and communication theorists, political scientists, international relations analysts, and systems theorists. This polarity is best seen in the contrast between the disciplines of psychology, where conflict tends to be seen as arising from the inner psychic structure of the individual and then projected onto the external social situation, and sociology, where it tends to be seen as arising from the social structures with consequent effect on the psychic life of individuals. 32

Alongside this distinction between individual and social sources of conflict is polarity in another dimension, the subjective or objective nature of the conflict. If the source of conflict is in the psychic structure of the individual, then it is a very subjective phenomenon. Perceptions become all important. One can, in fact, change the very character of the conflict by changing the perceptions. If, on the other hand, the source of the conflict is in social structures, then conflict is objective and not amenable to alteration through changed perceptions. It is a matter of incompatibility between real ³³ conditions or events. Here, is the heart of the tension between the pluralist and the structuralist.

Many theorists, today, believe that it is impossible

to gain an adequate theory of conflict without fusing both the macro- and micro dimensions, and the objective and subjective character, into a coherent whole. Yet the study of international conflict still reflects this polarization. Galtung, while recognizing the presence of both subjective and objective elements, places emphasis on the latter by defining conflict as incompatibility between goal states held by the actors in a social system. According to Galtung, these goals can be either objectively defined interests or subjectively defined values, though the clash of antagonistic interests is the more severe and intractable form of conflict. Structural conflict of interests is, therefore, of deeper concern than perceptual conflict of values.³⁴ On the other hand, international relations analyst, John Burton, contends strongly for the basic subjective nature of international conflict and the need to alter perceptions of the antagonists. For him, it is the subjective values, rather than the objective interests, which are more fundamental. These values cannot be negotiated away, yet they can be re-perceived. Discovery of complimentary, or even, universal, values can result in mutual gain which substantially alters the conditions under which objective interests are evaluated.³⁵ Finally, social psychologists Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin are the ultimate proponents of the subjective nature of conflict, claiming that neither objective interests nor subjective values are outside the influence of re-perception. They

distinguish between interests and values, on the one hand, and goals or aspirations, on the other. They insist that, before a party's interests, or values, can clash with those of another party they must be translated into aspirations.³⁶ By tying all conflict to goals rather than intractable interests or values, they relegate all conflict to the subjective realm of perception.

The objective-subjective polarization is also reflected in different perceptions of the range of potential outcomes. An objective view of conflict is usually identified with fixed-sum outcomes, since it believes that incompatible interests are at stake and that one party must lose what another gains. A subjective view is identified with variable-sum outcomes, since it believes that interests are not necessarily incompatible and that gains can be mutual. This distinction, derived from economic and game theory constructs, has to do with whether or not the total amount of value in the system is constant. Does it change, or remain the same, during the period between initiation and resolution of the conflict? Here, value refers to assets, worth, or desirability rather than principles, standards or basic beliefs, as the term has been used in the above paragraph. One can speak of the redistribution of either positive value, what each party wishes to gain, or negative value, what each party wishes to avoid. Galtung claims that positive values are scarce and

thus tend to create fixed-sum outcomes, whereas negative values are more abundant, meaning that variable-sum outcomes are highly dependent on the impact of negative sanctions or punishments.³⁷ Burton, on the other hand, claims that positive value is no more scarce than negative value, when dealing with political conflict, since typical political interests, such as security and independence, increase in distributable size as each actor has more of them. He faults the fixed-sum model for being too tied to economic constructs of competition. For Burton, value can be more easily created, implying that the potential exists, in most cases of conflict, for a variable-sum outcome.³⁸

A final factor to consider in understanding conflict is the question of symmetry of power. Those who view conflict as subjective tend to discount inequities of power between parties. If value can continually be created, then the possibilities for mutual gain make the question of power relationships less important. One need not be more powerful in order to gain a desirable outcome. However, those who view conflict as objective see symmetry of power as a critical issue. If value cannot be easily created, and most conflicts are to be viewed as constant-sum, then gains are not mutual and the more powerful party has the edge. Thus, in situations of power discrepancy, which is the more typical state of affairs, the conflict resides in the very structure of the situation and cannot be adjudicated by any manipulation of interests. Any such

attempt at suspension of the conflict in these cases is
viewed, not as peace, but pacification.³⁹

The Handling of Conflict

Theorists representing a variety of disciplines have developed many different approaches to what sociologist Paul Wehr has collectively called the regulation of conflict. By this term he meant to include all intervention processes with the potential to facilitate creative outcomes to conflict, including not only resolution and management, but also prevention, and even limited initiation of conflict.⁴⁰ The earliest formal models of negotiation, as developed in economic game theory, focused attention around the zero-sum game in the belief that there could be no determinant solution for variable-sum games.⁴¹ Later many game models were developed to assist in the analysis of these variable-sum, also called mixed-motive or bargaining, games. These were games in which the interests and outcomes of the parties were both in conflict and congruent, so that it was possible, not only for one to win and the other to lose, but for both or neither to win.⁴² Thomas Schelling, who first applied game theory to international conflict, distinguished between three types of games. The pure-collaborative game was one where either both or neither could win; the zero-sum game was win/lose; and the mixed-motive game was a combination of both conflict and mutual dependence.⁴³

In more recent years many theorists have developed categories with which to describe the opposing theories and models of negotiation/mediation. These include competitive and coordinative (social psychologist Pruitt), competitive and cooperative (social psychologist Morton Deutsch), distributive and integrative (industrial negotiators Richard Walton and Robert McKersie), adversarial and problem solving (lawyer Carrie Menkel-Meadow), traditional realist and problem solving (social psychologist Herbert Kelman),⁴⁴ and many others. Generally the theories sift naturally into two camps. The competitive-distributive-adversarial-realist approaches tend to be based on macrocosmic theories that stress the importance of power and the need to claim, rather than create, value. They speak in terms of conflict management or settlement, emphasizing the reality of conflicting objective interests and the necessity of fixed-sum outcomes. The coordinative-cooperative-integrative-problem solving approaches tend to be based on microcosmic theories that minimize the importance of power and maximize the potential for creating value. They speak in terms of conflict resolution, emphasizing the role of subjective values and aspirations and the reality of variable-sum outcomes. The competitive approach stresses quantitative goals, the reality of limited resources, the need to win, and adversarial tactics. The problem solving approach emphasizes qualitative goals,

interdependence, the possibility for mutual gain, and the
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advantage of mutual strategy. Here, again, is the tension
between structuralist and pluralist.

Of course the above categorization is somewhat oversimplified. Many theorists believe that the actual practice must be a combination of the two approaches. For example, business negotiators David Lax and James Sebenius emphasize that both creating and claiming value are important. According to them, no matter how much creative problem solving enlarges the pie, it must still be divided. Even value which has been created must be claimed. Therefore, a dilemma always exists for any negotiator, as the tactics used for one approach tend to impede the realization of the other goal. In addition, they assert that the optimum gain for any party is usually one which comes at the expense of the other party. Mutual gains tend to produce "good", rather than "excellent" outcomes. Yet, to complicate the picture further, each negotiation has multiple, as opposed to single, opportunities to create or claim value, and the line between creating and
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claiming is not always "text book" clear. Furthermore, other negotiation theorists point to additional factors effecting value tradeoffs. For example, economist Howard Raiffa mentions the differences in judgement, both within and between parties, regarding the value of any specific gain and the commensurability of the units in a given
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tradeoff.

However, the basic distinction between competitive and problem solving approaches is useful for the purpose of evaluating basic differences in the handling of conflict. The competitive approach is the traditional one which has been employed in international diplomacy. Therefore, there is much that has been written from that perspective. However, I will briefly examine a non-traditional, more extreme, and contemporary, proponent of unabated competition. Such a position will provide the best point of comparison with the conflict resolution approach which is the central focus of this study. The contrast in approach can very clearly be seen when comparing the works of a structuralist like Galtung, who represents a competitive approach, with pluralists like Burton or international lawyer, Roger Fisher, of the Harvard Negotiation Project, both of whom represent a problem solving posture.

Galtung's theory of structural violence, as previously noted, is based on the assumption that objective conflicts of interest lie at the heart of most conflict situations. This leads him to the conclusion that conflict resolution is appropriate in some kinds of conflict, but not others. The crucial determinant is the question of power symmetry. In symmetrical (or what Galtung refers to as horizontal) conflict, resolution is possible, even desirable. But in asymmetrical, or vertical, conflict, resolution strategies are detrimental. Instead, one must

think in terms of restructuring the system, whereby interests are altered even at the expense of one or more of the parties. This peacebuilding, as opposed to peacemaking, is Galtung's preferred strategy in most situations. Indeed he is suspicious of strategies which attempt to freeze a vertical conflict by trying to make the parties busy with one another in cooperative, positive-sum activities. He is convinced that they simply avoid direct confrontation and real solutions, rather than gain time for any useful purpose.⁴⁸

Peacebuilding, however, is not synonymous with conflict management. Conflict management may involve changing the system, but not in radical ways which would still be acceptable in terms of peacebuilding. Both conflict management and resolution strategies may produce minimal change through expansion of the conflict system to include new conflicts, or perhaps new actors. The difference between these two is that resolution always attempts to eliminate incompatibility, whereas management strategies may attempt either to eliminate or preserve it. The difference between each of these and peacebuilding, or restructuring, is that the latter always attempts to change the system, in some cases by more than simple expansion. Changing relationships among the actors, and even elimination of actors, are both possible strategies. On the other hand, both conflict resolution and management are most unlikely to come up with anything which does not

preserve the actor system, a subset of the conflict system, because both are actor oriented.

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My choice of problem solving over restructuring is based on a number of convictions. First, I wish to examine the potential for facilitating change through the alteration of perception within a given conflict system, a study which would be severely limited with the adoption of a restructuring approach. Second, I suspect a strong utopian element in restructuring. My conviction regarding the sinfulness of human nature leaves me skeptical of utopian theories of radical change which come through the manipulation of social structure. I do not exclude this approach entirely, but my concern to avoid needless disruption in the lives of people and nations prompts me to look primarily at an approach which operates within, rather than over against, the actor and conflict systems. A certain amount of turmoil is usually necessary in order to realize meaningful change. However, both pragmatism and compassion keep me from placing the emphasis upon an approach built primarily upon social upheaval. The question of means is as important as the question of ends. Third, while there has been much recent exploration of the theology of social restructuring, through the advent of liberation theology, there has been little contemporary theoretical basis laid for the development of a theology of conflict resolution or conciliation on the interna-

tional level. For these reasons I turn now to an examination of various approaches to problem solving, although I shall still use Galtung and others to raise critical questions.

In contrast to restructuring, Burton claims that the system has more potential for change. Structural violence inhibits the development of the powerful as well as the powerless. Therefore, impetus for change is built into the system if the powerful are able to accurately perceive their needs. Thus there is an inevitability of structural change that tends toward social order and consensual behavior which can potentially counteract any tendency toward dominance. It is misleading to refer to objective conflicts of interest, implying static situations, altered only by conflict and violence. If one can insert a different hierarchy of values, common and universal needs, then objective conflicts of interest cease to have any reality.⁵⁰ Burton admits that conflicts initially appear to be objective. In fact, he claims that, at any given point in time, a conflict must be seen as objective. Yet he hastens to add that no goal is unalterable. Therefore, the objectivity of conflict is merely time relative, since all interest elements are related to a given point in time. He writes:

... objectives involve preferences, and preferences can change. Consequently relationships within a situation of conflict can change, and there are therefore, possible forms of resolution from which both parties can gain. There are also subjective

influences involved in the different perceptions parties have of each other and of the world environment, and in the consideration they give to the costs of conflict involved in delaying settlements. Conflict can be transformed from violence and coercion into a problem-solving exercise with a positively beneficial result once there are opportunities to test perceptions and to assess costs of conflict in relation to values being pursued.⁵¹

The process Burton recommends is a problem solving workshop or seminar series. He has very specific criteria, requiring the presence of a third party mediator in the form of a panel. Such a group must be academic professionals in behavior analysis, but not be experts in the particular conflict at hand. They must not present solutions, but initiate and supervise a process whereby the participants share their perceptions, analyze the situation, evaluate and define the conflict, and explore options which meet the needs of all parties. The process is⁵² highly regulated, with some fifty six rules of procedure.

The approach to conflict resolution, of international lawyer Roger Fisher, is less analytic and more pragmatic than that of Burton. His methodology, called principled negotiation, has a highly prescriptive orientation, yet is clearly based within the problem solving tradition of conflict resolution. A detailed description of principled negotiation will be presented in chapter 2. In the remainder of the study, I intend to assess the usefulness of this theory in developing a theology of conciliation which, in turn, could lay the basis for a constructive intervention role for the church in the context of

international conflict. I will continue to draw upon other theorists, both within and outside the problem solving school, for needed analytical assessment of conflict resolution, especially in chapters 6 and 7. However, I have chosen Fisher's model over Burton's because of both its pragmatic focus and the less restrictive nature of its practical suggestions. Fisher allows a greater variety of parties into the intervener role and gives more flexibility to the role definition. Furthermore, he suggests guidelines as opposed to a very specific type of problem solving context. Such a perspective will be more helpful in developing a role model, and accompanying theological rationale, for the church. In addition, Fisher's book, Getting To Yes, co-authored with William Ury, is now considered to be one of the most significant books on the subject of negotiation.⁵³ It has become the most referenced book in the field, indicating its influence on both practitioners and scholars. Some consider that no other book has had more influence on contemporary concepts of conflict resolution.⁵⁴ Before turning to Fisher, however, I will examine the role of the third party intervener in conflict resolution, since third party intervention, rather than negotiation by the principal parties, is the role which will be the focus of this study.

The Place of Third Party Intervention

Factors Affecting Intervention

Various external and internal conditions of the conflict influence both feasibility, and type, of intervention in any given situation, as will be illustrated in the case material of chapters 3 and 4. These variables include the nature of the protagonist parties, the nature of the participants representing these parties, the nature of the issues, the nature of the interaction, and the nature of the third party.

Nature of the Protagonist Parties

The principle parties to a conflict may vary according to the number involved, their power symmetry, their experience with conflict resolution, the degree of intra-party unity, and the nature of hierarchical organization within each.⁵⁵ The likelihood of third party intervention increases among parties with experience in conflict resolution due to increased willingness to accept intervener legitimacy and expertise.⁵⁶ Similarly, prospects are enhanced among clearly bounded, well-organized parties with a centralized decision making apparatus.⁵⁷ The type of intervention is clearly affected by all the above factors.

Nature of the Participants

Apart from conflicts between very small parties, participants in most negotiation or mediation processes

function as representatives of their parties. Therefore both the outcome and process of selection is a significant factor in the nature and success of any intervention. Again the number of participants and degree of experience with the process, are important variables. In addition a number of new factors enter the picture:

- status of the participants within their own party (elite decision makers, persons with informal access to decision makers, or rank and file members with little access),

- degree of experience with the conflict (those with direct experience or those removed from the impact),

- range of views represented (official view, hard-line view, or a variety of views) and degree of official sanction,

- degree of previous acquaintance with each other (close, brief, or no contact),

- degree of symmetry in social background (education, professional role, formal position, etc.), and

- process of selection (by principle parties or third party; and, if the latter, whether or not it is done with tacit approval of party leaders).

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Nature of the Issues

The complexity of the issues effects both feasibility and nature of intervention. The more numerous and quantifiable the issues become, the greater is the

intervener's power to generate movement which will create new, and desirable, options. In short, the intervener gains flexibility with increased complexity. However, at the same time the magnitude of the task increases at each level of functioning. For example, while data collection in a single issue conflict may involve one simple intake interview, it may require much more detail in a multiple issue conflict with complex psychodynamics. Secondly, the intervener's expertise with respect to the issues influences the degree of one's credibility and influence, as well as the design of an intervention process. The less knowledgeable the intervener is, the more the role will become nondirective.

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Nature of the Interaction

The history of the relationship between adversaries is a crucial factor in determining intervention feasibility and strategy. It is especially important to note the stage of the conflict and the character of any negotiation/mediation process.

Theorists have charted the course of conflict in various ways. However, four basic stages seem best to characterize the progression of conflict in terms which assist in determining the optimum timing and nature of intervention. Though sometimes spasmodic and irregular, rather than linear and logical, the basic stages are incipient, escalating, stalemated, and de-escalating. The

first is also referred to as the pre-stage, the middle two -- during-stage, and the last -- post-stage. It is often asserted that the best time for effective mediation is after the conflict has stalemated. Frequently, at this point, there is mutual exhaustion, uncertainty, recognition of limitations, dissatisfaction with previous efforts, and desire for an honorable exit. However, some argue that effective intervention is more likely at the pre-stage, before parties commit themselves too much to the conflict.⁶⁰ Furthermore, those who focus more on the subjective aspects of conflict claim that determination of propitious timing depends greatly on the nature of the intervention. A problem solving approach can be a channel for altering the relationship and de-escalating the conflict. Consequently, intervention need not wait until the relationship reaches the stage where substantive issues can successfully be approached.⁶¹

The nature of the interaction is also influenced by the character of the negotiation/mediation process -- the degree, context, and quality, of contact between parties. The degree of contact varies between those isolated from one another, with the intervener shuttling back and forth, and those in face-to-face relationship, with everyone present. The context varies with interaction size -- interpersonal or intergroup. The quality varies with the changes in psychological climate, determined by need for differentiation or integration. Parties still building, or

struggling to maintain, their identity, and those who perceive the costs of accommodation to be to their disadvantage, will be concerned about the potentially negative pacification role of the intervener. On the other hand, some parties with the ability to maintain an integrated, though conflicting, relationship may be capable of resolving their own dispute without assistance. While the degree of focus on differentiation/integration does not, alone, determine the likelihood of successful intervention, it has been shown to play a significant role, especially in international disputes.⁶² The presence of cooperative ties, such as similarity in perception, attitude, motivation, or trust has consistently led to a greater likelihood of intermediary involvement. Furthermore, ability to adopt an integrative focus, along with extent of contact and interaction size, also affects the degree of intervener flexibility and formality with respect to matters such as meeting places,⁶³ agendas, and time constraints.

Nature of the Third Party

Who the third party is becomes a dominant factor in the nature of the role one can play. Formal mediation, with all parties present, is only possible if the protagonist parties agree to invite the third party. Such an invitation is dependent on the former's view of the legitimacy or credibility of the latter. The question of credibility in the protagonists' eyes remains central to

the intervener role even though the type of third party acceptable to the principals may vary according to the latter's status. (For example, meeting with unofficial representatives, who have little or no access to their party's decision making apparatus, becomes an option for a wider number of potential intermediaries.) Even uninvited interveners must depend on some form of legitimacy, though they are restricted to a much less formal context, such as information gathering, an unofficial form of shuttle, or a completely unplanned and spontaneous response to circumstances (being in the right place at the right time).⁶⁴

Legitimacy in all of the above circumstances -- formal/informal, invited/uninvited -- is tied to the identity of the third party. There are three bases of identity which are important to examine in this light, those which are -- inherent by virtue of natural resources, ascribed to the intervener by others, and acquired by the intervener's own effort.

Bases of Identity

Identity based on inherent capabilities refers primarily to control of physical resources with which one can reward or coerce the protagonists. For example, potential third parties may be selected on the basis of their possession of communication and information processing equipment. Likewise, they may be effective due to their control over financial or material resources critical

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to the future development of the protagonist parties.

Identity based on ascribed capabilities refers to the kind of prestige and reputation which is bestowed primarily by the protagonists, and secondarily by outside observers. Occasionally, such status is accorded to a renowned individual, but more frequently is given on the basis of institutional affiliation and one's office, rank, or other credentials within the organization. The intermediary as representative, rather than individual actor, carries all the benefits and detriments of the affiliation into the mediation setting. The relative prominence, permanence, and experience of the institution, and/or individual, is bound to influence both acceptability and function as inter-
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vener.

Identity based on acquired capabilities refers primarily to personal expertise on the part of the individual intervener. In this case legitimacy is earned through knowledge and behavior. Knowledgeability about the specific situation, and the various party positions, is seen by many as crucial to effective third party functioning. However, some problem solving proponents claim that knowledge of the dynamics of conflict is far
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more important. Conflict resolution skills and attitudes (such as articulation, persuasiveness, imagination, unobtrusiveness, friendliness, impartiality, and sense of timing) are even more important. Certainly, many protagonists

will value each kind of knowledge, skill, or attitude to varying degrees and will, therefore, expect the intervener to perform different functions. Of all these ascribed qualities impartiality is the most basic. Some theorists refer to it as a definitional characteristic of the intervener role. Along with the related concepts of neutrality, non-advocacy and independence, it is central to the development of any classification of intervention roles.⁶⁸ Consequently, I will now examine impartiality in greater detail than other variables which affect intervention role. Furthermore, I will examine this issue in the context of each of my case studies (chapters 3 and 4) and again in the conclusion of the study.

Impartiality

Traditionally, the problem solving school of conflict resolution has assumed that any third party to a dispute will play an impartial and neutral role. Burton asserts this position by stating that the third party must exhibit the capacity to identify with all the parties on a nonjudgmental basis, regardless of their apparent morality or values.⁶⁹ The intellectual rationale dates back to Max Weber's concept of "value-neutral" sociology, where he proposes that analysis replace value judgement in the process of social inquiry.⁷⁰ Consequently, professional negotiation and mediation have frequently claimed that it is essential for the conflict intervener to have minimal (if any) power over the parties, credibility with the parties, a focus on

process rather than outcome, and a rational approach which can facilitate the mutual recognition of relevant information. Indeed, if the primary task of conflict intervention is to facilitate communication between equally valid interests, then impartiality is critical.⁷¹

On the other hand, Galtung points out some of the problems with this conception of the role, even in the context of horizontal, or power symmetrical, conflict. First, he points out that third parties are usually called in by the dominant party when it fears violence in response to its dominance, thus biasing the procedure right from the start. Second, in direct contradiction of Burton's hypothesis, he claims that the presence of even a supposedly neutral third party may take away the main parties' power. In horizontal conflict this would create a new structure of dominance, with the third party on top. In vertical conflict this would maintain the underlying dominance inherent in the structure. Third, he fears that the resulting "solution" is often not self-supporting, claiming that only restructuring, something which could only be facilitated by a biased intervener, can lead to permanent solutions to conflict.⁷² While important as a modifying influence, these objections do not take into account potential influence, on successful intervention, of many of the above variables, such as complexity of the issues, stage of the conflict, and especially identity of the intervener. For example, an intermediary with sufficient institutional

status may be able to overcome the bias arising from an invitation by the dominant power, even using this "special" relationship to influence its "friend." Likewise, the skilled intermediary should be able to intervene without taking power away from the principal parties. In fact, proper expertise in conflict dynamics, on the part of the intervener, will lead to empowerment, not disfranchisement. Finally, it can be argued that an intermediary with low coercive potential and minimal stake in the outcome, but with adequate skill and status, offers the best chance of lasting agreement since the resulting solution has not been forced on anyone.⁷³ Clearly, then, Galtung's arguments do not apply to all situations.

However, all questions over impartiality and neutrality cannot be dismissed that easily. The possibility exists that in certain situations (such as power asymmetry, with its needed phase of differentiation) some form of advocacy may be important. Some theorists, such as sociologist James Laue, would limit neutrality to the strictest technical sense. He does state that, if one party feels that a mediator is acting unfairly, it could require the mediator to withdraw from the process.⁷⁴ Yet he claims that the concept of neutrality is of second importance to the concept of power. Conflict interveners cannot avoid using power; nor can they blind themselves to its use by others. Consequently they cannot be neutral in terms of

their effect on the parties and the process of social interaction. According to Laue:

Conflict intervention is the process in which an outside or third party deliberately and systematically enters into a conflict with the aim of influencing its outcome or course, in a direction the intervener defines as desirable. Every act of intervention alters the power configuration in the social system in which it occurs, and therefore every intervener is an advocate -- for party, outcome, or process.⁷⁵

According to Laue, any intervener must necessarily act as some kind of advocate, as indicated in the above quote. This advocacy may not be obvious, as in process advocacy. However, in the case of any intervention in what he calls extreme asymmetrical conflict, the desired outcome is dependent on the empowerment of the weak party. Therefore, the intervener cannot even appear to be neutral, as one is responsible for facilitating the empowerment necessary to realize mutual gain.⁷⁶ Therefore, like Galtung, Laue's approach to conflict intervention is dependent on the degree of power symmetry within the relationship.

Role of the Intervener

Classification of intervention roles varies from author to author. Some refer to all forms of intervention as mediation, breaking down different categories into subgroupings of mediator roles, such as communicator, formulator, and manipulator.⁷⁷ Most classifications limit mediation to the middle category, choosing to identify both the nondirective and the authoritarian approaches by other designations. Laue suggests this type of three part clas-

sification of intervention roles, including one which observes and reports (eg. fact-finder, observer, inquirer, investigator, researcher), a second which serves as a go-between (eg. conciliator, mediator, facilitator, problem solver, consultant), and a third which exercises power over the disputants (eg. arbitrator, adjudicator, enforcer).⁷⁸

The problem solving approach to conflict resolution generally falls within the middle category, as stated above. It may include a range of strategies as diverse as: simply being present, inviting parties into a mediation process, collecting and analyzing data, encouraging parties to explain their positions, inducing a problem solving orientation, improving communication, educating the negotiating parties, taking charge of setting and schedule, equalizing power relationships, devising new options for agreement, encouraging concessions, and supervising the implementation of an agreement. Some, like Pruitt, use the term mediation to refer to the entire range of go-between roles, distinguishing between content and process mediation, with only the latter representing a problem solving approach.⁷⁹ Others restrict mediation terminology to the end of the spectrum involving more advocacy, utilizing other terms to refer to problem solving strategies.

Burton defines mediation as the attempt on the part of a third party to suggest a reasonable outcome. His designation for process oriented problem solving is facilitation.⁸⁰

others who make similar distinctions between resolving issues and altering relationships use the terms mediation and consultation, respectively, with the latter consisting of a workshop process led by experts in conflict dynamics.⁸¹ The most common term, used in contrast with content mediation, is conciliation. Whereas content mediation aims at resolving issues through fair settlement, conciliation aims at reconciling parties through increased trust and cooperation.⁸² In addition, conciliation is frequently designated as the psychological component of mediation, as defined in the larger sense. At times, it has been used to demarcate the less formal forums or methods for third party conflict resolution. Finally, it is frequently used to refer to the relational aspects of pre-negotiation and pre-mediation activity, those dealing with communication, emotion, misperception,⁸³ legitimacy, and trust.

Various intervention activities are frequently linked sequentially. A typical flow of intervention stages would include moving from fact-finding (preparatory investigation) to conciliation (attempt to dispose parties to a face-to-face negotiation process) to mediation (facilitation of negotiation process) to implementation (supervision and monitoring of agreement).⁸⁴ In this context the fact-finding stage may include research of secondary sources, direct observation, personal interviews and interpretation of the data. The conciliation stage may include contacting and inviting participation of the parties, further interviewing,

building rapport between other parties by long-range informing and interpreting, establishing mediator credibility by educating and building commitment to the process, and synchronizing levels of readiness for dialogue through exploitation of power over timing. The mediation stage may include defining issues, setting or altering agendas and rules of procedure, providing resources, interjecting outside opinion, providing incentive for abandonment of previous positions, examining interests, generating and assessing options, and suggesting ideas or proposals. The implementation stage may include identifying steps to operationalize an agreement, helping maintain contact and communication, evaluating performance, and creating an enforcement and commitment mechanism. Certainly, there is some vacillation between these stages. However, it is far easier to move backward than forward. The difficulty of moving forward from one stage to the next is demonstrated by the fact that most interveners never get to the end and many do not get past the first stage.⁸⁵

Both the kind of intervention attempted, and the ability to move from one stage to the next, may be affected by the variables listed in the previous section. The following illustrations demonstrate the influence, on type and stage of intervention, by protagonist parties, participants, third parties, issues, and interaction processes. First, since process mediation need not wait for a

stalemate, one might expect it to be the preferred type during incipient and escalatory phases of conflict. At the same time, conditions of extreme power asymmetry between the parties may inhibit the persuasion potential of process mediation, leading an intervener to adopt a content mediation approach. Second, while it is obvious that parties which remain isolated will never permit anything beyond the conciliation stage of intervention, such a role is equally unavailable to the uninvited intervener, even when the protagonists do begin formal negotiations. Third, the identity of the third party affects its ability to get invited as well as its ability to put pressure on protagonists. For example, non-governmental organizations have virtually no inherent resources with which to reward or coerce parties. Therefore, they are less likely to be effective in obtaining and enforcing settlement during the later stages of formal mediation and implementation, unless their reputation for impartiality and/or humanitarianism outweighs the lack of physical capability. Nevertheless, when they do function as mediators, their low stake in the outcome and low coercive potential increase the probability that any resulting settlement, however unlikely, will last due to genuine accommodation.⁸⁶

In this study I will focus on conciliation and content mediation. Conciliation will be my preferred terminology for referring to the kind of informal, pre-negotiation, process-oriented problem solving which is the primary

subject of this study. Use of this terminology is consistent with the definitions given above. Furthermore, it is utilized by the interveners in my second case (chapter 4) and is closely related to the theological concept of reconciliation. However, Fisher uses the term "mediation," including both content and process varieties, to describe his preferred method of third party intervention.⁸⁷ Fisher's scheme has the advantage of including both the communication/fact-finding functions and some advocacy functions traditionally used in more competitive models. Therefore, I will, at times, utilize this terminology, especially when I wish to emphasize settlement of issues more than reconciliation of parties.

Summary and Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been threefold. First, I have endeavored to set the theoretical context in which this study, on the role of the church as an intermediary in international conflict, will take place. Giving an overview of theories of conflict and conflict intervention has served a number of purposes: 1) to indicate the breadth of perspective on this topic; 2) to outline many of the specific issues which I will address in subsequent chapters; and 3) to form a basis for my selection of both problem solving and principled negotiation as the most appropriate school and model to assess. Second, a rather detailed examination of

methodology, as utilized within behavioral science, has produced much material which I will use in my own methodology and in the evaluation of my case material. As in behavioral science research, my investigation will include data from historical records and interviews. In my analysis, I will test out my own material against selected factors from behavioral research regarding a variety of issues, such as the supposed uniqueness of international conflict or the nature of the intervention process. Third, I have defended the validity of a generic theory of conflict. This affects both my methodology and conclusions. I have demonstrated the validity of utilizing research from a variety of conflict settings. I have also built a case for applying the results of my research beyond the limited confines of my particular cases, though certainly the greatest applicability will be within similar contexts.

Due to the primary significance of behavioral science in setting the theoretical context for this study, it is important to summarize the fundamental issues which it has raised regarding conflict and conflict intervention. One basic theoretical divide in the behavioralist study of conflict is between those who view it negatively, attempting to avoid or terminate it quickly, and those who view it positively, recognizing its potential value for creative innovation. Recently, most scholars have affirmed the positive nature of conflict, while recognizing the

existence of both positive and negative conflict attitudes and behavior.

A second major divide exists between those who perceive the origins of conflict in individuals, referred to as microcosmic theory, and those who perceive it in social structure, referred to as macrocosmic theory. In negotiation strategy the proponents of microcosmic theory minimize the importance of power symmetry and maximize the potential for creating value, or enlarging the pie. They speak in terms of conflict resolution, emphasizing the role of subjective values and aspirations, and the reality of variable-sum outcomes. They emphasize qualitative goals, interdependence, the possibility for mutual gain, and the advantage of mutual strategy. On the other hand, the proponents of macrocosmic theory stress the importance of power symmetry and the need to claim, rather than create, value. They speak in terms of conflict management or settlement, emphasizing the reality of conflicting objective interests and the necessity of fixed-sum outcomes. They place emphasis on quantitative goals, the reality of limited resources, the need to win, and adversarial tactics. In the handling of conflict the approach of the microcosmic theorists has been the development of various problem solving strategies, in significant contrast to the competitive negotiating strategies of macrocosmic theorists.

Each school of thought has left its impression on intervention roles as well, with the problem solving

perspective placing more emphasis on collaborative roles. However, perspectives on intervention roles also tend to vary according to a number of other variables, including the nature of the protagonist parties, participants, issues, interaction, and third party. Parties vary according to number, experience, symmetry, and hierarchical organization. Participants vary according to number, experience, status, symmetry, previous acquaintance, and range of viewpoints. The issues vary according to number, complexity, and knowledge of by the third party. The nature of the interaction is determined by the stage of conflict (incipient, escalatory, stalemated, or de-escalatory) and the character of the negotiation/mediation process (degree, context, and quality of contact). Third parties vary according to the basis of their identity (inherent -- ie. physical resources; ascribed -- ie. reputation or office; and acquired -- ie. expertise) and whether or not they are invited into the process.

The most basic factor to influence perceptions of intervener role is impartiality or neutrality, an acquired basis of third party identity. The degree of advocacy or neutrality, attributed to the intermediary by self or others, tends to create definitional parameters. Problem solving strategy leans heavily toward neutrality, though different theorists support various types of advocacy. Burton accepts only process advocacy. Fisher accepts both process

and outcome advocacy. Laue accepts process, outcome, and limited forms of party advocacy. Galtung, representing a competitive model, recognizes the validity of all forms of advocacy, including those which would radically restructure the conflict system.

Classification of intervention roles tends to vary considerably. In general, there are three commonly accepted types: an observer role, a go-between role, and a manipulator role. Most problem solving strategy, the focus of this study, fits in the middle category, which can be subdivided into conciliation and content mediation. My emphasis will be on informal, process-oriented, conciliation, since that is the setting most conducive to intervention by the church. To begin my examination of this role, I will now give a detailed presentation of Roger Fisher's principled negotiation. It is my hypothesis that principled negotiation, with slight adaptation, provides a challenging, new model for utilization by the church in its potential role as an intermediary in international conflict.

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CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION

Roger Fisher, of the Harvard Negotiation Project, has contributed significantly to the problem solving approach to conflict resolution, especially through his development of guidelines for the practice of negotiation and mediation. His work has influenced numerous types of conflict situations, including those occurring in the international context. He, himself, has contributed directly to the resolution¹ of various international disputes.

Fisher is well aware of the constructive role that conflict can play. The main problem for him is not conflict, but how to handle it.² Although Fisher recognizes the reality of conflicting interests, his emphasis, without doubt, is on the subjective nature of conflict. He asserts that, "Ultimately, conflict lies, not in objective reality, but in people's heads." His writing also stresses the variable-sum nature of outcomes, the importance of searching for mutual gain, and the relative unimportance of power symmetry.³ Therefore, he clearly falls into the problem solving camp of conflict resolution.

Fisher refers to his approach as "principled negotiation,"⁴ or when referring to mediation, "principled problem

solving."⁵ The very purpose of principled negotiation, or problem solving, is to determine issues on their merits rather than by means of a distributive, positional bargaining process. According to Fisher, a good negotiation/mediation process does not involve pressuring the adversary (hard bargaining), through either prolonged negotiation or the use of extreme tactics, to come to the position one wants. Neither does it involve making concessions quickly (soft bargaining) so as to avoid conflict. Instead, Fisher⁶ advocates being "hard on merits, but soft on people." The strategy is to alter the adversary's perception of his or her choices, so that the decision will reflect one's preference. To do this one must take into account one's own long range values, as well as the other party's view of the present conflict, and its political problems, desires, and⁷ fears.

Hard bargaining is inefficient because its extreme opening position, and small concession mode of operation, create incentives to stall settlement. It endangers the ongoing relationship because anger and resentment often result from the test of wills. This produces considerable strain, sometimes to the point of dissolving the relationship. Soft bargaining is more likely to produce an agreement since the objective of reaching one has replaced the goal of victory or winning. However, the agreement may be equally unwise. Soft bargaining, unlike hard, is efficient.

time and resources are not lost when one party is willing to give. However, it makes one vulnerable to the hard bargainer,⁸ since the latter strategy is dominant over the former. On the other hand, according to Fisher, principled problem solving tends to be dominant over hard bargaining when the hard bargainer realizes that pressure does not lead to the desired result and that his opposite party is flexible and willing to respond to good arguments made on the merits of the case.⁹

In contrasting principled problem solving and positional bargaining, either hard or soft, Fisher has developed some prescriptive guidelines. Due to the development of his thought, these guidelines have undergone some change over time. Yet there is definite consistency in the various formulations. He first refers to them in 1978 as three negotiating problems -- human problems, inventing problems,¹⁰ and procedural problems. In his most influential treatment of negotiation in Getting to YES in 1981, he specifies four points which define his method -- focus on people (separating the people from the problem), focus on interests (looking at interests, not positions), focus on options (generating a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do), and focus on criteria (insisting that results be based on some objective standard).¹¹ Since then he has continued to revise his formulation of these categories and has added a fifth one related to power. I shall use one of the more recent renderings, presented in 1983, in order to reflect a

current understanding of his perspective. He now lists five guidelines which form a theoretical framework and methodological base for principled negotiation.¹²

1) Issues: Substantive (objective problems which could become terms for a possible agreement) vs. Relational (subjective problems such as perception, emotion, and communication ability)

2) Rightful Claims: Positions (demands to be insisted upon) vs. Interests (underlying concerns, needs, wants, hopes, and fears which the positions are intended to serve)

3) Options: Deciding (committing oneself to accept or reject a given option) vs. Inventing (generating a range of possibilities which may be worthy of consideration)

4) Criteria for Accepting Agreement: Subjective (what each party is willing, or unwilling, to do) vs. Objective (what each party ought to do, based on some external measure of legitimacy)

5) Power: Imposing (the physical capability to arrange and enforce a result according to one's will) vs. Influencing (the capability, through negotiation, to sway the decisions of others in one's favor)

Before examining each of these points more thoroughly, notice should be taken of Fisher's conscious attempt to bring theory to bear on practice. In the analysis of each of the above factors, and at every stage in the negotiation process, he emphasizes both the theoretical and practical,

and the descriptive and prescriptive. He is convinced of the need to go beyond the activities of the pure scientist who confines himself to description, either theoretical or practical, the pure theoretician who confines himself to theory, descriptive or prescriptive, or the pure practitioner who confines himself to the practical, descriptive or prescriptive. Therefore, he has devised a circle chart to conceptualize the movement from descriptive practice (the problem as seen in facts and symptoms), to descriptive theory (diagnosis or analysis of cause and effect), to prescriptive theory (approaches or strategies to correct the problem), to prescriptive practice (proposed action ideas or suggestions about what might be done), and back to descriptive practice.¹³

The stages of the negotiation process reflect this movement from identification of the problem, to analysis, to planning approaches, to discussion of specific action/agreement. Each of the five categories comprising the negotiation context must be dealt with at each stage. One will need to identify, and then analyze, the "people problems," the interests, the presently perceived options and criteria, and the power realities. Then one will need to plan new approaches and discuss possible agreements, both for handling the "people problems," the interests and the power realities, and for generating new options, power configurations, and criteria for deciding among them.¹⁴

Finally, prior to describing the tenets of principled

negotiation, as listed above, it is important to note Fisher's approach to third party intervention since this intermediary role is the focus of examination in this study. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Fisher uses the term "mediation" to include both content mediation and conciliation. He definitely portrays the mediator as a process advocate who can use his power in an attempt to change the rules of the game. Occasionally he limits the third party role to that of process facilitation, with limited opportunity to express substantive views.¹⁵ However, he usually goes beyond this, parting company with many proponents of problem solving conflict resolution. He does clearly reject advocacy of any party, but often asserts the importance of outcome advocacy. According to Fisher, one should not fear imposing a settlement, but should advance proposals which can then be the subject of discussion in an atmosphere which is least likely to be reactionary.¹⁶ In treating the tenets of principled negotiation, I will elaborate on Fisher's own application of each category to this third party mediation/conciliation context.

Issues: Substantive or Relational

Fisher claims that positional bargaining is inadequate because it focuses on substance rather than process. Instead, he emphasizes the validity of both substantive and relational issues in any negotiation process. While the former deals with the terms of agreement, the specifications

likely to be incorporated in the accord, the latter deals with the human dimensions of perception, emotion, and communication. His major concern is to avoid entanglement of one with the other.¹⁷ When egos become involved with substantive positions there is lessened opportunity for cooperative problem solving. The parties are then more apt to be prepared for a contest of wills than for joint invention of wise solutions to common problems.¹⁸ Fisher warns against trading substance for relationship or vice versa. Appeasement does not work since rewarding poor conduct is only likely to produce more of the same, as B.F. Skinner has aptly demonstrated. On the other hand, use of either threat or extortion may produce the desired concession, but will damage the relationship and the possibility of long-term substantive agreement.¹⁹ Rejection creates both physical and psychological obstacles to problem solving. In the worst case, communication is totally prevented by the refusal of one or more parties to even meet. However, even when this extreme action is not taken, communication can be hindered when one party's desire to fully cooperate has been undermined by rejection.²⁰

In place of the competitive cycle of mutual rejection which is so common to positional bargaining, Fisher recommends separating substance from relationships and dealing with each on its own legitimate merits. Only in this way can the substantive issues of alternatives, interests, op-

tions, commitments, and legitimacy be handled effectively. Thus, process becomes more important than specific outcome in principled negotiation. The way in which one deals with differences is more important than any judgement about a given substantive issue. The paramount task becomes defining a commonly understood *modus vivendi*, one which will make it easier to handle successive transactions. The purpose for this negotiating of the negotiation process is to enhance the prospects for better substantive outcomes, at minimal cost, even for parties with inconsistent interests. To improve the mutual problem solving aspect of the relationship is the key. Rather than using either substance or relationship as leverage upon the other, Fisher recommends adopting an unconditionally constructive strategy in which one pursues only those things which are good for both the relationship and one's own outcome. This strategy defines winning as "well-being" rather than victory, thus paving the way for an inclusive, mutual gain. Yet, if conducted wisely, it does not require reciprocity, thus reducing the chance of failure.

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It is not surprising, therefore, that Fisher first addresses the people, or the human, problem in negotiation and mediation. He is conscious that people are not the only players in the international arena. Governments and other institutions play a major role. In fact, personalizing the negotiation process too much is a danger he would have one avoid.

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in international transactions, one is not dealing with abstract representatives of the other side, but with specific human beings who have strong emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds and viewpoints. The ability to deal with these differences in an unconditionally constructive manner depends on the degree of such factors as rationality, understanding, communication, honesty and trust, noncoercive means of influence, and acceptance.²³ Fisher generally breaks these down into three major human problems -- emotion, perception, and communication -- and encourages²⁴ that they be made explicit to the parties. I will now briefly examine each of these, indicating Fisher's recommended ways of handling them.

Emotion

Principled negotiation is based on a "reasoned" approach to conflict resolution. This rationality also applies to Fisher's approach to the emotional content. One must handle the emotions in such a way that reason will prevail. Anger may be expressed, but one must control it rather than letting it take control. Emotions are important, but when it comes to the problem solving aspect of the relationship, the degree of rationality is critical.²⁵ When rational arguments are overwhelmed by strong emotions it threatens the very interaction process, the modus vivendi. At this point Fisher recommends measures such as: 1) stepping above the fray until rational discussion is possible

(including frank statement of one's reasons for this action, together with a commitment to return to the negotiation process); 2) analyzing, in retrospect, what engendered the feelings and taking steps to address the causes; and 3) asking whether or not the direction of a given dialogue serves the agreed-upon purpose of the meeting. He even suggests "recruiting constructive emotions" to replace negative ones. By this he means -- imagining different circumstances which condition a different emotional state for oneself, or adopting the emotional state one would like to see in the other party, or taking actions which would enhance in others an emotional state which would improve joint ability to deal with differences.

On the other hand, Fisher also recognizes the problem of assuming that the only effective mode of influence is rational dialogue. He writes that most people, most of the time, are reacting emotionally to things that have already happened rather than pursuing rational goals by rational means. Deep emotions generated by one problem frequently spill over to other situations. Furthermore, emotional involvement changes as negotiations proceed, necessitating continual rediagnosis and intervention. In addition to recognizing and understanding the emotions of the other negotiator(s) one must also acknowledge and appreciate the emotions of constituents back home (government and public) and one's own emotions, even if one is a mediator. The

following are some of Fisher's suggested ways of constructively handling emotion. 1) Make the emotions explicit and acknowledge their legitimacy by writing down both parties' present feelings and desired feelings. 2) Develop a range of emotive expressions and relate the tone of the communication to the substantive issue being discussed. 3) Have a session for letting off steam. This could be done in a public setting, facilitating the catharsis of constituents as well. 4) Give the parties a joint, and non-threatening, task which is likely to provide constructive shared experience. 5) Develop crosscutting cleavages by providing opportunity for informal contact between persons with similar background, but from different parties. 6) Reward constructive efforts with personal credit, something a mediator is especially well situated to do. 7) Stimulate symbolic gestures which one side could perform at little cost to itself, but with constructive emotional impact on the other party -- for eg. shaking hands, attending a cherished function, making a statement of regret, eating together, giving a present, or singing a particular song.

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Perception

Principled negotiation holds that perception is central to conflict resolution. Although Fisher recognizes the reality of conflicting interests, he sees the primary cause of conflict as lying in the party's different ways of thinking. Each party to a conflict is likely to have a different

estimate of what constitutes the most important issues, relevant history, current facts, acceptable grievances, and accurate goals or intentions of all parties concerned. Each side tends to focus on those estimates which confirm one's own prior conceptions and disregard or misinterpret those which call their perceptions into question. This leads to the familiar problem of each party overemphasizing the merits of its own position and the faults of the other side, as well as putting the worst interpretation on what they say or
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do.

Fisher stresses that the best way to influence the other party is to understand empathetically the power of their point of view, their partisan perception, and to feel the emotional force with which they believe it. This is the opposite of deducing their intentions from one's own fears and assigning blame, a tactic which only leads to defensiveness and resistance. Even if one is misunderstood, the adoption of this approach by one party, alone, can reduce the risk of serious collision. In order to empathetically understand one must withhold judgement for a while, while one explores inside the others' interests and values or tries on their views of the situation and possible solutions. This does not involve agreement with the other party, even though it may result in a reassessment of one's own position. If this should happen it is beneficial to all. It allows one to reduce the area of conflict and advance one's
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newly enlightened self-interest. However, it does necessi-

tate acceptance of the other as one whose interests and values deserve serious consideration. It means remaining open to the possibility that one's adversary may be right, and oneself wrong.³¹ Acceptance means treating the other as equal in basic respects. Differences are not to be ignored. However, each partner in problem solving should be viewed as "equally human, equally caught up in the situation, equally entitled to rights, and equally entitled to have any interests and views taken into account." One must look behind the stereotype and not allow it to damage or preclude a working relationship by determining whether or how one interacts with the other. Acceptance should always be expressed in terms of a willingness to meet with, and listen to, any adversary. Fisher even counters objections that such an attitude simply encourages bad behavior on the part of the adversary or contaminates one's image by "supping with the devil." Fisher simply argues that "the devil we know is easier to handle than the devil we don't."³²

In light of his concern for mutual acceptance, Fisher suggests illuminating and contrasting participant's perceptions in simple and dramatic form. Each set of perceptions should be set forth in such a way that the party being described can own the statements and the other party will perceive them as plausible and illuminating. Giving the participants a stake in the outcome, through such a participatory process, is probably the most important single nego-

tiating procedure. Fisher makes a number of concrete recommendations, including the following. Have the parties write out both what they are saying and what they are hearing; ask one party to provide, for purposes of discussion, a variety of "worst interpretations" of one of its statements; have the mediator draft the contrasting "messages" in parallel columns for the purpose of clarifying intention and interpretation; set a ground rule requiring parties to speak about themselves, not the motives or intentions of others; and limit the amount of communication, encouraging participants to be more purposive in their comments. His primary approach is to make the present perceptions of each party explicit in writing through a listing of partisan perceptions and/or a balance sheet of presently perceived choices. A list of contrasting, nonjudgmental, perceptions in parallel columns serves to highlight differences constructively, alter overly optimistic expectations through reality testing, and enable parties to make low cost moves to satisfy interests important to the other side, but not to one's own. A balance sheet performs a similar function by revealing perceived consequences, favorable and unfavorable, on each side of the choice with which each party sees itself confronted. Such procedures are useful to a mediator, as well as the parties in conflict. They can be suggested as a means of educating the mediator as to the facts and areas of dissension. In fact, they do provide the mediator with an

opportunity to immerse oneself in the situation, demonstrate one's interest in what each party thinks, communicate one's understanding of each perspective, avoid the impression of bias, and increase one's credibility in the eyes of the parties. One may wish to pursue such strategies through private sessions with each party as well as formal and informal joint sessions.

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Communication

Negotiation is a process of communication from start to finish. Yet this task can be done well or poorly. Fisher outlines three basic communication problems -- first, when the parties are not speaking to each other in ways that can be understood; second, when the message is not being heard; and third, when that which is heard is misunderstood. Fisher assesses these one at a time, giving prescriptive guidelines in each case, regarding speaking, listening, and misunderstanding.

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With respect to speaking he encourages the negotiator or mediator to speak to be understood. This involves clear, concise statements directed toward the appropriate people at the negotiating table.

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Frequently, because participants have given up on the other party, communication is really directed toward third parties or one's own constituency. To counter this tendency the principled negotiator should attempt to establish private and confidential means of communication with the other party. Fisher recommends doing this by precluding the taking of

notes and limiting the size of the negotiating teams.

Hearing the concerns of another party is also critical to both negotiation and mediation. Fisher continually advises consultation prior to any decision. Asking for advice places parties on the same side of the problem. Yet one must go beyond simply initiating a listening process. Two kinds of listening are involved, hearing what is said and hearing between the lines. Accurate listening is frequently precluded by diversions, inattention, or internal screening processes which lead each person to hear only what one wants. Active listening attempts to overcome these difficulties by interacting in a manner which shows one is paying attention. By acknowledging communication received the listener not only reassures the speaker, but also gives the latter a chance to correct the impression. Suggested techniques include -- asking a party to spell something out carefully and exactly, asking for repetition of ambiguous ideas, asking one party to comment on a point just made, stopping when someone is diverted,³⁸ inquiring about reasons behind statements,³⁹ and allocating particular times for each party to listen.

Misunderstanding can be the result of either misperception or conscious deception. I have already dealt with the former. Regarding deception Fisher is clear in his rejection of any dishonesty. He critiques Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East for the Secretary's use of decep-

tion, saying that the cost to his reputation is part of what jeopardized the negotiation process. However, his advice for one faced with deceptive behavior on the other side is not simply to trust. Instead he advocates building compliance features into an agreement, verifying factual assertions, and insisting on reciprocal rights when faced with failure to adhere to a commitment.⁴⁰

Rightful Claims: Positions or Interests

Having separated the relational from the substantive and dealing with the former, Fisher then addresses the various issues associated with negotiating the substance. The first of these relates to the question of parties' legitimate rights. What are they justifiably due and where is this to be found? Are these rights represented in a party's positions or in the underlying interests, in the decision made or in what has caused one to decide? Fisher recognizes that the problem initially appears to be a conflict of positions since the goal is to arrive at agreement on a position.⁴¹ However, as already noted, he is absolutely clear in his rejection of positional bargaining and his conviction that interests must form the basis of negotiation.

Reconciling interests, as opposed to positions, is preferable for a number of reasons. First, there are several possible positions which could satisfy an interest. Therefore, by looking behind one's position for the motivating

interest, one can frequently find an alternative position⁴² which will meet the interests of all parties. However, Fisher does recognize that this will not always be done to an equal degree of satisfaction. While stepping into the shoes of a hypothetical negotiator, he writes that "my" interests should be well satisfied, "yours" acceptably satisfied, and "the community's" tolerably satisfied. Second, it is easier for a party to accept alternative means for⁴³ meeting its interests than to back down from its positions. Third, compromising between positions rarely leads to an agreement which will effectively satisfy the human needs and⁴⁴ interests which lead people to adopt the positions. Fourth, behind opposed positions lie, not only conflicting, but shared and compatible interests. Though he admits the macro-cosmic contention that there are real, objective situations in which interests are substantially opposed, he claims that there are many more interests which are shared or compatible. Some obvious examples include interest in preserving a good relationship, limiting costs if negotiations break down, and taking advantage of opportunities for cooperation and mutual benefit. Fifth, some differing interests, unlike opposing positions, actually enhance potential agreement,⁴⁵ rather than inhibit it. Fisher, then, concludes that principled negotiation should accommodate the conflicting interests, as well as possible, and formulate the shared ones⁴⁶ into goals.

Identification of Interests

After explaining the benefits of looking behind positions for interests, Fisher addresses the difficulty of actually doing so. While a position is concrete and explicit, interests may be unexpressed, intangible and inconsistent.⁴⁷ He mentions a couple concerns regarding interest identification, and suggests a couple techniques for getting behind positions.

In the task of interest identification, he reminds the negotiator/mediator that each side has multiple, not single, interests. One must appreciate the differing interests of the various people and factions involved. Second, he asserts that the most powerful interests are basic human needs which motivate all people. Meeting these needs increases the chance of both resolution and compliance. Ignoring them, or seeing them as the other party's problem, is a common and fundamental mistake.⁴⁸ These basic human needs include: security, economic welfare, belonging or identity, recognition and equal treatment, and control over one's life.⁴⁹ Such a definition of interests actually encompasses what Burton refers to as universal values and needs. Therefore, I would conclude that Fisher shares Burton's contention that objective conflicts of interest need not be seen as permanent.⁵⁰

Discussion of Interests

Fisher is adamant in his insistence on not arguing over

positions. In fact he recommends ignoring any declared⁵¹ position except as evidence of an underlying interest. On the other hand, he insists that an effective negotiator will be prepared, not only to discuss interests, but to state those of the other side more convincingly than can that party itself.⁵² Acknowledging the other's interests as a part of the overall problem⁵³ increases the chance that one's own will receive attention.

In the same way, the negotiator's task is to see that the other side correctly understands the importance and legitimacy of one's own interests. One can be just as assertive talking about interests as one can be talking about positions. Furthermore, the wisest, and most creative, solutions are often produced by strong interest advocacy. Taking a strong stand can be coupled with openness to correction in a way that impresses the other party. When coupled with concern for the other people and their interests, it tends to create a cognitive dissonance which increases pressure for a mutually agreeable and effective⁵⁴ solution.

In addition to these general guidelines, Fisher gives some specific recommendations for discussing interests. First, state interests and reasons before conclusions and proposals. Second, be specific, but flexible. Concrete-detail adds impact and credibility, yet treating suggested solutions as illustrative maintains negotiating room. "Illustrative specificity," especially if more than one option

is considered, avoids the appearance of rigidity. Third, look forward, not backward. Interests are better served by pursuit of future goals than by justifying, or complaining about, the past.⁵⁵

Reconciling Divergent Interests

Many interests are divergent rather than opposed. In fact, as stated above, there are times when a satisfactory agreement can be made precisely because each side wants something different. Since agreement is often based on disagreement, it is important to look for items which are of high benefit to one side and low cost to the other.⁵⁶

There are various types of differences which Fisher claims can potentially be dovetailed in this manner. In addition to differences in interests, he lists differences in beliefs, in the value placed on time, in forecasts, and in aversion to risk. Among possible differences of interest he mentions concern for substance vs. form, symbolic vs. practical, internal vs. external considerations, economic vs. political benefits, immediate vs. more distant future, progress vs. tradition, precedent, vs this situation, reputation vs. results. Differences in belief may lend themselves to an agreement to involve a third party, since each is confident of its ability to convince an unbiased party of the rightness of its position. Differences in time valuation allow one party to be more concerned with the present and another with the future. Different forecasts of the

future may enable the parties to gamble according to differing stakes. Differences in risk-aversion cause some parties to be more cautious than others.⁵⁷

Fisher, again, recommends practical methodology regarding the reconciliation of these divergent interests. One can list the parties' interests in parallel columns, placing them in order of priority. Even when interests may be completely inconsistent, prioritizing may be an avenue for possible reconciliation. A slight variation is to list conflicting interests opposite one another, leaving creative blank spaces where there is no opposed interest. In constructing such a list it must be noted, again, that similar interests do not necessarily mean opposed ones. For example, two countries primarily concerned with internal politics, may find they are not as incompatible as was thought initially.⁵⁸

Extrication from Positions

Fisher recognizes that loosening parties from their commitments to presently held positions is a difficult task. Yet he still gives a wide variety of suggestions for how both negotiators and mediators can get others to follow the procedures of principled negotiation.

To the negotiator faced with an opposite party who is entrenched in positions, Fisher recommends what he calls "negotiation jujitsu." As in the Oriental martial arts he recommends a strategy of stepping aside and channelling the

other party's strength into exploring interests rather than directly confronting it with resisting force of one's own.⁵⁹
The key is deflecting rather than reacting.

Fisher's first basic guideline for this situation is to look, again, for the interests behind the position rather than attack the latter. One should treat a position as one possible option, examining the extent to which it meets the needs of each party. In addition to sharing one's own reflections, one might ask the other party how it perceives this solution addressing the complete problem. The second guideline is to invite criticism of one's ideas, rather than defend them, and ask for advice. One must examine any input to discover underlying interests and to adapt one's own ideas to fit their perspective. Such a procedure turns criticism from an obstacle to an asset and invites the other party to step into one's own place and confront the other half of the problem.⁶⁰

In addition to these basic guidelines, Fisher has a number of specific recommendations. He encourages a negotiator/mediator to recognize the tactics being used, make them explicit, ask for the justification, state that one is sure of the existence of legitimate interests underneath the position, make clear what will be lost by the present negotiating strategy, interpret a party's commitment in a way that weakens it, de-emphasize it so that the other party can gracefully back down, ask why one party has not made the

choice which it perceives the other as requesting, and encourage consideration of other ways in which interests
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may be met.

Fisher's first word to a mediator is a warning that third party presence may even cause an increase in intransigence. One must be careful that a party does not adopt a partisan position where it previously had none, or rigidify a previously "padded" one, out of the belief that it can get a better deal with a mediator. Commitments to positions tend to become entrenched to the extent that they are written, official, publicly announced, and repeated. Therefore, a mediator will want to move parties toward oral, private, and informal sessions, a process quite the opposite of
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standard mediating tactics.

Options: Deciding or Inventing

The purpose of negotiation is to arrive at an optimal decision. Principled negotiation claims that this occurs when the optimal point for all parties is found. Fisher wants what he calls an "elegant" solution, the very best option possible. Such a solution will have no waste. If one party does not care about a specific item, the agreement should give all the benefits, on that point, to the other party(ies). The terms should be so well crafted that they cannot be made better for one party without becoming worse
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for another.

Positional bargaining is not optimal because it locks

the negotiators into positions. It leaves fewer resources to ascertain and meet underlying interests and, therefore, depends on compromise (claiming value) rather than the crafting of alternative solutions (creating value). Crafting an elegant solution requires that invention of multiple options precede decision for adoption of any one. If the goal is not merely a decision, but the optimal one, then decision making must be seen as the desired end product of negotiation rather than the whole process. However, inventing options is neither a simple, nor a traditional, negotiating procedure. Fisher lists four major obstacles: 1) premature judgment; 2) searching for the single answer; 3) the assumption of fixed sum; and 4) the assumption of singular responsibility for one's own problems.⁶⁴

Identifying Obstacles in the Way of Inventing

Premature judgement is the natural state of affairs. A number of factors contribute to this reality. Precedent carries great weight since it requires much more time and effort to consider new alternatives. There is substantial personal cost to the subordinate who continually raises unrealistic solutions unless the head of the negotiating team is sympathetic.⁶⁵ Fear of jeopardizing one's own negotiating position leads to an unwillingness to suggest alternate options due to the risk of disclosing confidential interests or priorities. Finally, simple emotional involvement makes it difficult to achieve the necessary detachment.⁶⁶

Therefore a traditional negotiating team decides on a proposed solution before negotiation begins. Whenever adversaries come to the table, each convinced it already knows the right answer to the problem, there is very little incentive to devise alternative solutions. Judgement hinders imagination and heightens anxieties. The idea-generating process needs to be freed from the act of commitment, since having a lot at stake inhibits the creative. In fact the authority to make binding commitments is more of a handicap than a help. Negotiators are better off with less official authority.⁶⁷

If the first hindrance to creative process is premature criticism, then the second is premature closure. This, too is encouraged by traditional negotiating practice. Rather than assuming differing viewpoints to discover the benefits of collective thinking, each person on the negotiating team is expected to take everything into account and recommend a realistic solution.⁶⁸ Searching for the one correct answer detracts from the primary task of creating negotiating room. The latter requires a considerable number of markedly different ideas. However, the temptation is to fear that unrestricted discussion will prove unproductive, resulting only in delay and confusion. Broadening the options may feel like a needless, or even harmful, tangent. But premature closure is even more likely to short-circuit the process.⁶⁹

A third reason why inventing options seldom occurs is because each side perceives the situation as either/or. This fixed-sum game carries the assumption that the size or shape of the pie cannot be altered. The result is disinterest in devising new solutions if all the options are already obvious and one party can gain only at the other's expense. Fisher's rebuttal points to the existence of the many divergent, but unopposed, interests mentioned in the previous section.

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The final obstacle lies in each side's preoccupation with its own immediate interests. The sense that one has enough problems of one's own, without worrying about those of the other side, is pervasive. There is a natural psychological reluctance to legitimate anything on the other side. Yet, as indicated previously, this shortsighted sense of loyalty hinders the very process with the most potential for meeting one's self-interest.

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Beginning the Inventing Process

Principled negotiation employs a number of techniques to initiate the inventing process, to free thought patterns from existing constraints. Not only does this involve the development of tools, but frequently the adoption of an objective stance from which to view the conflict. The first technique, for a mediator, is simply to make the inventing problem explicit. One can bring to the attention of the parties the lack of fair, operational and competently pre-

pared solutions, as presented by either side. This can be accomplished by presenting contrasting lists of the characteristics of desirable and undesirable proposals (vague generalities vs. operational proposals, reflecting interests of one side vs. reconciling interests of both, few in number vs. numerous, etc). The question on the table would then be the desirability of new options. Another possibility, or perhaps additional step, would be the preparation of fresh proposals which could be evaluated according to the two sets of characteristics. These options could be presented by either the participants themselves or by the mediator. Either of these techniques has the advantage of creating agreement, not only on the poor quality of existing proposals from both sides, but also on an alternative process for moving ahead.⁷²

The discovery of new options can be facilitated by a variety of brainstorming techniques. One can utilize the circle chart in order to use one desirable proposal to generate others. By moving from a good action idea back to the general approach, of which the proposal is only one possible application, one can often discover other applications. Likewise, one could go back another step, to the diagnosis, and generate alternative approaches which would in turn lead to new action proposals. This tool could be combined with another Fisher suggestion, that of examining the problem, or parts of it, from the perspective of various third party experts. Different disciplines, professions or

organizations will use varied criteria for determining what is important and evaluating proposals. Each might diagnose the situation differently or suggest various approaches or action ideas. Placing oneself in these hypothetical shoes⁷³ can be very enlightening. A variation of this technique would be to invite such outsiders to present their specialized points of view, taking advantage of their recognized neutrality and legitimacy.⁷⁴

Fisher recommends a variety of commonly accepted guidelines for use before, during, and after brainstorming. The preliminary guidelines involve questions of purpose, as well as who, when, where, and what atmosphere. Guidelines for during the process involve seating, ground rules, and recording. Guidelines for follow-up involve selection, improvement, and use of best ideas. The sole purpose of brainstorming is to invent a wide variety of possibilities. Therefore wild ideas, outside the realm of the possible, are encouraged since the group could generate from these unrealistic options, others which are credible. Group size should be large enough to stimulate interchange and small enough to encourage participation, usually five to eight people plus a facilitator who can oversee the process and raise questions. It is easiest if participants all come from the same side. However, inclusion of two or more sides has the potential of creating a climate of mutual problem solving and education⁷⁵ regarding parties' interests. For these reasons, it may be

advantageous to involve chief negotiators from each side. On the other hand middle level people may find emotional detachment easier.⁷⁶ Such a procedure was used during the successful SALT I talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ Time, place, and atmosphere can all contribute to successful suspension of judgement if the context is separated as far as possible from the negotiating sessions themselves. Informal, shirt-sleeved sessions, at a different time and place, on a first-name basis, with mixed seating are most likely to generate a multitude of beneficial options.⁷⁸ Seating should also be side by side in a semicircle, facing a rapporteur, in order to avoid argument and foster joint response to the external problem.⁷⁹ Ground rules should be implemented only with the consent of the participants. The primary one is to postpone all criticism and evaluation. Others may include making the entire session off the record and refraining from attribution of ideas. The rapporteur may be given the authority to select which ideas are worth recording and, thus, reduce the sense of attribution.⁸⁰ At the end of the session, however, the no-criticism rule should be relaxed, enabling the group to select the most promising ideas. These ideas are not decisions, but nominations of promising proposals, worth further development. The task is, then to invent ways to improve them, make them more realistic and implement them. Finally, a time must be set to decide which of these to advance in formal negotiations and how to do it.⁸¹

Inventing a New Game

Informal brainstorming must ultimately effect the formal negotiating process. The structure of this process, or game, is more amenable to change than is usually thought. Furthermore, the impact of such a move is also underestimated. In fact, a mediator's major power is the ability to adjust the formal negotiating process or invent a new game. Two ways of doing this are by altering the players or their roles and by altering the standard moves.⁸²

The players and their roles may be altered by adding a new party, eliminating a party, or dealing with a different subgroup within a party. Contrary to traditional practice Fisher recommends adding participants who represent the most extreme positions. The perspective of these effected third parties is important to the process and the desired outcome may well depend on their involvement. Parties can also be added to provide moderation, reduce bipolar division, bring in additional mediators, create crosscutting cleavages, or provide additional material resources. On the other hand, there are also constructive ways to decrease the participants. Groups could be represented by one person to reduce communication problems. A separate agreement among fewer parties may be possible if the larger attempt proves impossible. In some circumstances it is even advisable to proceed with only one party, requiring that party to assign some people to represent the other side's concerns. This

approach may be adopted for different purposes -- to present an unwilling party with a reasonable solution or as an exercise to educate one party regarding the other's interests. Finally, a mediator can take advantage of the different subgroups within a party and decide to treat a particular person, or even another level of government, as the more significant player. Helping a given negotiating team to get different instructions may be the key to advancing a particular negotiation.

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Fisher also applies this strategy of changing the players or their roles to international conciliation, or pre-negotiation. Whenever one attempts to influence any party to move toward any decision, including formal negotiation, one ought to recognize the non-monolithic structure of that party. Frequently one can influence a smaller subgroup, which is sufficiently cohesive, to make a decision on its own. Even when this is not the case, a lower official may be able to exert influence on a higher one if convinced of a needed change. Finally, there are advantages, at times, to talking as if one were attempting to influence a different player than the party, or sub-party, with which one is presently dealing.

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The standard moves of the negotiating game can be altered in a number of ways which change the process to one in which present positions are irrelevant. This could take the form of referring the differences to experts for advice,

perhaps by collecting last best offers and giving the mediator the authority to decide. A second example is for the mediator to ask for contingent offers rather than demand concessions. Each party would be asked to indicate offers they would, or might, be willing to render if the other party were willing to agree to a particular provision. The parties would then be encouraged to exchange these contingent and reciprocal proposals. Finally, a mediator could insist that the only acceptable response to an unacceptable contingent offer be a counter offer.⁸⁵

Another variation of changing the standard move is a process developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project and one of the favorite techniques used by Fisher. The single negotiating text procedure involves a series of submissions, discussions, and revisions of a common draft agreement. Based on one's own analysis of common interests, as well as participants' assessment of interests and specific drafts, the mediator, or a body of non-partisans, would initiate each draft and determine the point at which a given text should be presented for acceptance or rejection.⁸⁶ Fisher acknowledges that this procedure carries the risks of an unfamiliar process, too early a focus on details, reduction of participant participation, and a likely ultimatum at the end. However, he stresses the positive gains -- ability to initiate process without formal agreement, irrelevance of extreme positions, avoidance of concession making, ease of criticism, concentration on interests, freedom from blame if

failure occurs, informal process which encourages corridor diplomacy, and a resulting concrete proposal which requires only one final decision and around which public opinion can mobilize. Fisher illustrates the advantages of this approach, over against a traditional one, by contrasting Kissinger's failure at Middle East shuttle diplomacy with the successful use of the single negotiating text procedure at the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt.⁸⁷

Inventing a New Choice

Principled negotiation asserts that the decisions people make depend upon the choices they face and that differing procedures can create different choices. Mediation as a practice presupposes this to be the case. Inventing new choices for one's adversary, ones acceptable to all parties, is at the heart of Fisher's methodology. He refers to this as the development of "yesable propositions", proposals to which the word "yes" is sufficient, feasible (with at least 20% probability), and operational.⁸⁸

Fisher recognizes that yesable propositions have their limitations. There is the danger of such a proposal feeling unfamiliar or sounding like an ultimatum. It also risks including details offensive to the other side and may prohibit the asking of more favorable terms for one's own side. Yet Fisher feels that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages, provided one understands that this is simply a beginning step. Giving a yes or no choice, rather than a problem

to be solved, makes it easier for busy bureaucrats to respond, cuts through suspicion about one's intentions, encourages others to evaluate the real costs and benefits of the proposed solution, and increases the likelihood that ongoing negotiation will avoid positional bargaining. In order to ensure this Fisher recommends preparing, and placing on the negotiating table, at least two such proposals at any given time. This avoids the possibility of a yesable proposition being viewed as a positional statement by either side, thus preventing rigidity, as well as reaction and counter reaction.

Three types of choice alteration are the focus of yesable propositions -- altering the decision itself, the consequences, and the manner of asking. Altering the decision itself can take a number of forms. First one can make the existing options more operational. This could mean simply restating one's objective in the other party's terms or emphasizing different elements. Often proposals stated as general principles need to become more specific. Concretizing existing general proposals may well result in more than one yesable proposition. On the other hand, reducing the number of decisions can also be useful. One way to accomplish this is to accumulate a number of tentative proposals and then consider adopting them as a group. Second, one can invent agreements of lesser strength -- agreements on procedure rather than substance, on "what is disa-

greed" rather than "what is agreed", provisional rather than permanent, non-binding rather than binding, contingent rather than unconditional, in principle rather than final.⁹¹

Changing the goals of the game can be accomplished by helping each side to strengthen the moderate tendencies of the other. There will always be some faction within a party which is concerned about reputation, reciprocal compliance⁹² or non-compliance, non-intervention, or system breakdown. If necessary, especially during a pre-negotiation stage, an international conciliator could lessen the strength to the extent of proposing a "long-term vision", with specific suggestions regarding who could do what at this time to move⁹³ toward fulfillment. Third, one can change the scope of an agreement. Fisher recommends fractionating the conflict. This involves separating the issues into smaller, more manageable components. Agreements may be limited in time, physical size, parties involved, or subject matter. Such a process increases the chance of avoiding stalemate, capitalizing on immediate progress, and deciding on the merits of the case. The opposite technique of enlarging or coupling issues may also be beneficial in certain circumstances. It can be used to make the package more attractive by⁹⁴ joining issues favorable to each side respectively.

Altering the consequences involves changing the perceptions of expected results in either making, or not making, a given decision. The task, in this case, is to alter the target balance sheet of pros and cons so as to make a spe-

cific choice more acceptable to a particular party. The typical first reaction is to increase the threat. However, Fisher argues that this strategy is usually ineffective, costly, and lacking in credibility. Instead, he recommends focusing attention on making a credible offer, even converting threats into offers where possible. One can alter the magnitude, likelihood, immediacy, legitimacy, or character of either of these potential consequences. Some illustrations include: changing the beneficiary, giving the benefits sooner, demonstrating that one has detailed plans for implementing it, making a commitment from which one cannot back down, offering a fading opportunity with limited availability, and decreasing the precedential effect of a decision by emphasizing the uniqueness of the case. Furthermore, a mediator can counter the perceived need to stand firm, for the purpose of maintaining constituency support, by increasing awareness, on the part of all, of the high costs of intransigence.⁹⁵

The final means of altering the choice is through the manner of asking for a decision. One way to do this is to assist parties to accept part ownership of an idea. In this way, the proposed solution has already begun to be identified as part of the party's own "interest." One can also buffer a new idea by having it conveyed privately, or even indirectly. Private contact has the advantage of being less threatening and providing opportunity for explanation and

response. In addition there is a kind of ladder of threat escalation regarding the language used in presenting a party with a choice. Asking is less threatening than proposing, which is less threatening than demanding. Likewise, there is potential escalation in content, as well as actions, moving from information to advice to promises to ultimatums. 96

Commitment to a Decision

Principled negotiation discourages the making of commitments at the beginning of the negotiating process. However, commitment to a mutual decision is the very purpose of negotiation. At the end one hopes to achieve an agreement. Decisions need to be specific as to who is going to do what and who will refrain from doing what. These commitments should be realistic, easy to implement, "compliance prone," and no more extensive than necessary to serve the mutual 97 interests. They should be jointly formulated, with care taken to clarify the formal status and any interdependence 98 and to draft an illustrative public statement for each.

Criteria for Accepting Agreement: Subjective or Objective

Principled negotiation does not describe its philosophy as "win-win." Despite its emphasis on the value of ongoing relationships, the reconciliation of divergent interests, and the creation of alternative options for mutual gain, benefits are hardly ever equal. One will always confront incompatible interests which cannot be reconciled. Traditional negotiation attempts to resolve these by a contest of

wills over which side will be either most stubborn or most generous. The outcome results from the interaction of human wills. It is not based on history, custom, or moral standard, but on the subjective criteria of the parties involved.⁹⁹ This is particularly disadvantageous to the party which wants to change the status quo. If such a party desires to proceed quickly, they are in a very weak position, unless they have the kind of power needed to impose a solution in the particular situation at hand.¹⁰⁰

Fisher's solution is to negotiate on the basis of objective criteria, independent of the will of either side. He argues that it is precisely in deciding distributional issues that objective criteria are most useful. The more one utilizes standards based on reason, legitimacy, and practicality, the greater the chance for a wise and fair outcome. The more one refers to facts, precedent, and community practice, the less vulnerable are all parties and the more durable the agreement. The more one relies on mutually recognized standards the fewer are the number of necessary commitments and the greater the ability to forecast the consequences of a proposal. Furthermore, all these advantages increase when dealing with multiple parties who form coalitions or with negotiators constrained by higher authorities or constituencies.¹⁰¹

An agreement should not only be fair, but must also appear to be so in the eyes of all parties. A negotiator

needs to justify any distributive proposal in the eyes of the adversary, not because the other perspective is right, but because it is the other's action which one is trying to influence.¹⁰² Governments usually formulate demands in exactly the opposite way, legitimating the desired decision in the eyes of one's own people. One cannot expect an adversary to make a decision based on "our" standard of fairness. This necessitates legitimating both the messages sent and the means of communication. In both cases Fisher points to rule and logic, as the necessary means to justify consideration of, or resistance to, a proposal.¹⁰³ To produce an outcome which is not subjective one can apply either fair and reasonable standards (rules) for the substantive question or fair and reasonable procedures for resolving the conflicting interests.

Identifying Objective Criteria

There is usually more than one objective standard available. Fisher lists a multitude of possibilities from which one might look for criteria appropriate to a given situation. Among these are: precedent, tradition or custom, reciprocity, proportionality, expert opinion, professional standards, unavoidable costs, legal decision, scientific judgement, proceed standards, equal treatment, efficiency, and simplicity of administration.¹⁰⁴ He readily admits that there is much work to be done in suggesting better objective standards and procedures which guide the process of interna-

tional negotiation. However, at present, the primary standard which Fisher likes to apply is precedent. According to him this criteria is most effective in facilitating a decision. The negotiator is encouraged to look, not only for an external ruling, but for a precedential decision or statement which the other party made in a similar situation.

Perhaps this request, or something very nearly like it, is something they have already promised to do. The adversary's need to be consistent will help one generate options which are both acceptable to oneself and legitimate to the other. The fear of setting a harmful precedent by giving way to the other side can also be overcome by demonstrating that a particular decision is consistent with principles already

¹⁰⁶ established. Whatever the method or rationale, the resulting criteria should apply to all sides. The test of reciprocity can help determine whether or not a given criterion is fair and independent of the will of either party. ¹⁰⁷

There is also a variety of fair and reasonable procedures which can provide objective criteria. First, there is the age old practice of "one cuts, the other chooses." A variation of this is to have parties negotiate what they think is a fair arrangement before they determine either their roles or their piece of the pie. Second, there is the practice of taking turns, especially helpful when there is a large amount to be divided. There is always the opportunity to make the selections tentative, allowing for the possibil-

ity of trading before finalizing the transaction. Third, there is drawing of lots or some other form of chance. The results may be unequal, but the opportunity is equal. Fourth, letting someone else play a role in the decision is a procedure with almost unlimited variation. As already suggested, one could ask for expert advice, for facilitation, or even for a binding decision. Giving the third party the authority to decide between each side's final offer puts pressure on them to put forward their best efforts.¹⁰⁸

Negotiating With Objective Criteria

Principled negotiation approaches the question of standards the same way it approaches the substantive issues. There must be a joint search for objective criteria through a process governed by reason rather than pressure. "Agree first on principles, before even considering possible terms" is the centerpiece of the approach. Even if substantive interests are in conflict, parties can affirm the shared goal of determining fair criteria.¹⁰⁹

What makes this joint search possible is coming to the table with an open mind. Therefore, Fisher emphasizes that each party must recognize the potential validity of criteria other than its own. One set of valid standards and procedures does not preclude the existence of others. In fact, he suggests that one's case will have much more impact if presented in terms of the other side's criteria. Agreement would not be a matter of concession, but of keeping one's

word.

Though a principled negotiator may yield to an alternate principle, based on reason and objective standards, one must never yield to pressure. Pressure can take many forms -- bribes, threats, personal attacks, stressful environment, a good-guy/bad-guy team, manipulative appeals to trust, or a simple refusal to budge. Whatever the form, Fisher is convinced that the principled negotiator can usually shift the process from positional bargaining to a search for objective criteria. Making the rules of the game the issue normally gives the principled negotiator the edge. Reasoned principle, as one's "stand", is much easier to defend than ¹¹¹ is pressure to conform with someone's will.

The actual process of negotiating the criteria takes much the same form as negotiating the substance. First, suggest one or more criteria oneself. A good standard opening proposal for a principled negotiator should not include any suggestion which one would refrain from making to an impartial third party. It need not be a middle position, nor the one which the negotiator deems that an arbitrator would accept. ¹¹² But it must not undercut one's credibility nor turn the other party off. One must also check to make sure that one can disengage from the criteria without undue risk, that one perceives a way to move from the criteria toward satisfaction of one's interests, and that the end product is realistic. In addition to the criteria which

one presents, a wise negotiator will formulate some "fall
back" criteria.¹¹³ Second, invite the other side to present
criteria. Then ask them what theory underlies their sugges-
tion. Treat them as serious participants in the joint search
for fair criteria. Yet, realize that each standard they
propose becomes a tool which can be used to present one's
own case persuasively. If one should speak as though talking
to an arbitrator, then one should listen as though one is an
arbitrator. Third, behave as a judge, or better yet, a
team of judges. Weigh the merits of each criterion. Look
for an objective basis for deciding between them. If two
different standards seem equally legitimate, a compromise
which splits the difference may be the best procedure. In
this case the outcome is still independent of the will of
either party. Fourth, defer to someone both sides see as
unbiased if the parties are unable to come to agreement
themselves. Give the third party the lists of proposed
criteria and ask it to choose the fairest and most appro-
priate. Such a procedure does not give the third party the
authority to settle the dispute, only to settle the question
of standards. Finally, quit the negotiation if the other
side will not budge and if they have not given a persuasive
reason for their position. The status quo may be better
than any alternative the other side has presented, but first
one should check to make sure that no good objective stan-
dard has been overlooked. One should also weigh this "take
or leave it" move against the cost to one's reputation as a

negotiator.

power: Imposing or Influencing

One of the first questions Fisher raises about power is its relevance to the discussion of negotiation. On the one hand he does not show any hesitation in legitimating the continual attempt, on the part of nations, to accumulate power. He states that any nation wants to have the physical and psychological resources necessary to insure that one is in a strong position for dealing with future issues. Since power is not automatically transferable from place to place and purpose to purpose, any government is always concerned to accumulate it anew. Therefore, its actions in a current conflict will always be designed to acquire or generate military, economic, political, proceed, or legal bargaining chips. According to Fisher, such a quest for power is not improper, ipso facto. Any state ought to want to influence
115
events for proceed reasons.

Fisher's answer to the question of the legitimacy of power is to ask, "What kind of power?" To that question, he answers, "influence," which is exerted by changing the message which one party sends to the other. Influence consists of three fundamental elements: the demand (the decision that is desired), the offer (expressing the consequences that will follow if the action is taken), and the threat (expressing the consequences that will follow if the action is not taken). With each of these elements he raises the subsidiary

question of: who (which parties are addressed)? what (which elements are addressed, credible, attractive)? when (relative timing of the elements)? and why (which elements can be legitimated)? This combination of elements constitutes the essential structure of an attempt to influence a decision.¹¹⁶

For the third party intervener, as well, this strategy is central to Fisher's methodology. He frequently makes reference to Machiavelli's query, "What is the best advice you can give a prince?" as the primary question to be asked.¹¹⁷

One central task of the third party mediator is to influence one or more aspects of the message sent, or to alter perception of the message received, in order to change the set of choices before the parties.¹¹⁸

On the other hand, imposed, coercive, destructive power has very little legitimacy for Fisher. Even then, it has legitimacy only when it functions as influence or persuasion, the legitimate expression of power. He states that there is certainly some truth to the assertion that military force, coupled with the willingness to use it, can influence a negotiation. In fact, he asserts that, before World War II, superior physical force was often a critical factor in determining who would prevail in international negotiation. The reliability of this self-help strategy gave powerful nations the option of imposing their will. According to Fisher, this has drastically changed with the advent of the nuclear age. Asymmetry of traditional power is no longer a

significant issue since powerful countries often cannot use their full force and seemingly less powerful ones have often prevailed in conflict. He points to Vietnam, Iran, and many other examples, to indicate that most contemporary foreign policy objectives cannot be accomplished by use of force. Therefore, he asserts that physical superiority, and with it the ability to impose one's solution, has become largely irrelevant to the negotiation process. The critical balance today is not that of destructive force, but the balance sheets of presently perceived choice. Diplomatic success now depends primarily on the ability to influence another government to do something one desires. This "negotiating power" is both legitimate and desirable.¹¹⁹

Fisher points out that nations and negotiators still attempt to function according to the old coercive power model. With respect to military force he feels that it is a demonstrably flawed strategy. However, he admits that in other respects imposing power does play more of a role. Those with wealth, friends and connections, good jobs, or more time usually fare better than those who are poor, friendless, unemployed, or in a hurry. While this is true, he claims that it is irrelevant to negotiation strategy. Fisher is not impressed with descriptive assessment unless it has prescriptive significance. He is interested in determining what exactly can help the less powerful, as well as the more powerful, to find the best mutual solution. He is convinced that principled negotiation provides the best ap-

proach to enhance the persuasive negotiating power of all.

Not only is coercive power ineffective as a guarantee of assured victory. According to Fisher, coercion actually damages both the working relationship and the quality of an agreement. Coercion will destroy effective communication, reason, trust, mutual understanding and acceptance. Furthermore, because of it, any agreement is less likely to benefit from creative thinking or to meet the coerced party's needs and standards of fairness. Such agreements are also frequently harder to implement and more likely to break down. Fisher admits that the line between coercion and persuasion is not sharp. The difference is often one of degree, especially in situations where there is little time or opportunity for persuasion. Nevertheless, Fisher sees coercion operating in every aspect of positional bargaining. Some of its features include: attacking the actions, judgments, honesty, and character of individuals (psychological coercion); treating negotiation as a contest to be won; early commitment to one's position which requires the other party to change; narrowing choices and limiting discussion to fewer and fewer options; trying to break the other party's will rather than search for fair criteria for agreement; and worsening the other's alternatives by threatening bad consequences. Virtually every facet of the negotiation process becomes coercive when not viewed as a problem solving procedure. Persuasive modes of influence, as

difficult as they may be to ascertain or implement, are the
only ones which are "unconditionally constructive."¹²¹

However, Fisher does caution negotiators, and especially mediators, about the dangers of seeking influence for its own sake. To see persuasive power as an end in itself is to place more importance on one's ability to influence the future than to arrive at a good solution for the present conflict. Mediators are especially prone to this in the form of concern for success. Some concern for reputation is fine. In fact, for one to exercise any influence one must be known. However, one must be known as a person of principle. One's reputation is best based on integrity and compassion. This alone will provide the basis for lasting
¹²²
influence.

The primary question then is how to enhance principled negotiating power. According to Fisher, one's ability to influence favorably depends upon six interrelated elements -- 1) the power of skill and knowledge; 2) the power of a good relationship; 3) the power of a good alternative to negotiating; 4) the power of an elegant solution based on the best options; 5) the power of legitimacy; and 6) the power of commitment, both affirmative and negative. These categories for generating prescriptive advice are listed in
¹²³
a conscious order, each one building on the other. Negotiating power depends not only on competence in each category, but the cumulative total. An orchestrated combination
¹²⁴
of them all is what causes impact. Since many of these

overlap material I have previously covered I will focus on only three -- skill and knowledge, a good alternative to negotiating, and commitment.

The Power of Skill and Knowledge

A skilful negotiator is better able to influence others to make a decision. These skills, which can be learned and taught, include both interpersonal and analytical skills. In the first category Fisher lists the ability to listen, to become aware of emotions and psychological concerns, to empathize, to be sensitive to other's feelings and one's own, to speak different languages, to communicate clearly and effectively, and to become integrated so that words and behavior are congruent. Analytical skills include logic,¹²⁵ quantitative assessment, and organization of ideas.

A knowledgeable negotiator is also powerful. General knowledge of procedural options, national negotiating styles, and cultural differences can add enough to one's persuasive ability to offset other power advantages the other party may have. Special knowledge pertinent to a particular negotiation is even more powerful. Fisher lists a number of categories of knowledge which can increase one's influence. 1) Knowledge about the people (on both sides) -- their personal concerns, backgrounds, interests, prejudices, values, etc. 2) Knowledge about the interests -- group needs, hopes, fears -- on both sides. 3) Knowledge about the facts -- history, geography, economics, and scientific

background as well as legal, social, and political implications. The importance of unknown facts is important enough to warrant researching a quantity of material in order to gain a few relevant facts.¹²⁶

The Power of an Alternative to Negotiating

This is Fisher's specific answer to the question of how to deal with a more powerful party. He suggests developing in detail the best option one can create for use in the event that negotiations do not reach agreement. Knowing what other possibilities are available enables one to have a standard against which to measure any other proposed solution. One must take care, though, not to conceptualize these alternatives in the aggregate since one will be able to implement only one of the possible choices. This best alternative is not the same as a bottom line. It is not an arbitrary decision, but one which carefully weighs the results one can obtain without agreement. It protects one from accepting terms which are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms which would be beneficial. Furthermore, it is flexible enough to allow for imaginative exploration of other options.¹²⁷

Creating such an alternative gives one a great deal of power. Fisher claims that the relative negotiating power of two parties depends more on the degree to which each party is willing to not reach agreement than it does on resources like wealth, physical strength, or political connections.¹²⁸

For one who knows the best alternative, every negotiation can be a success, since any agreement will enhance one's position over the status quo. The results might not be the best possible, but at least it would not be a loss. Furthermore, this solution is not at the expense of the other party. It is not a threat of what one will do to the adversary, but a promise of what one will do for oneself. 129

To develop possible alternatives Fisher outlines a three step process prior to negotiation: 1) Invent a list of actions one might take if agreement is thwarted. 2) Improve some of the more promising ones and convert them into specific options. 3) Tentatively choose the option that seems best. One may then decide to reveal this alternative to the other party during negotiations if it is attractive enough. He also advises testing out the possible alternatives one's adversary has. Such preparation helps one to know what to expect, to help others be realistic, and even to consider actions which could alter the other side's best alternative. 130

The Power of Commitment

There are two kinds of commitment, affirmative offers and negative lock-ins or threats. The former has the power of an invitation. It usually focuses attention at the point of the offer, but it also ties the hands of the party which makes it. The offer may expire or be withdrawn, but while it is operative, the party is committed to honor it. Fisher

recommends that a wise negotiator formulate an offer in ways that build upon the other categories of negotiating power. In this way, the choice that is offered is most likely to confront the other side with a proposal to which they might say yes.¹³¹

Fisher still holds out the possibility of negative commitment as a last resort. One form of this is the lock-in, a commitment where one is unwilling to make certain agreements even though they may be better than one's best non-negotiating alternative. The other is the threat that, if agreement is not forthcoming, one will engage in purposive negative conduct against the other.¹³²

Both kinds of negative commitment are controversial and troublesome in Fisher's eyes. When used prematurely, they have a tendency to interfere with the full realization of other elements of negotiating power. The sooner one announces a threat, or a "take-it-or-leave-it", lock-in position, the less chance one has to realize the possible extent of one's negotiating power. Negative commitments have become the focus of attention around the negotiating table, leaving little, if any, room for affirmative commitments, including yesable propositions. The power of knowledge is disrupted before one can learn what is the best proposition to which to commit oneself. It is obvious that the power of a good relationship has been damaged by the ensuing lack of trust fostered by a negative commitment. The power of an

elegant solution is lost because it is now less likely that the choices being considered reflect best the interests of the other party or even one's own. The power of legitimacy has been damaged the most, since the persuasiveness of one's future proposals depends on one's past adherence to objective criteria. Even the power of a good non-negotiating alternative has been compromised. The attention of the other side is shifted from looking at the objective reality of one's most attractive alternative to a subjective statement regarding what one threatens or locks into. This simply
133
invites a contest of wills.

There is, incidentally, a subtle distinction between resorting to one's non-negotiated alternative and a lock-in tactic. The former does not consist of precise terms, which the other party must accept, in order to prevent one from undertaking a course of action. It is simply a base line by which to measure any of the options which one expects to generate. The non-negotiated alternative is also distinct from a threat. There is a difference between threatening another's interests and warning of either an outcome which would occur independent of one's own decision-making or an action one is taking for the sake of fulfilling one's own
134
best interests. In each case, the negative commitment quickly pushes the negotiator into a positional bargaining stance. On the other hand, although the non-negotiated alternative is an admission that inventing and influencing have not worked, the interests, relationships, and objective

criteria are still held in respect. Though it is far from optimum, it continues to adhere to the "hard on merits, soft on people" perspective of principled negotiation.

Summary and Conclusion

Principled negotiation clearly falls within the problem solving school of conflict resolution. Its third party intervention counterpart, called principled problem solving, reveals its self-conscious placement within this school. The five guidelines on which I have elaborated in this chapter, all serve to illustrate the relationship of this methodology to problem solving, as well as to the pluralist model of conflict resolution as developed within political science. The emphasis on rational morality also points to Fisher's indebtedness to traditional liberalism.

The guidelines, or tenets, of principled negotiation are as follows. First, one should separate relational and substantive issues. The people problem, consisting of emotions, perceptions, and communication, should be dealt with independently from the discussion of the issues to be decided. Second, one should focus on interests, not positions. Knowing and discussing the underlying concerns and needs of all parties is more important to an effective negotiation/mediation process than insisting upon one's own demands. Discovery of interests reveals many shared and compatible ones, in addition to those which are conflicting. Third, one should invent options for mutual gain, rather

than make early commitment to a given option. Instead of assuming a fixed pie, one should generate a range of possibilities which are worthy of consideration. Brainstorming and other such techniques should replace attitudes of premature judgment and the search for a single answer. Fourth, one should insist on objective criteria for agreement. The contest of wills should be replaced by standards and procedures which are determined on the basis of fair, external measures. Fifth, one should develop negotiating power in order to influence the other party, instead of relying on coercion to impose one's will.

The pragmatism of Fisher's approach is one of the features which makes it particularly attractive as a methodology which the church may be able to adapt for use in conflict intervention. Therefore, I will turn next to an examination of praxis. It is important to evaluate principled negotiation in the context of a case where some of its proponents acted as a third party (chapter 3) and compare this to a case where a religious group functioned in a similar situation (chapter 4). Both of these cases fall within the broader context of East-West relations during the cold war. In each case I will evaluate the procedures used in light of the tenets of principled negotiation. Such reflection on praxis will then be used to inform my theological reflection and evaluation of the utility of principled negotiation as model for adaptation by the church.

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PART II

CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER 3

INVOLVEMENT OF HARVARD'S NUCLEAR NEGOTIATION PROJECT IN DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

The Nuclear Negotiation Project, along with the Harvard Negotiation Project, is part of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. A variety of projects, operating under the umbrella organization, have been involved in mediation and intervention activities related to superpower conflict. They have explored a mediated settlement to the war in Afghanistan and have spent much time at efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war, a task they consider to be a primary focus of their current work. Approaches used to address the latter problem have included: 1) Research on superpower relations and negotiations, analyzing effective and ineffective assumptions and interactions, 2) Development of Multinational Workshops on Improving the International Negotiation Process (with Soviet negotiation experts included in the faculty), 3) Design and facilitation of U.S.-Soviet cooperation for converting nuclear weapons fuel into civilian use, and 4) Development and advocacy of various proposals for nuclear risk reduction.¹

Efforts by the Nuclear Negotiation Project (NNP) to develop nuclear risk reduction centers offers a very good

opportunity to examine the application of principled negotiation to a particular instance of informal mediation of east-west conflict. The project is directed by William Ury, co-author with Roger Fisher of Getting to YES, and co-formulator of principled negotiation. NNP has had a major impact on the perspectives and actions of policymakers with respect to nuclear risk reduction and crisis management.² In particular, the project was instrumental in the process leading to establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Moscow and Washington in April, 1988.³

In addition, the circumstances and dynamics involved in facilitation of this agreement, from inception to implementation, provide many parallels with the mediation/conciliation roles usually performed by religious groups. To illustrate this, I shall note some of the "factors affecting intervention" as examined in chapter 1. First, NNP was a non-invited intervener in what was mostly a pre-negotiation process, giving it relatively low coercive potential. Second, as a non-governmental organization, it needed to gain legitimacy based on an ascribed identity bestowed by the protagonist parties. Third, the primary focus of its efforts was on constructing a new aspect of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than on settling old disputes. Fourth, it represented an effort to work with a comparable substrata (academic rather than religious) within the other party's society in order

to resolve sub-unit differences, create inter-societal bonds, and influence government policy on both sides.

History

In September 1982, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) asked the Harvard Negotiation Project to write a report on crisis negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, giving birth to the sister organization, the Nuclear Negotiation Project. This research project involved examination of the dynamics of previous crises, the nature of existing crisis mechanisms, and the development of proposals for prevention or avoidance of future crises. Consequently, the initial phase of NNP, lasting until publication of the report in March, 1984, focused on conducting interviews and gaining extensive familiarity with the personnel in the field -- policy-makers, military personnel and academics. The final report recommended institution of presidential crisis briefing sessions, as well as development of agreements on crisis procedures, consultation periods following accidents, nuclear crisis control centers in Moscow and Washington, regular meetings of U.S. secretaries of defense and state with Soviet counterparts, and enhanced third party roles in defusing regional conflicts.⁴ This report had a significant impact on subsequent discussion in both academic and governmental circles. It was cited during a U.S. senate hearing on nuclear risk reduction centers in April, 1984 and

its executive summary was published in the hearing report. Within one year 2,000 copies of the ACDA report were distributed, including 750 to American and European leaders in government, business and academia.⁵ In April, 1985, the former director of ACDA, Ralph Earle, gave credit to the report for prompting his successful effort to gain the support of prominent Soviet and American statesmen at a meeting of the Consultation on International Security and Arms Control at the Carter Presidential Center of Emory University. Under their sponsorship, a joint statement calling for the creation of crisis management mechanisms, especially frequent and regular meetings of senior political and military leaders, was signed by Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and the head of the U.S. President's Commission on Strategic Forces, Brent Scowcroft, as well as former U.S. officials Carter, Ford, and Vance.⁶

As the project developed beyond the completion of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, the primary focus became the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers and the implementation of various crisis control procedures.⁷ Both negotiation and implementation of the eventual agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed on September 15, 1987, required overcoming bureaucratic resistance on each side.⁸ Throughout the process, NNP was extensively involved as a go-between -- in the facilitation of communication between the U.S. government and Soviet academic policy advisers, as well as be-

tween the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. Beyond this, they contributed counsel and new ideas, and helped shape proposals at various points in the process.⁹ They also contributed significantly to public education on the issue through public speeches, the use of media, and support for public interest groups and sympathetic local and state governments.¹⁰ NNP was by no means the only third party intervener on this issue, a fact they quite willingly recognize. However, according to Ury, they played a key role at various critical points in the U.S. intra-governmental dialogue when "ideas were in danger of falling through the cracks."¹¹ By numerous accounts, they played an important role in facilitating communication between the Soviets and the U.S. government. In fact an official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington credited NNP with the primary responsibility for shifting Soviet opinion toward the idea of crisis management mechanisms and dialogue.¹² Finally, their monthly seminars on nuclear crisis control, with a variety of distinguished guests in attendance, functioned as a useful bridge between academic expertise and pragmatic action. This forum was used to generate proposals, make recommendations on implementation,¹³ and connect policymakers with academic people and ideas.

Facilitation of the Process Within the United States

In the United States opposition to the centers came over a number of issues. First, the Reagan administration,

especially the Defense Department, did not trust the standing Consultative Commission, an organization set up to perform a similar function. Second, the intelligence community feared that an inflexible communication commitment, as well as the potential for deception, would compromise American capability and may even create or increase conflict.¹⁴ Third, there was considerable inter-agency dispute over who would control the newly created center and concern for whether the added bureaucratic layer would simply complicate decision making. Consequently, even after administration commitment to the basic idea, the Departments of State and Defense feared the loss of influence over official communication to foreign governments. Finally, there was the fear that the Soviets would demand a concession in exchange for an "American" proposal which,¹⁵ when implemented, will be little used, if not ignored.

Despite these reservations, there was some support for specific crisis control measures. In late 1984, Ury discovered support for the institution of crisis control briefings for the president and top advisors while interviewing numerous current and former national security decision makers. Furthermore, that same year the United States and the Soviet Union signed an accord updating the hotline (the first arms control agreement in twelve years) and the U.S. proposed a joint military communication link¹⁶ (JMCL). However, the primary impetus for this growing

concern with crisis management came from Congress, where its two major proponents were Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner. A series of legislative actions, initiated primarily by them, culminated in the 1984 passage of a non-binding senate resolution. This legislation called for the president to propose negotiation for the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.¹⁷

The turning point, regarding support for the centers within the United States government, came on March 22, 1985 when Nunn and Warner met for a half day, high level, executive working session with key administration officials from the State Department, Defense Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, National Security Council, and others.¹⁸ NNP was instrumental in both preparation for, and execution of, this meeting between executive and legislative branches of government. In August 1984, Ury and NNP staff assistant, Ellen Meyer, began meeting with Warner, who had proposed a crisis control symposium the preceding May. Their intention was to organize a two day conference on crisis control which, according to NNP, would educate and involve key people, produce an agenda for action, and generate media attention. By November, Warner and Nunn had agreed to co-sponsor the event.¹⁹ By December, the conference had evolved into the scaled-down working session for executives, with a stated purpose, according to NNP, to "Gather together the thinking.... Examine the existing obstacles.... (and) Organize a small working level group to

draft and coordinate a strategy...". Warner's staff accepted this objective; Nunn's staff found it vague and²⁰ wanted more structure. However, this formed the basic outline of what eventually became the schedule of the executive working session -- examination of obstacles, possible initiatives, critique, and recommendations to²¹ working group. By January 1985, NNP was clearly centrally involved in formulating the design of the meeting; while congressional staff for Nunn and Warner handled the administrative process. In fact NNP began to assume the role of educating the congressional staff, as personnel had totally²² changed since the Senate resolution had been voted in June 1984.

Warner and Nunn were actively looking for advice on what to do both during and after the executive session. The primary question was how to get the government to act on what kind of center. Therefore, during December 1984 - January 1985, NNP devoted one entire Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar at Harvard, and a series of meetings in Washington, to the request from Nunn and Warner staffs for recommenda-²³ tions on process and outcome. The NNP role involved pre-²⁴ paring the following: 1) process proposals for the executive working session; 2) a list of functions for the pro-²⁵ posed center; 3) a rationale to counter objections; and²⁶ 4) action-forcing mechanisms which would influence the²⁷ administration.

The executive working session served to revive the issue of the centers within the administration, with the National Security Council (NSC) becoming the White House advocate. Within two weeks of this meeting, national security advisor Robert McFarlane indicated to Nunn that the administration would reconsider its position on the centers.²⁸ The primary moving force within that agency was Col. Robert Linhard, who represented NSC at the executive working session and eventually co-²⁹led the U.S. delegation during formal negotiations on the establishment of the centers. Linhard was responsible for coordinating an inter-agency working group, including Nunn and Warner, which met over the next six months to explore the pros and cons and evaluate possible center functions. There was still significant difference of opinion between various internal parties over the nature, and even feasibility, of the concept. For example, the senators wanted to make the centers part of the Standing Consultative Commission, an idea which the Defense Department completely opposed.³⁰

During these months, NNP helped facilitate the process of gaining administration support. Linhard utilized, not only their ACDA report, but also a concrete list of suggestions, put forward in an August workshop run by NNP. Out of this came a shorter list of ideas which, together with Ury's informal counsel, shaped the proposals which the working group could recommend to administration decision

makers. During this period, support for NNP's role came
from a variety of administration sources. In addition,
evidence of its success in altering public opinion and
administration policy also began to appear.

On August 26, McFarlane informed the inter-agency
group that the government accepted a scaled-down version of
the centers and would raise the matter with the Soviets.
The one page agreement, "Outline of Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center Proposal," was based largely on the minimalist
concept encouraged by NNP, as an initial step, at the March
executive working session. Nunn and Warner then presented
this agreement to Gorbachev during a September visit to the
Soviet Union and recommended it be placed on the agenda for
the Geneva Summit in November. The same recommendation was
made to the U.S. administration. Linhard, with the assis-
tance of NNP, was crucial in seeing that it was selected,
out of a potential thirty six items, by Secretary of State
Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at a pre-summit
meeting. A U.S.-Soviet agreement to study the center pro-
posal, at the expert level, was finally reached at the
Geneva summit.

After the summit it remained possible for the idea to
get lost, or diminished, amidst the tangle of a still
skeptical bureaucracy. Though top echelons of the U.S.
government (Reagan, Schultz, and Weinberger) were now
favorable, the commitment was not deep. In this context,
Linhard had the task of forming an inter-agency coalition

to study the proposal, each member of which had a different end point in mind. Throughout the first half of 1986, Ury continued to provide him and others with information, working papers, and public education endeavors in order to, first, prepare the way for formal negotiations and, then, assist in that process after they began in May.³⁷ Earlier that year Ury wrote a working paper addressing both internal and external debate over objections and illustrating the utility of the centers in a wide variety of circumstances.³⁸ He then went to Washington during the summer of 1986 to serve as a consultant to the White House Crisis Management Center. During this time support solidified on the part of ACDA and the State Department, as Ury met with experts and respond personally to objections to the centers. According to a White House source, Linhard's working group used two or three of the major points from Ury's working paper in developing the version they finally used with the Soviets.³⁹

As the centers opened in April 1988, NNP became involved in the task of implementation. The major question became expansion of center functions, given the considerable amount of bureaucratic resistance still evident. Before the Washington center even opened, Ury spent time with its new director and with the director of the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs in the State Department, where the center is located. They discussed next steps in the

incremental approach -- transition briefing papers which would assist policymakers to understand both present and potential functions, reports which might provide access to administration officials by the new director, and seminars to review progress and chart further strategy.⁴⁰

Facilitation of the Process Between

United States Government and Soviet Academics

In the Soviet Union there was even greater resistance to the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. Many Soviet objections actually paralleled American skepticism. Both were concerned with intelligence loss and disinformation, complication of decision making, and the possibility that the centers would be ignored during a crisis. In addition, the Soviets expressed concern over outside perception of superpower condominium and the nature of American support. They were suspicious of both the endorsement of a known anti-Soviet Senator (Henry Jackson) and the dependability of coordinated and continuous backing from the American public. However, the two most common objections centered on diversion of attention from the more important task of negotiating arms reductions, and creation of a "safety valve" which would legitimize limited war and "provoke" crises.⁴¹ Georgi Arbatov, of the Institute of USA and Canada in Moscow, and a member of the Central Committee, repeatedly expressed these fears of a dangerous, diversionary tactic, to a visiting delegation from Harvard in

early 1985. He claimed that "political tranquilizers," in the form of consultations, had "taken away the feeling of danger" during arms control negotiations in the early 80's.⁴² At the least, we can conclude that there were significant differences between Americans and Soviet academics with respect to the level of priority which should be given to nuclear risk reduction centers. Such a conclusion is in keeping with a tendency, on the part of Soviets, to stress the health of the overall relationship and, on the part of Americans, to be concerned with details.

Contact between Soviet and American academics, over the issue of crisis prevention and control, began in Vienna at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in the summer of 1983. Four Soviet experts joined half a dozen western counterparts for a one month study on negotiation, coordinated by William Ury.⁴³ During this session a proposal was developed for further study of nuclear risk reduction, especially establishment of a crisis control center and a periodic joint crisis consultative group⁴⁴ where senior ministers might talk.

The next year such a study was begun under the auspices of the Avoiding Nuclear War Project of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Institute of USA and Canada (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. With Ury functioning as associate director of the Avoiding Nuclear War (ANW) Project and ANW research fellow, Bruce Allyn, serving as associate director of NNP,

the two Harvard organizations formed a close working relationship in order to more effectively pursue overlapping purposes. This Joint Study on Crisis Prevention and Settlement involved a series of biannual discussions by experts pooled primarily, but not exclusively, from Harvard University and ISKAN.⁴⁵ Soon after Soviet leader Chernenko called for "urgent consultations to prevent a nuclear conflagration," as part of a set of norms to govern superpower relations, the constituting meeting of the Joint Study was held at Harvard in May 1984. Both parties agreed to present any findings to policymakers in their respective countries, a process facilitated in the Soviet Union by the attendance of policymakers at meetings held in Moscow, the close relationship between a number of researchers and policymakers, and the overlap of roles on the part of a few.⁴⁶

Following the opening meeting there were a number of individual research exchanges which supplemented the sessions. Harvard researchers Ury and Allyn spent three weeks in Moscow in November, conducting seminars on crisis prevention and interviewing scholars as well as members of the Central Committee, Foreign Ministry, and advisors to the Politburo. They explored Soviet concerns and ideas by discussing a series of Allyn's working papers on Soviet views toward crisis prevention and settlement.⁴⁷ During this visit they obtained the cooperation of a well known politi-

cal commentator, and advisor to Krushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This Soviet ally not only attended the next meeting of the Joint Study in Moscow (February 1985), at which he called for the creation of mechanisms for consultation in times of crisis, but also discussed the centers idea with people in the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, in a departure from official policy, he wrote an article (August 1985) calling for instant communication in crisis situations. Upon return to the U.S., a report on the Ury/Allyn trip was given to Senators Nunn and Warner.⁴⁸ The research exchange was reciprocated in December 1984 when Harvard hosted two members of ISKAN, including its director (also a member of the Central Committee) and a retired General. Pros and cons of the center idea were specifically raised.⁴⁹

The critical turning point for Soviet support came, in the opinion of Ury and Allyn, as a result of two events in early 1985. First, the second Joint Study meeting in February precipitated initial openness on the part of ISKAN's director and other prominent Soviets; and second, Gorbachev came to power in March. During the study meeting these key Soviets came to realize that a safety valve may in fact be of significant use. The crucial moment seems to have been following two illustrations, one by Ury and another by a highly placed Soviet, arguing for the crisis intervention value of a city fire department and paramedics, respectively. In neither case does crisis

mechanisms replace the need for measures to improve the general situation. The same Soviet who suggested the illustration then called for a threefold approach to nuclear crises: 1) communication in crisis, 2) limits on especially dangerous weapons systems, and 3) better understanding of each others perceptions of strategic balance.⁵⁰ This combination of crisis control measures with significant progress on arms control gained considerable acceptance among the study participants. Following the study meeting, Allyn and Ury met with a series of individuals and discovered increased concern over accidental war and interest in crisis control, even on the part of one prominent military official. This changing Soviet perspective was then communicated by Ury to U.S. administration officials at the executive working session sponsored by Senators Nunn and Warner in March. A series of supportive quotes by prominent Soviets was given to the senators and the director of ACDA for use when engaging Soviet officials⁵¹ in serious talks on crisis management.

Clear evidence of progress in Soviet thought and actions, regarding inadvertent war, could be seen in many quarters during the next few months.⁵² The most dramatic event occurred in July when ISKAN's deputy director contacted Ury in Paris to inquire how interested the U.S. government really was in the center idea, a question raised a number of times subsequently. The Soviet kept saying he

was looking for practical ideas upon which they could agree and took copious notes on Ury's suggestions. Ury concluded that he had been asked for background information on this option as a possible agenda item for the Geneva Summit, at which he later was present.⁵³ In addition, the wide distribution of NNP's ACDA report, and its positive review in the ISKAN journal in October, reflected openness to the idea at high levels of Soviet decision making.⁵⁴

Still, progress on this issue owed much to Gorbachev's pragmatism and growing concern over inadvertent war, as demonstrated in various statements made by him just prior to the summit.⁵⁵ In fact, the relatively swift decision to study the center concept came as a result of need, on the part of both presidents and key advisors, for an easy and positive result at their first meeting. Without this event it is likely that more time would have been required for agreement, since the bureaucracies of both were still quite skeptical. After this, both bureaucracies were compelled to take the idea seriously. In the Soviet Union this meant that both ISKAN and the Foreign Ministry, to whom primary government responsibility for the centers idea was assigned, were now obligated to do research and assign personnel to the subject.⁵⁶

During the period between the summit and formal negotiations, there were still numerous intra- and inter-party differences to face.⁵⁷ NNP continued to facilitate dialogue between the Soviets and the U.S. reciprocated It

also continued its efforts, in cooperation with ISKAN, to promote the centers within resistant sectors of the Soviet reciprocated. In January 1986, during a third trip to the Soviet Union, Ury and Allyn conducted another seminar series on crisis control.⁵⁸ They discussed in detail the centers proposal with ISKAN's deputy director, focusing on the document of agreement between U.S. administration and senators. Ury provided a paper, similar to the one later circulated within the U.S. administration, outlining Soviet and American views on the centers and recommending a framework for dialogue. The deputy director then requested permission to circulate it within ISKAN and the Foreign Ministry. In addition, Ury reaffirmed U.S. administration endorsement and answered queries about its interpretation of the summit agreement. The deputy director responded with unqualified support for the centers and proposed that the Joint Study be seen as a form of negotiation that would ease naturally into formal negotiation.⁵⁹

It is fair to conclude that the Joint Study process played a crucial role in facilitating movement by Soviet policymakers on the issue of linkage, the factor which had formed their primary objection to the centers. By the time initial negotiations began in May 1986, the official Soviet position favored pursuing simultaneous efforts on crisis management and arms control,⁶⁰ a shift in attitude which Ury later reported to U.S. officials at a nuclear crisis simu-

lation exercise held in Washington. The specific influence of NNP/ANW on Soviet perspectives was later confirmed by the head of the official Soviet delegation. In preparation for the second set of formal negotiations in August, he told Linhard that they had some "new ideas" as a result of conversations with Ury.⁶¹ Finally, public acknowledgement of the role of "experts", as well as "private groups and individuals," was finally given by both governments at the signing ceremony for the agreement.⁶²

The continuing role of NNP is evident in the implementation process as well. While the formal agreement adopted a minimalist interpretation of center functions, limited to notification of ballistic missile launches,⁶³ this conception quickly broadened in accordance with the incremental process envisioned by NNP. By the time the centers opened in April 1988, one of their initial roles was to function as the communication link for verification of the INF Treaty signed in December 1987.⁶⁴ Ury's perspective regarding further evolution of functions continues to be heard and respected, not only by the American officials responsible for running the center in Washington, as indicated earlier, but also by influential Soviet academics at ISKAN, as indicated by a recent report issued by the ANW/ISKAN Joint Study Group.⁶⁵

Analysis

I will now assess whether the role played by NNP

within this process is consistent with the theory of principled negotiation. One must remember that principled negotiation was designed primarily to guide the behavior of parties in formal negotiations. However, as indicated in chapter 2, Fisher and Ury claim that it can be applied to third party intervention. Indeed, much of their own efforts involve the functioning of their respective Harvard organizations as third parties in informal mediation. Therefore I will be looking to see, not only if practice fits theory, but also the points where principled formal negotiation may need modification when it becomes "principled informal mediation." The assessment will follow the main tenets of principled negotiation, concluding with an evaluation of the specific nature of third party functioning in this case.

Separation of Relational From Substantive Issues

It is very clear from the evidence that NNP succeeded in turning the attention of potential adversaries, both U.S. and Soviet, toward joint problem solving. As indicated previously, this problem solving approach necessitates viewing the adversary as a partner, rather than as part of the problem. This attitude of partnership was demonstrated by NNP's determination to include all the players, to the extent possible, in both private consultations and group process, and acknowledge the ways in which each had been supportive. This inclusion and coop-

eration represents a considerable achievement, especially in relations with the Soviets, where cultural differences would naturally make such a mutual endeavor that much more difficult. Still, it is not possible to conclude that people problems were totally separated from substantive issues. NNP was not able to separate attitudes and value systems from the way various parties dealt with issues. This was apparent in attitudes such as the Soviet preference for principle over pragmatism which surfaced in their desire to place greater value on the reduction of tension in the overall political relationship. Even at the end, many Soviets still expressed more concern for arms control than for crisis control. However, the Joint Study Group was able to keep these culturally determined values, and the resulting personal perspectives of participants, from destroying progress on the centers proposal. From the beginning they agreed to set aside recriminations and accusations, rhetoric and propaganda, allowing Americans to disagree with Americans and Soviets with Soviets. Consequently, it was possible to "insulate divisive issues from the working relationship," as Ury proposed at the February 1985⁶⁷ meeting.

None of the meetings, either with U.S. administration or Soviet academics, was structured for the sole purpose of dealing with emotional interpersonal issues. However, an informal, off-the-record atmosphere was created in sessions with both. For example, the seating pattern at Joint Study

meetings interspersed Americans and Soviets at random. Furthermore, on a couple occasions they shared leisure activity together, fishing in Siberia and golf in Florida. According to Allyn, one of the most enduring results of this process was the deepened personal and working relationships between ISKAN and Harvard academics. ⁶⁸ Such a development was no small feat, given the initial Soviet skepticism over what they referred to as the "western absolutization of the psychological element" in negotiation theory. While recognizing this, NNP/ANW counted on Soviet beliefs that cooperation was a key to regulating a chaotic ⁶⁹ world.

Facilitation of communication, both inter- and intra-party, became one of the primary tasks of NNP. Initially they spent a great deal of time in 1984 and early 1985 listening to the views of a wide spectrum of Soviets and Americans. They were very concerned to know who had been involved and what perspective they brought to the issue. This active listening was later combined with clear presentation of NNP's perspective, a tactic which frequently helped legitimize the issue for people on all sides. For example, during the second Joint Study meeting in February 1985, Ury demonstrated his understanding of Soviet concerns prior to presenting his rationale for the centers and again at the conclusion of the meeting. In so doing, he drew upon Soviet statements, both those made

within that meeting and previous public ones, to support
his position. ⁷⁰ Similarly, in relation to the U.S. administration, he demonstrated equal facility with communication skills. At the beginning of the executive working session sponsored by Nunn and Warner, he was able to hear the pessimistic assessment by some administration officials, acknowledge the difficulties they raised, and reframe the
issue in a more positive light. ⁷¹

In addition to facilitating communication within one party by such methods as listening to people's perspectives, breaking impasses, and summarizing discussions, NNP also translated and clarified many issues for all participants in the process. Though a few arguments were kept in-house in order to avoid any detrimental influence on the other party or on a third party, such instances were infrequent. ⁷² Some of the translation and clarification was done through the various background and policy recommendation papers referred to above. Other times it was done through dialogue with individuals or small groups. Two previously mentioned examples include Ury's translation of American perspectives on the summit text to ISKAN's deputy director and Ury's report on changing Soviet views to the Senator's executive working session. Accurate perception was also of crucial importance when dealing with American-American dialogue, as can be seen in NNP's planning efforts for the executive working session. During preparatory seminars

they made great efforts to understand the perceptions of potential administration participants by role playing officials from the various government agencies.

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Focus on Interests Rather than Positions

The existence of common interests between Soviets and Americans was a large factor in the successful negotiation of nuclear risk reduction centers. Unquestionably, the most important common interest was the desire to avoid nuclear war and the resulting destabilization or destruction of both states, something acknowledged by both sides even before the start of the study. In addition, a sense of commonalty was enhanced by the existence of the common objections -- intelligence loss and disinformation, complication of decision making, and possibility of the centers being ignored in a crisis. Both sides had an interest in avoiding negative consequences and ensuring that promised ones would, in fact, occur. Furthermore, as awareness developed regarding skepticism on the other side, this helped reduce fears of deception, and diversionary tactics. The ability of NNP to facilitate the awareness of common interests and skepticism enabled the parties to change their opposed interests into ones which were merely divergent.

Such a transformation is best exemplified by the change in adversary perspective toward both Soviet interest in linking arms control and crisis management and American

interest in avoiding Soviet demand for concessions. Initially the two interests seemed totally at odds. Soviet insistence on linkage was seen by Americans as evidence of the very concession demand which they feared. However, eventually both sides came to see that the existence of overriding common interests outweighed the importance of these conflicting interests and even changed their nature. For example, during the Nunn/Warner executive working session, Ury directed attention away from concern over Soviet intention to hold confidence building measures hostage to concessions. He did this by pointing to the even greater importance of common interest in avoiding inadvertent war. 75

The attempt by NNP to nurture awareness of interests came at a historical moment when radical changes in Soviet thinking were just beginning to clear the way for open discussion of national interest for the first time. In fact, the transition in Soviet thinking can be seen in the course of the interactions between NNP and ISKAN personnel, a dialogue spanning the years 1983-1987. As recent as 1982, Allyn was writing about the incompatible nature of Soviet and American ideology regarding validity of national interests. According to classical marxism, one's consciousness of true interests was distorted by economic concerns. Therefore progressive class interests were more valid than national interests. However, Allyn now points to the radical transformation whereby the Soviet President,

himself, has proposed the need for a balance of interests. During the Joint Study, qualified reservations regarding validity still found expression in questions about accuracy and subjectivity. However, there was widespread acceptance of legitimacy among Soviet participants. As early as 1984 one Soviet interviewed by Allyn and Ury indicated that acknowledgement of one another's interests was a precondition to meaningful talks on crisis prevention. By the time of the second meeting in February 1985, ISKAN's associate director was speaking of the need for equality in definition of interests, while another Soviet suggested replacing national interests with common international interests. By 1986 a key Soviet at ISKAN was defending the center proposal on the basis that it creatively changed the balance between competitive and common interests of the two countries.⁷⁷

The process by which NNP helped parties to identify and accept underlying interests was, with few exceptions, in line with principled negotiation's admonition to help each party state the interests of both. First, with all parties, they stressed the need to hear and accept all concerns. For example, in planning for the Nunn/Warner executive working session, Ury suggested that it be designed so as to educate all participants about the concerns of all constituent agencies and see where interests align.⁷⁸ Second, NNP encouraged more resistant participants to assert their own interests as they saw

them. For example, NNP participants recognized, and agreed⁷⁹ with, Soviet concerns for progress on arms control. They also affirmed the interests of U.S. administration officials regarding the separation of negotiations over the centers from other forums so as to prevent the hostage⁸⁰ phenomenon. Third, they encouraged those on each side who accepted the primacy of the common interest of preventing nuclear war to assert this among colleagues. This strategy is readily apparent in relation to key figure within the American government, such as Nunn, Warner, and Linhard. It is also clear in relation to a very few Soviets who caught the vision early in the process. However, most of the time those participants who did catch the vision, as well as NNP itself, failed to separate assertion of these common interests from assertion of the particular position or solution they were promoting, namely the center concept. At the same time their proposals/positions did have a degree of flexibility. Meyer suggested during an NNP seminar, in preparation for the Nunn/Warner executive session, that while NNP should clarify the goal, it should leave the⁸¹ details.

In addition, NNP helped to extricate parties from previous positions. This process was made easier by the fact that there were no official positions opposing the center idea, even on the part of governments. Yet, nonofficial positions of particular agencies or individuals can

still be problematic. Therefore NNP utilized various means recommended by principled negotiation. First, they frequently asked for advice and invited criticism. Second, they utilized positive statements within a party to press for more movement. For example, one Soviet participant during the second Joint study meeting proposed building a concrete proposal based on Chernenko's norms, a standard frequently referred to as an indication of official Soviet willingness to consult in the event of crises. Later various NNP participants picked up on this and made even more specific suggestions. Third, they asked parties whether their solution addressed the complete problem. For example, at one point ISKAN's director defended his position that risk reduction centers are merely political tranquilizers by comparing the situation to the likelihood that no-fault automobile insurance would increase reckless driving. In response, one Harvard participant challenged him by asking how utilization of a seat belt would harm his real interests. Fourth, they challenged participants over whether a particular position had been helpful or harmful in the past. For example, during one of the Joint Study meetings Ury asked one of the Soviets whether it would have been better to consult before the invasion of Afghanistan. A response of qualified agreement indicated that the position had been effectively challenged.

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Invent Options Before Making Commitments

NNP clearly intended to be a catalyst for creation of new options. A memorandum from a planning session for the second Joint Study meeting indicates NNP aimed to "separate inventing from deciding" and develop a "framework for agreement, not necessarily a specific commitment or decision, ... (but one) with holes to fill in."⁸³ A general strategy memorandum by Ury, in May 1984, set forth the same purpose by calling for the use of questions rather than statements so as to play a facilitative role during interviews and seminars. However, at the same time, Ury proposed use of the single text negotiating procedure whereby a draft agreement and presidential speech would be circulated.⁸⁴ In addition to the implementation of these specific examples, other evidence of the use of this procedure has already been described above. The initial center function list developed by NNP provided the basis for later proposals discussed at the Nunn/Warner executive working session, with Gorbachev prior to the Geneva Summit, and with ISKAN's deputy director following the summit. Furthermore, Ury's 1986 working paper on the centers again circulated a single text of functions within the upper echelon of both governments. Although the single negotiating text is a tried and recommended procedure of principled negotiation, it is a process which presents both framework and specifics of a decision in an attempt at "illustrative specificity." At best, it is the presentation of one quite specific option,

with the belief that this will generate other proposals. Under more controlled circumstances, where the third party functions as an official intermediary, it may be able to restrict the creation of rival positions as a result of use of this strategy. However, that is not the context in which it is being employed here.

This case illustrates one of the potential problems inherent within principled negotiation. On the one hand it professes to discourage early commitment to decisions, while on the other hand some of its favorite strategies, such as creation of the single negotiating text and "yesable propositions," rely heavily on presentation of potential solutions rather than brainstorming techniques. In this case NNP was convinced that it knew at least the basic outline, as well as much of the detail, for what was needed. A comment by Ury illustrates the dilemma. He attempts to justify this "option presentation," rather than "option creation," process with the claim that "Soviets⁸⁵ hate choices. Don't burden them with endless options." In making this assessment, it is necessary to note that there was more emphasis on inventing options during the first phase of the project, than there was during the later period. Such an observation does fit with principled negotiation's admonition to invent "first" and decide later. However, as noted above, there were also some very early indications (1984) of "option presentation" in the form of a draft agreement. Furthermore, the early option invention

took place among a limited network of people. Many key players entered the picture after "option presentation" was clearly predominant.

This case demonstrates sufficient emphasis on "option presentation" to call into question the fundamental validity of principled negotiation's "invention before decision" maxim, at least as it applies to any negotiation with the Soviets. Yet, Ury would undoubtedly, and rightfully, reject this assessment as a challenge to the overall validity of principled negotiation. It is possible that use of the option presentation approach can, in this case, be justified by the claim that NNP was acting as a third party which was focused on construction of a new aspect of the relationship, rather than attempting to settle old disputes. Hence the situation was one where a presented option might well meet with less opposition and might even create openness. However, the key here is whether or not this process enabled the primary parties to respond with creative invention and whether third parties can function by different standards than the principals. More will be said on this subsequently, under both this and the last section.

Despite premature judgement, the endeavor succeeded. NNP was able to fulfill its purpose as stated by Ury in preparation for the Nunn/Warner executive working session, namely to reach agreement on what's needed to get the U.S.⁸⁶ and the Soviet Union to "buy off on" the center concept.

To accomplish this, NNP altered the choices facing the superpowers by offering them a feasible decision at a time when both needed a low cost agreement at a crucial summit. They avoided the danger of making it sound like an ultimatum, a warning made by Fisher when utilizing these procedures, since they had no power to issue such a warning. Yet, they chose not to follow a second piece of Fisher advice -- to produce more than one yesable proposition in order to make them look less like positional statements. Inventing one new choice and convincing the key players of its mutual benefit and feasibility was the primary task.

However, there was an ongoing, though limited, inventing process in order to fill in the framework with necessary specific details. In pursuing this task, NNP utilized most of the techniques recommended by principled negotiation. The only tactic they were unable to employ was altering standard moves in a negotiating game. First, NNP altered the scope of the agreement by limiting it to a minimalist concept of the centers. Possible expansion at a later date was always left open. However, this limitation of formal agreement freed up discussion and enabled widely divergent groups of people, both within and between governments, to reach consensus over a smaller number of issues.⁸⁷ Second, NNP altered perception of the consequences on the part of both governments. They increased the saliency of the centers idea primarily by emphasizing pros over cons and demonstrating the likelihood and magnitude of

potential benefits. Ury outlined numerous operational situations in which the distinctive features of the centers could play a pivotal role in mutually beneficial management of nuclear accidents. ⁸⁸ Instances of NNP's resort to threat to alter perception of consequences were limited to the principled negotiation ploy of offering a fading opportunity. This was done only in relation to the U.S. government ⁸⁹ through the limited use of action-forcing mechanisms. Third, NNP altered the nature of the game by including different players in the process. They introduced Soviet academics to the issue and even made suggestions to ISKAN regarding the presence of certain sympathetic Soviets in ⁹⁰ the Joint Study. They also exercised influence in the selection process for U.S. administration participants in ⁹¹ the Nunn/Warner executive working session. However, it is noteworthy that those solicited by NNP tended to be moderate in their views, contrary to Fisher's recommendation to include participants representing the most extreme positions. They then brought their influence to bear on these lower, accessible officials and cohesive subgroups (like NSC and ISKAN) who were, in turn, able to influence higher officials as well as make some critical decisions on their own.

Even if NNP's strategy was to alter various aspects of the pre-negotiation game, it is still important to ask to what extent the tactics employed utilized option-inventing

techniques. NNP personnel utilized interviews to both stimulate option creation and collect options for incorporation into its own perspective.⁹² However, brainstorming techniques are the most beneficial structure. These were very apparent within NNP internal preparation, but largely absent in actual meetings with other players. The NNP seminar in January 1985 which developed plans for the Nunn/Warner executive working session was an excellent brainstorming meeting. Options were discussed for executive session process, the broader process of influencing the administration, and the development of proposed center functions. However, the format envisioned for the working session itself is much more controlled, with NNP personnel assuming that they have to be the ones to come up with the center functions. The seminar report concludes with, "No one is going to be able to work out the concept of the Center better than the people in this room."⁹³ The working relation with the senator staffs comes closer to a brainstorming process. For example, at a planning meeting for the executive working session, the initial functions proposal presented by one of Senator Nunn's staff was criticized as too narrow. Ury's suggestion to call it one of many options and make it more flexible, less specific, became the consensus of the meeting and informed the final proposal used in the working session.⁹⁴ As for meetings with the Soviets, there is some evidence of brainstorming. During the 1983 IIASA summer study on Negotiation, in which

ury laid the groundwork for the subsequent Joint Study, U.S. and Soviet academics brainstormed action ideas regarding crisis procedure. ⁹⁵ During the study itself, there was less indication of a fully structured brainstorming procedure. However, some common ground rules for such processes -- elimination of all criticism and evaluation plus presence of a rapporteur -- ⁹⁶ were observed.

Search for Objective Criteria

The search for objective criteria as a basis for agreement was hardly needed by the time formal negotiations began. On the basis of this case, it appears that the such a search may be unnecessary when there is obvious mutual need or interest. However, the process whereby both principal parties recognized common interest in the center proposal, was one which included the investigation of mutually acceptable criteria for fairness. NNP had to operate with some sense of what was fair in order to convince Soviet academics and both governments of the merits of their proposal. The use of objective criteria as a valid form of persuasion is as significant in the exploratory phase of pre-negotiation as it is in the distributive phase of formal negotiation. Consequently, it will follow that the search for objective criteria, in this case, was limited to the discernment of standards for a fair resolution of substantive issues. Discovery of criteria for negotiating procedures, one of the stated aims of

principled negotiation, was irrelevant.

NNP made great efforts to legitimize the center proposal in the eyes of the U.S. administration and ISKAN academics on the basis of mutual benefit, expert and public opinion, and precedent. Since much has already been said about NNP's role in establishing consciousness of mutual benefit, I will limit comment at this stage to one such instance. In Ury's 1986 working paper, outlining Soviet and American views and recommending a framework for dialogue, he illustrated the unique utility of the centers in a wide variety of past and hypothetical circumstances. The paper, circulated within both governments and ISKAN, concluded that there was a critical gap in the sufficiency of existing crisis control mechanisms at the point of preventing
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inadvertent war. Thus legitimacy was established, in the eyes of all parties, by addressing mutual objections with the presentation of mutual benefits.

The use of expert opinion to legitimize the centers is apparent within the same working paper for governments. Ury utilizes crisis experiences of both American and Soviet government officials to document near accidents and indicate the support of these former officials for
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additional communication mechanisms. Furthermore, due to the rather exceptional circumstances of this case, NNP itself became part of the panel of experts used by Senators Warner and Nunn to convince the U.S. administration. The

extensive utilization of NNP in the executive working session, and inclusion of their ACDA report in Congressional testimony, aptly demonstrate this. Likewise, officials at ISKAN used their writings to both introduce and legitimize the concept to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The effective education and use of public opinion by NNP has also been noted previously. Again the senators are encouraged to refer to both domestic and foreign public opinion to give credence to their argument. Finally, Ury even claimed that U.S. public opinion polls, showing inadvertent war to be the greatest American fear, helped convince the Soviets that the U.S. was genuinely interested in crisis control and not using it simply as a tranquilizer.

Precedent is considered to be the primary means of legitimation in principled negotiation. This case bears out that pattern. Numerous precedents are repeatedly used to justify the centers proposal. The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), set up during SALT I negotiations, was designed to clarify and define specific rules of behavior regarding strategic force structure. In providing background information for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Meyer cites this as an example of a body having responsibility for implementation of other agreements. She even makes reference to a statement by a former SCC commissioner, drawing an analogy between the SCC and a potential nuclear risk reduction center. According to him, the flexible charter regarding operating regulations and

procedures, together with the commitment to regular consultations, was a perfect model.¹⁰¹ As noted previously, the SCC was initially promoted as a model, and even an umbrella agency, by NNP and Senators Warner and Nunn. However, resistance from the U.S. Department of Defense made this impossible. Even some of the American delegation to the Joint Study questioned whether or not precedent taken from a monitoring and enforcement agency for arms control would be suitable for crisis control.¹⁰² Hence, it becomes clear that precedent was used by more than one party in the search for objective criteria.

The center proposal was also compared with a number of formal agreements. The Hotline Agreement of 1963 broke fifteen years of deadlock in U.S.-Soviet relations, a situation comparable with that of the early stage of pre-negotiations for the center proposal. Furthermore, this communication was first used by the Soviets, a fact Ury mentions to counter U.S. administration fears that such an institution would, in fact, be ignored.¹⁰³ The Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) of 1972, which encoded rules of naval behavior and procedures for handling accidents, served both crisis prevention and management purposes. INCSEA was used by NNP to legitimize the mutual recognition of prevention and management preferences on the part of Soviets and Americans respectively.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, NNP and one supportive Soviet even proposed that the centers could

serve as the implementation of the Accidents Agreement of 1971 and the Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War (APNW) of 1973, both of which call for consultation in the event of crisis. By presenting the center proposal as an extension of previous treaties, the second of which was pushed by the Soviets and the first of which they agreed to readily, its credence was enhanced with both governments.¹⁰⁵ However, again the criteria of precedence was used against the proposal by both Soviets and Americans, even among Joint Study participants, who pointed to APNW compliance failures as justification for reservations.¹⁰⁶

Informal agreements and unilateral actions also provided useful precedent. In the former category, one supportive Soviet suggested the development of "mechanisms of consultation" at the second Joint Study, based on the Basic Principles Agreement (BPA) of 1972, a loose and generalized accord which defined the basis of the detente relationship. In the latter category, during the same meeting, conservative Soviet participants referred to the Chernenko norms. These norms, which include a call for crisis consultation, were later suggested as an additional basis for proposed "mechanisms of consultation."¹⁰⁷

The interplay regarding criteria, between NNP and various resistive parties, noted above to some extent, must be examined in closer detail. How NNP related to both their own and other's criteria, and how a final set of criteria was determined, are crucial questions for

evaluating NNP's adherence to principled negotiation. Was this truly a joint search? Did NNP ask for alternative criteria? Did it utilize them or dispute them? Could NNP disengage from its own proposed criteria when necessary?

To evaluate these questions I will limit the examination to one set of divergent criteria employed by Soviets and Americans in the course of the Joint Study. One of the main issues hindering reconciliation of criteria was the different value systems referred to above under separation of relational and substantive issues. Despite NNP's declared intention, prior to the second meeting, to discover the objective criteria as understood by each side,¹⁰⁸ the dialogue made clear Soviet preference for agreements of general principles versus American preference for pragmatic agreements with detailed substantive proposals. The two value systems formed quite divergent sets of "subjective" criteria for judging both outcome and process. This tension emerged in the opening session of the second meeting when a generally supportive Soviet participant responded to Ury's call for mutual consultations on regional conflict by insisting that consultation without agreement on principles could be ineffective. In this context, NNP demonstrated its willingness to discuss general principles. Most of the discussion in that three day meeting was devoted to an evaluation of general norms or principles to guide behavior. Americans as well as Soviets

contributed to the search for mutually acceptable written and unwritten norms. It was an American who first itemized a "ten commandments" of U.S.-Soviet relations, to which Soviets then made addition. Within this more general, less threatening context, NNP was able to introduce its own objective criteria in the form of analogies (fire department and seat belts) to validate its claim that crisis management was important. It is not insignificant that the crucial Soviet illustration of the paramedics was made in this "general principle" context.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, NNP demonstrated, at a crucial point, that it was committed to a joint search for objective criteria. It had disengaged from its own predisposed criteria and affirmed that of the Soviets.

At the same time NNP was able to effectively communicate the reservations of the American government over reliance on general principle agreements and declarations. One U.S. participant stressed that, though he agreed personally with the need to start with general principles, detente and BPA had become symbols of ineffectiveness which tainted all such approaches within the American mindset. Another basis for negotiation would have to be found in order to interest the Reagan Administration. American participants also questioned the limitations of general principle agreements, which cannot be sensitive to the unique demands of a particular situation.¹¹⁰

It is clear that both Soviets and Americans contri-

buted to a joint search for objective criteria. The final report of the Joint Study comments that Soviet views helped Americans appreciate the value of general principles and Soviets listened carefully to American concerns about uniform, codified ground rules.¹¹¹ Furthermore, each group noted instances when the other had adopted its preferred criteria. NNP pointed to an Andropov call for "concrete deeds." One Soviet participant recalled that a declaration of no-first-use of nuclear and conventional force was made recently in Stockholm in order to assuage western fears of Soviet invasion.¹¹²

Conclusions Regarding Nature of the Intervention

This case clearly demonstrates the utility of principled negotiation in at least certain contexts. I shall begin by examining this case in light of selected "factors affecting intervention," as outlined in chapter 1. It is worth mention, first, that this context was clearly one of pre-negotiation. Second, the principal parties involved were ones with strong identities and approximate power symmetry. Consequently, they did not need empowerment through party advocacy. Third, the aim of the intervention was to construct a new aspect of the relationship, rather than settling old disputes. Fourth, the informal, nonofficial nature of the intervention helped avoid the danger that third party presence would increase intransigence among principal parties, a reservation of

fisher's, as observed in chapter 2. However, the accomplishment is still significant and holds the potential for modeling an intervention role for other nongovernmental institutions wishing to intervene creatively in international conflict.

In this light, it is all the more important to examine carefully the exact blend of advocacy/neutrality which NNP employed in this case. Ury's own analysis was that NNP had functioned as neutral with respect to party, advocate with respect to process, and a combination of both with respect to outcome, where it had a general idea of what was best.¹¹³ Each of these areas of advocacy/neutrality must be examined to see whether this assessment is accurate.

NNP's claim to party neutrality appears generally to be supported by the evidence, despite the fact that they are citizens of one of the two countries concerned. They spend as much effort to convince the U.S. government of benefits of the center proposal as they do the Soviet academics. If anything, they appear closer in personal relationships to their Soviet professional colleagues than to their fellow citizens in government service. Collegial bonds may well be as significant as national ones in determining partiality. In this case, NNP's behavior clearly demonstrates a positive relationship with all parties. They show a skilled ability to identify with all

concerns and interests on a nonjudgmental basis. Their universally acknowledged credibility and legitimation testifies to the accuracy of the assessment.

Process advocacy, as indicated in chapter 2, is an inherent part of principled negotiation. Therefore, problem solving process is clearly advocated in theory as well as demonstrated in practice. Informational and go-between roles can be observed in much of NNP's activity in this case. They collected and analyzed data. They facilitated both inter- and intra-party communication by translating and clarifying intentions, as well as breaking impasses. They encouraged awareness of common interests and skepticism and facilitated understanding of divergent ones. They showed an ability to welcome and utilize the criteria of others, while disengaging from their own, in a search for objective criteria. There were some limits to their use of this methodology, such as limitation of most brainstorming to internal sessions and lack of many option creation procedures.

Ury's claim to operate with a combination of outcome advocacy/neutralty is basically accurate. However, the balance appears to be much further in the direction of advocacy. Their aim to create a framework for agreement, with details to be filled in by others seems to have overachieved its goal. The yesable proposition they created contained a great many details. It is true that some of their original specifications, such as incor-

poration of the centers within the structure of the SCC, were later abandoned. It is also the case that many details came clear in the context of interaction with and between the principal players. However, on balance, the proposals put forward by NNP could hardly be said to be neutral in character. The single negotiating text procedure, by necessity a process designed to convey specifics, was used to circulate proposed lists of center functions as well as a presidential speech, a joint communique, and even a center agreement. This is a very creative process, but it is not impartial. NNP had a solution clearly in mind and, in the words of Allyn, lobbied for it.¹¹⁴ This analysis is further supported by the recommendation of a member of NNP's crisis control seminars who recommended to Ury, early in 1984, that NNP should play the political "insider" game and public "outsider" game,¹¹⁵ gathering endorsements across the political spectrum. In fact, this is exactly what NNP did, as demonstrated in Meyer's background information paper which was "aimed at interested advocates... both 'insiders' and 'outsiders.'"¹¹⁶ Furthermore, this same pattern of advocacy and lobbying has been traced in the process of Soviet decision making on the centers. There were informal advocacy channels both from NNP to ISKAN and from ISKAN to the Soviet government, as previously noted.¹¹⁷

At the same time, NNP's use of some problem solving

techniques, in the pursuit of their desired outcome, necessitates viewing the process as a combination of approaches. They presented their own proposals with clarity and sensitivity. They extricated other parties from positions by asking for advice and criticism of NNP's proposal, utilizing positive statements by the other party, challenging whether their position had been useful in the past, and asking if their solution addressed the complete problem. To gain support, they altered the scope of the agreement by limiting it to a minimalist concept of the centers, one far less than their own ultimate hopes. They altered the players and their roles to gain the most assistance from moderate forces in and around both governments. However, they limited brainstorming primarily to internal processes and interaction with sympathetic factions within the principal parties. In short, they frequently altered various aspects of the pre-negotiation game, but utilized option invention techniques within the limitations of presenting a solution.

Assessment of outcome advocacy/neutrality necessarily brings to mind this previously noted theoretical inconsistency within principled negotiation, the tension between option presentation and option invention. The attempt to provide a solution is consistent with some of principled negotiation's central pragmatic techniques, such as creation of "yesable propositions." However, it is

inconsistent with the principled negotiation maxim "to invent before deciding" and inhibits any wide use of brainstorming techniques. The dilemma is accentuated when functioning as a third party in a mediation process.¹¹⁸ The lack of theoretical clarity becomes even more apparent with examination of the tension between outcome advocacy and neutrality. The heavy balance in favor of the former suggests that, in third party mediation, the authors of principled negotiation become more directive than they would recommend for a participating party in a negotiation process. Modification of the theory is especially apparent in the utilization of the "single negotiating text" procedure. This process, which can only be used in a mediation context, is limited to presentation of a single solution at any given time.

However, despite accentuation of a significant theoretical inconsistency, this case provides an excellent illustration of creative conflict intervention. In fact, the combination of problem solving and lobbying techniques contributes positively toward successful realization of a mutually beneficial solution.

NOTES

1. Harvard Negotiation Project, "Harvard Negotiation Project" (unpublished project description, distributed at Program on Negotiation Conference for Associates, Harvard University, October 19, 1984), pp. 7-9; and

Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Nuclear Negotiation Project" (unpublished project description, distributed at Program on Negotiation Conference for Associates, Harvard University, October 19, 1984), p1.

2. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Nuclear Negotiation Project," p. 1.

3. William L. Ury, private interview by telephone, February 9, 1989.

4. William L. Ury and Richard Smoke, Beyond the Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis, A Report to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ("n.p.": Nuclear Negotiation Project, Harvard Law School, 1984), pp. iv-ix; and

William L. Ury, Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War, ed. by Martin Linsky (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), p. xi.

5. United States Senate, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations on Nuclear Risk Reduction, Senate Resolution No. 329, 98th Congress, 2nd session, April 4, 1984 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 35-44; and

[Ellen G. Meyer], "Crisis Control Progress Report: 1984/85" (unpublished report, Nuclear Negotiation Project, 1985), pp. 2-3.

6. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: February - May, 1985" (unpublished report, 1985), p. 2;

[William L. Ury], "Results" (unpublished report, Nuclear Negotiation Project, [1985]), pp. 1-2; and

Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Ralph Earle, director of the Consultation on International Security and Arms Control at the Carter Center of Emory University, June 13, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files, June 17, 1985).

7. [Meyer], "Crisis Control Progress Report: 1984/85,"

8. Editorial, The Washington Post, reprinted in The International Herald Tribune, September, 18, 1987, p. 4.

9. William L. Ury, private interview at Nuclear Negotiation Project, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 14, 1989;

Bruce J. Allyn, private interview at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 13, 1989; and

Robert Bell [staff member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services], private interview by phone, March 13, 1989.

10. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: February - May, 1985," pp. 3-6.

11. Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; and Allyn, private interview, March 13, 1989.

12. [Ury], "Results," p. 2.

13. [Meyer], "Crisis Control Progress Report: 1984/85," p. 3;

Nuclear Negotiation Project, "NNP Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar: Next Steps" (unpublished memorandum, November 7, 1984); pp. 1-2; and

E[llen] G. M[eyer], "NNP NCC Seminars" (unpublished one page memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, January 15, 1985).

14. [William L. Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm Line' to Reduce the Risk of War by Accident or Miscalculation" (unpublished paper, Nuclear Negotiation Project, [1986]), pp. 16-18;

Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on interview with Col. Bob [Robert] Linhard of the National Security Council staff of the U.S. government, Washington, June 13, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files, June 17, 1985), pp. 1-2;

Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on planning meeting at CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] on risk reduction centers, Washington, December 19, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), pp. 1 and 4; and

[Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memorandum (5 pages in length) on interview with unnamed U.S. administration official, [1984] (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), p. 3.

15. [Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm

Line', " pp. 16-17;

"Next Steps Towards Establishment of Risk Reduction Centers," unpublished memorandum on executive working session co-sponsored by Senators [John] Warner and [Sam] Nunn, Room S-207, U.S. Capital, Washington, March 22, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), p. 1;

Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on interview with Col. Bob [Robert] Linhard of the National Security Council staff of the U.S. government, Washington, December 19, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), pp. 1-2; and

[Dan Abbasi, research assistant at Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memorandum (2 pages in length) on interview with unnamed U.S. government official, September 18, 1984 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), pp. 1-2.

16. [Meyer], "Crisis Control Progress Report: 1984/85," p. 1; and

Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: October 1984 - January 1985" (unpublished report, 1985), p. 2.

17. In 1981, Nunn commissioned a report from the commander of the Strategic Air Command, requesting an analysis of the potential for accidental nuclear exchange. The report, which recommended dramatic improvements, prompted Nunn, Warner, and Senator Henry Jackson to introduce legislation in 1982 to evaluate a number of risk reduction measures, including establishment of centers. That legislation resulted in a 1983 report by Defense Secretary Weinberger indicating administration support for some measures, including the Hotline accord and JMCL, but rejecting risk reduction centers. In the meantime, Nunn and Warner had formed an expert working group to study the center concept. The resulting report, released in November 1983, called for establishment of separate national risk reduction centers in the respective capitals. Finally, on June 15, 1984, the non-binding senate resolution was voted unanimously as an amendment to the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1985. Subsequently, this provision was approved in conference with the House of Representatives and enacted into law. ([Ellen G. Meyer], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Proposal Update" {unpublished report, Nuclear Negotiation Project, May, 1985}, p. 2; [United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services], "Chronology of the Risk Reduction Center Initiative" {unpublished report, Office of Senator Sam Nunn, United States Congress, [May 11, 1987]}, p. 1; "A Nuclear Risk Reduction System: Report of the Nunn/Warner Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction," [William Hyland, secretary] {unpublished copy, United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, November, 1983}, p. 3; and

18. Ury, private interview, February 9, 1989; and [Ury], "Results," p. 1.

19. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memorandum (2 pages in length) on conference call between William Hoehn of Senator Nunn's office, Les Brownlee of Senator Warner's office, William Ury and Ellen Meyer of the Nuclear Negotiation Project, November 5, 1984, p. 1;

[Ury], "Results," p. 1; and

[Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Symposium, Spring 1985" (unpublished draft memorandum, October 30, 1984), pp. 1-2.

20. Nuclear Negotiation Project, unpublished memorandum (3 pages in length) in preparation for planning meetings attended by William L. Ury and Ellen G. Meyer of the Nuclear Negotiation Project and members of the congressional staffs of Senators Warner and Nunn, Washington, December 17, 1984, p. 1;

[Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memorandum (3 pages in length) recording proceedings of planning meeting attended by William L. Ury and Ellen G. Meyer of Nuclear Negotiation Project and members of the congressional staff of Senator Warner, Washington, 10:00 a.m., December 17, 1984, p. 3; and

[Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memorandum (2 pages in length) recording proceedings of planning meeting attended by William L. Ury and Ellen G. Meyer of Nuclear Negotiation Project and members of the congressional staff of Senator Nunn, 12:00 noon, Washington, December 17, 1984, p. 1.

21. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], schedule attached to "Towards a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: Next Steps," unpublished memorandum in preparation for March 22, 1985 executive working session on nuclear risk reduction centers, February 22, 1985.

22. E[llen] G. Meyer, unpublished memorandum recording proceedings of planning meeting attended by William L. Ury and Ellen G. Meyer of the Nuclear Negotiation Project and members of the congressional staffs of Senators Warner and Nunn, Washington, January 7, 1985, p. 3; and

[Ury], "Results," p. 1.

23. Nuclear Negotiation Project, preparatory memorandum for planning meetings, December 17, 1984, pp. 1-2; Meyer, planning meeting, January 7, 1985, pp. 1-3; [Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memo-

random recording proceedings of the "Nuclear Negotiation Project Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 17, 1985, pp. 1-9; and

E[llen G.] Meyer, unpublished memorandum recording proceedings of planning meeting attended by William L. Ury and Ellen G. Meyer of the Nuclear Negotiation Project and members of the congressional staffs of Senators Warner and Nunn, Washington, January 25, 1985, pp. 1-2.

24. Process proposals for the executive working session were presented by NNP at various planning sessions. An NNP symposium draft, outlining goals and format ([NNP], "Nuclear Crisis Control Symposium, Spring 1985," October 30, 1984, pp. 1-2), is reflected in the record of a subsequent conference call involving NNP and congressional staff for Nunn and Warner ([NNP], conference call, November 5, 1984, pp. 1-2). The minutes of separate meetings between NNP and each congressional staff (both held on December 17, 1985) indicate that each meeting followed the agenda and recommendations set forth by an NNP memorandum prepared for those occasions. Agenda and recommendations included purpose, process, key issues, topics, participants, preparation, next steps, location and date (NNP, preparatory memorandum, December 17, 1984, pp. 1-3; [NNP], planning meeting with Warner staff, December 17, 1984, pp. 1-3; and [NNP], planning meeting with Nunn staff, December 17, 1984, pp. 1-2). At the December 17 meeting with Nunn's staff, it was agreed that NNP would provide a "proposal, road map, flow chart" for the next meeting on January 7, 1985 ([NNP], planning meeting with Nunn staff, December 17, 1984, p. 2). At the January 7 meeting it was again agreed that NNP would provide a more detailed scenario for both process and outcome to be discussed on January 25 (Meyer, planning meeting, January 7, 1985, p. 3). This was prepared after input from the roundtable discussion during the January 17 seminar at Harvard ([NNP], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, pp. 5-9).

25. A list of functions for the proposed center was drafted by NNP in mid-January 1985 ([Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: Details of Functions," unpublished draft memorandum, n.d.; and Ellen [Meyer], "Possible Functions of the Risk Reduction Centers," unpublished one page memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, January 10, 1985). This was sent to stimulate the initial drafting of function lists by congressional staff, in preparation for a January 25 meeting (Meyer, planning meeting, January 7, 1985, p. 3). It was also prepared after input from the January 17 seminar at Harvard. Consensus in the seminar discussion reflected preference for an incremental approach, beginning with a minimal concept to which one could later add additional functions. Furthermore, it was agreed that any proposal given to the adminis-

tration should consist of one page ([NNP], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, pp. 2-3, and 8-9). Both suggestions were ultimately adopted by congressional staff in their preparation of drafts for the executive session. This can be seen in the series of drafts submitted by Bob Bell of Senator Nunn's office to the planning meeting on January 25 ([Robert Bell], "A Proposal for the Initial Establishment and Operation of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers," unpublished one page memorandum, United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, n.d.; and Meyer, planning meeting, January 25, 1985, p. 1), and to the executive working session ([Robert Bell], "Options for Functions That Could Be Performed in the Initial Operation of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers" unpublished memorandum, United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, n.d., pp. 1-2; and "Next Steps Towards Establishment of Risk Reduction Centers," executive working session, March 22, 1985, p. 4). Following the executive session, the influence of brevity and an incrementalist approach can also be seen on Nunn and Warner in their dialogue with both the U.S. administration and the Soviet government (Sam Nunn and John Warner, unpublished letter to William Ury, September 20, 1985, pp. 1-2; and [United States Senate, Armed Services Committee], "Outline of Nuclear Risk Reduction Proposal," unpublished one page memorandum, n.d., enclosed with Nunn and Warner letter to Ury on September 20, 1985).

26. NNP spent considerable time, prior to the executive working session, uncovering objections and preparing a rationale to counter many of them (Ellen G. Meyer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: A Backgrounder and Policy Recommendations," unpublished paper, Nuclear Negotiation Project, January 11, 1985, pp. 10-12; and [NNP], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, pp. 4-5). Some of these obstacles and rationales were discussed at the 1/25/85 meeting, (Meyer, planning meeting, January 25, 1985, p. 2).

27. NNP devised various action-forcing mechanisms which could be used by Nunn and Warner to influence the administration. Between Jan 17-26, post-doctoral fellow John Borowski wrote drafts of various potential speeches and documents which could be recommended to the administration (John Borowski, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, unpublished series of proposed documents, "Presidential Statement Endorsing Risk Reduction Centers," p. 1, "Presidential Statement Endorsing Commission to Study Risk Reduction Centers," p. 2, "Text of the Joint Communique," p. 3, and "Agreement on Risk Reduction Centers," pp. 4-5; and Ellen G. Meyer, "Follow-up to 'Nuclear Risk Reduction Center' Discussion, of January 17, 1985" {unpublished memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, January 26, 1985}). NNP then suggested the drafts be fol-

lowed with a threat, by the senators, to introduce legislation to create the centers and to appropriate funding, if the administration did not act ([NNP], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, pp. 8-9).

28. Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Bob [Robert] Bell, staff member of the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, June 13, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files, June 17, 1985); and

[Ury], "Results," p. 1.

29. Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; and The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations" (unpublished one page press release, Washington, May 5, 1987).

30. Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; and Ury, CSIS planning meeting, December 19, 1985, p.

1.

31. Bell, private interview, March 13, 1989; Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; and Ury, interview with Linhard, June 13, 1985, p. 1.

32. Soviet affairs advisor to the President, Jack Matlock, promised support during a visit to NNP in April. After attending an NNP crisis control seminar, Ambassador James Goodby, head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, wrote a supportive article in the official State Department journal. Even Ambassador Paul Nitze urged continuation of the work during a meeting with Ury (Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: February - May, 1985," p. 4; Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: October 1984 - January 1985," pp. 2-3; and James E. Goodby, "CDE Measures to Reduce Tension in Europe," Department of State Bulletin, LXXXV, No. 2101 (1985), 39-40.

33. The impact of NNP's public education campaign on the Pentagon was noted by an assistant general council to the Defense Department ([Ury], "Results," p. 2). However, the big public relations "coup," as Ury describes it, was McFarlane's success in getting mention of risk reduction mechanisms into a Reagan speech before the European Parliament on May 8, a tactic previously discussed in an NNP seminar. The accompanying fact sheet even made specific reference to the Nunn/Warner center proposal (Ury, private interview, February 9, 1989; Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; [Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, p. 8; Ronald Reagan,

"The President's Address to the European Parliament," Strasbourg, France, May 8, 1985 {unpublished copy of one page press release issued from The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Madrid, Spain}; and The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet for 'The President's Address to the European Parliament': Strasbourg, France, May 8, 1985" {unpublished press release issued from The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Madrid, Spain}, p. 6).

34. Nunn and Warner, letter to Ury, September 20, 1985, p. 1; and [United States Senate, Armed Services Committee], "Outline of Nuclear Risk Reduction Proposal," enclosed with Nunn and Warner letter to Ury, September 20, 1985.

35. Ury, private interview, February 9, 1989; Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; Anne Witkowsky, unpublished memorandum on interview with Bill [William L.] Ury, Harvard Faculty Club, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 2, 1986 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), p. 7; and "Text of Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement," Washington Post, November 22, 1985, sec A, p.15.

36. Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on interview with Bob [Robert] Linhard of the National Security Council staff of the U.S. government, [Washington], December 19, 1985 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), p. 1; and

Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, p. 6.

37. Ury, interview with Linhard, December 19, 1985, pp. 1-2;

Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989; and Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, p. 7.

38. [Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm Line'," pp. 1-20; and Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989.

39. William L. Ury, unpublished letter to this author, March 14, 1990, p. 1; and Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, p. 6.

40. Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on interview with Allan Holmes, Director of the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and

with David Swartz, Staff Director of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, U.S. Department of State, [Washington], February 23, 1988 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), pp. 1-2; and

Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on inter-view with Dave [David] Swartz and Doug Doan, Boston, Massachusetts, May 3, 1988 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), pp. 1-2.

41. [Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm Line'," pp. 16-18;

Meyer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: A Back-grounder and Policy Recommendations," pp. 1b and 11-12;

Anne Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making" (unpublished paper, Harvard University, January 10, 1987), p. 8; and

[Bruce J. Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Exchange: Joint Study on Crisis Prevention and Settlement, Harvard J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Institute of USA and Canada" (unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November, 1984), p. 12.

42. Bruce [J.] Allyn, unpublished transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting on Crisis Prevention and Settlement between the Avoiding Nuclear War Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Institute of USA and Canada, Soviet Academy of Sciences, February 25-27, 1985 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 15, 1985), p. 20.

43. William L. Ury, "Nuclear Crisis Control: Turning Ideas Into Reality" (unpublished program description, Nuclear Negotiation Project, [1983]), p. 4.

44. Bruce J. Allyn, "IIASA Summer Study on Negotiation: July 18-29, 1983" (unpublished draft report, Harvard Russian Research Center, 1983), pp. 56-59.

45. Allyn, private interview, March 13, 1989;
Ury, "Nuclear Crisis Control: Turning Ideas Into Reality," p. 4;

David Hamburg, "Foreword," to Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), p. x; and

Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury, "Notes on Contributors," in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), pp. 343-

46. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Nuclear Negotiation Project," p. 3;

[Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, p. 11;

[Meyer], "Crisis Control Progress Report: 1984/85,"

pp. 1 and 4;

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Institute of USA and Canada, Soviet Academy of Sciences, "Joint Study on Crisis Prevention and Settlement" (unpublished one page statement, John F. Kennedy School of Government, [May 1984]); and

K.U. Chernenko, speech given on March 2, 1984 in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, quoted in "Chernenko Speaks to Moscow Constituents," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXXVI (March 28, 1984), 7.

47. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: October 1984 - January 1985," p. 3;

Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Nuclear Negotiation Project," p. 3; and

[Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Exchange," November 1984, p. 2.

Examples of Allyn's working papers include:

Bruce J. Allyn, "The Soviet Approach to Crisis Prevention in Third Areas" (unpublished paper, Nuclear Negotiation Project, January 1984); and

Bruce [J.] Allen, "Brief on Soviet View of Crisis Prevention and Management" (unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, February 1984).

48. Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," pp. 16 and 20;

Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, p. 12;

[Bruce J. Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit: January 5-12, 1986," unpublished report of the Joint Study on Crisis Prevention: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Institute of USA and Canada, Soviet Academy of Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1986), p. 11;

Nuclear Negotiation Project, preparatory memorandum, December 17, 1984, p. 1; and

[Nuclear Negotiation Project], planning meeting with Warner staff, December 17, 1984, p. 1.

49. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: October 1984 - January 1985," p. 3.

50. Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989;

Allyn, private interview, March 13, 1989;
Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting,
February 25-27, 1985, pp. 32-33; and
[Bruce J. Allyn], "Crisis Prevention in US-Soviet
Relations" (unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, 16 September, 1985), pp. 43-44.

51. Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: February - May, 1985," pp. 4-5;

"Next Steps Towards Establishment of Risk Reduction Centers," executive working session, March 22, 1985, p. 3;

William L. Ury, "Soviet Quotations on Avoiding Inadvertent War" (unpublished one page memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, March 27, 1985); and

[Bruce J. Allyn], "Soviet Statements on Inadvertent War" (unpublished two page memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, n.d.).

52. In April, U.S. and Soviet army commanders in Germany met to draw up rules to avoid repetition of the Soviet shooting of an American officer. In May, the first official positive Soviet response was given the center idea by Ambassador Dobrynin in a session with former U.S. presidents Carter and Ford. ISKAN's journal recorded the meeting, but eliminated mention of the agreement. The Soviet embassy in Washington confirmed the change in attitude during a visit to NNP by an embassy official, at which time they also responded to Allyn's Moscow 57 presentations on Soviet perspectives (Nuclear Negotiation Project, "Crisis Control Progress Report: February - May, 1985," pp. 2 and 5; and Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," p. 9). In August the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached a common understanding on terrorism, an indication that both sides were amenable to discussing external sources of conflict (Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, p. 4).

53. Such a conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that an ISKAN researcher, and member of the Joint Study group, was asked by the director for several memos on the subject. Furthermore, this researcher had personally advocated the idea within the government and was of the opinion that the director had done likewise (Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," p. 12; [Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, p. 11; Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, pp. 2-4; and [Ury], "Results," p. 2).

54. E.N. Shcherbakov, "Diskussiiia v SShA vokrug 'mer doveriia' v iadernoi oblasti [Discussion in the USA of Nuclear Confidence Building Measures]," SShA: ekonomika,

politika, ideologija, No. 10 (1985), (unpublished translation by Bruce J.] Allyn, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 12 March, 1986), pp. 3-5. By the time of Ury and Allyn's third trip to the Soviet Union in January 1986, it was well known, with thirty to forty copies in circulation within a population of pertinent experts and actors numbering less than one hundred. One senior researcher at ISKAN told Ury and Allyn there was no reason for the Soviets to research the subject since "You've written everything on the question. I'm satisfied.", an indication of the degree of influence ([Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, pp. 8-9 and 12; Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, pp. 3; Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," p. 15; and Ury, private interview, February 9, 1989).

55. In a speech to the UN Gorbachev referred to the danger of technical accidents, and during the Moscow visit of Senators Warner and Nunn he expressed that the center idea "demanded attention" ([Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, p. 7; and Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," p. 10).

56. Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," pp. 22-24;
[Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, pp. 7 and 11-12; and
Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, pp. 3-5.

57. Some Soviets were now "fascinated with the proposal." Others continued to express concern over the potential intelligence and tranquilizer problems. Furthermore, while the agreement between the U.S. administration and Senators Nunn and Warner tended to stress the role of the centers in accident prevention more than deterring aggression by third parties, Soviet perception was the reverse. Finally, many Soviets were still convinced of the need for linkage between crisis control and arms control and therefore preferred that negotiations on this be added to the agenda of some ongoing forum. The Americans preferred to keep them separate, therefore, avoiding the need to trade anything in exchange ([Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, pp. 14-15; and Ury, CSIS planning meeting, December 19, 1985, pp. 1-4).

58. Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," p. 10.

59. [Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, pp. 13-17.

60. Bruce J. Allyn, "Toward a Common Framework: Avoiding Inadvertent War and Crisis," in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), p. 202.

61. "Chronology of Development of Crisis Control Centers" (unpublished report, Nuclear Negotiation Project, [ca. September 1986]), p. 8;
Ury, unpublished letter to this author, March 14, 1990, p. 1; and
Witkowsky, interview with Ury, December 2, 1986, pp. 3-5.

62. Ronald Reagan and Eduard Shevardnadze, "Remarks of President Reagan and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at Signing Ceremony in the Rose Garden of Agreement to Establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers," Federal News Service, Tuesday, September 15, 1987 (n.p.: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1987), pp. 1-2.

63. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Protocol I, Article 1, September 15, 1987 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), p. 1.

64. "Moscow-Washington: Channel of Confidence," Tass, trans. by Federal Bureau of Information Services, 25 March, 1988, p.1

65. William L. Ury, "Developing Risk Reduction Institutions and Procedures," in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), pp. 80-89;

Mikhail Mil'shtein, "Soviet View" (in response to William Ury, "Developing Risk Reduction Institutions and Procedures"), in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), pp. 93-96; and

Viktor Kremeniuk, "Soviet View" (in response to William Ury, "Developing Risk Reduction Institutions and Procedures"), in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Gra-

ham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), pp. 97-98.

66. Meyer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: A Back-grounder and Policy Recommendations," pp. 1a-1b.

67. Graham T. Allison and Georgy Arbatov, "Preface," to Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), p. xiv.

68. Allyn, private interview, March 13, 1989; and Allison and Arbatov, "Preface," to Windows of Opportunity, p. xiv.

69. Allyn, "IIASA Summer Study on Negotiation: July 18-29, 1983," p. 60; and [Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Interacting Creatively With Soviets" (unpublished one page memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, October 8, 1984).

70. Ury acknowledged previous statements of concern over progress on arms control. However, he also referred to both the Chernenko norms of conduct during conflict and the illustration, made earlier in the session by a Soviet participant, comparing the utility of paramedics with that of nuclear crisis control (Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, pp. 34 and 45).

71. When some participants predicted that the Soviets would hold the center idea hostage to movement on other issues, Ury acknowledged the danger and suggested a forum for negotiations where that would be less feasible ("Next Steps Towards Establishment of Risk Reduction Centers," executive working session, March 22, 1985, p. 1).

72. William L. Ury, "Joining the Dialogue on Preventing Inadvertent War" (unpublished draft summary of paper, Nuclear Negotiation Project, January 27, 1986), p. 3; and Ury, CSIS planning meeting, December 19, 1985, p. 4.

73. [Nuclear Negotiation Project,] unpublished one page preparatory memorandum for Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar, January 15, 1985; and [Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, pp. 5-6.

74. Allison and Arbatov, "Preface," to Windows of Opportunity, p. xv; and

Allyn, "IIASA Summer Study on Negotiation: July 18-29, 1983," pp. 48-49.

75. "Next Steps Towards Establishment of Risk Reduction Centers," executive working session, March 22, 1985, p. 2.

76. Allyn, "Toward a Common Framework," p. 204; and Bruce J. Allyn, "US-Soviet Nuclear Crisis Management Project" (unpublished paper, [Harvard Russian Research Center], 12 October, 1982), p. 10.

77. [Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Exchange," November 1984, p. 9;

Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, p. 19;

[Allyn], "Crisis Prevention in US-Soviet Relations," pp. 8-9; and

[Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, p. 17.

78. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], planning meeting with Warner staff, December 17, 1984, p. 2.

79. Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, p. 31.

80. "Next Steps Towards Establishment of Risk Reduction Centers," executive working session, March 22, 1985, p.1.

81. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, p. 9.

82. Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, pp. 12, 15, 31, and 45.

83. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], unpublished memorandum recording proceedings of planning meeting for the second Joint Study Meeting of Harvard's Avoiding Nuclear War Project and the Soviet Union's Institute of USA and Canada, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 19, 1985, pp. 2-3.

84. Bill [William L.] Ury, "Tools for the Crisis Control Campaign" (unpublished one page memorandum, Nuclear Negotiation Project, May 29, 1984).

85. Edwin G. Quattlebaum III, "Negotiations and Avoiding Accidental Nuclear War: A Profile of William L. Ury '70," Andover Bulletin (Fall, 1985), 19.

86. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], planning meeting with Warner staff, December 17, 1984, p. 2.

87. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], planning meeting, February 19, 1985, p. 3; and
Ury, interview with Linhard, December 19, 1985, p. 1.

88. [Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm Line'," pp. 1-12.

89. See footnote #27.

90. E[llen G.] Meyer, unpublished memorandum recording proceedings of meeting with Georgi Arbatov, Avoiding Nuclear War Project, John F Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 5, 1984, p. 2.

91. Nuclear Negotiation Project, preparatory memorandum, December 17, 1984, p. 2; and
Meyer, planning meeting, January 7, 1985, p. 3.

92. [Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, pp. 13-15.

93. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, pp. 1-9.

94. Meyer, planning meeting, January 25, 1985, p. 2.

95. Allyn, "IIASA Summer Study on Negotiation: July 18-29, 1983," pp. 52-56.

96. Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury, "Acknowledgements," in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), pp. xvii-xviii.

97. [Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm Line'," pp. 4-12.

98. Ibid., pp. 4-8.

99. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, p. 4.

100. Quattlebaum, "Negotiations and Avoiding Accidental Nuclear War," p. 19.

101. Meyer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: A Back-

grounder and Policy Recommendations," pp. 8-9.

102. [Allyn], "Crisis Prevention in US-Soviet Relations," p. 18.

103. [Ury], "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A 'Warm Line'," p. 16.

104. Meyer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: A Background and Policy Recommendations," pp. 7-8; and Ury, "Developing Risk Reduction Institutions and Procedures," p. 78.

105. Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, p. 13;
[Nuclear Negotiation Project], "Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar," January 17, 1985, p. 5; and Ury, "Developing Risk Reduction Institutions and Procedures," p. 78.

106. Alexander L. George, "The Search for Agreed Norms," in Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, ed. by Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury with Bruce Allyn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc, 1989), p. 58.

107. Ibid., pp. 47-48;
[Allyn], "Crisis Prevention in US-Soviet Relations," pp. 26-27; and Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, pp. 4-7, 12, 19, and 45.

108. [Nuclear Negotiation Project], planning meeting, February 19, 1985, p. 2.

109. Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, pp. 7-8, 18-27, and 31-32.

110. [Allyn], "Crisis Prevention in US-Soviet Relations," pp. 17 and 26; and George, "The Search for Agreed Norms," pp. 49-50.

111. Ibid., p. 64.

112. Allyn, transcript of Moscow Joint Study Meeting, February 25-27, 1985, p. 25; and [Allyn], "Crisis Prevention in US-Soviet Relations," p. 17.

113. Ury, private interview, March 14, 1989.

114. Allyn, private interview, March 13, 1989.

115. Bill [William L.] Ury, unpublished memorandum on interview with Larry Smith, member of the Nuclear Negotiation Project's Nuclear Crisis Control Seminar Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 30, 1984 (Nuclear Negotiation Project files), pp. 1-3.

116. Meyer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: A Backgrounder and Policy Recommendations," pp. 1a-1c.

117. [Allyn], "Report of Ury/Allyn Research Visit," January 5-12, 1986, p. 11; and

Witkowsky, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Case Study in Soviet Decision Making," p. 19.

118. I refer to mediation instead of conciliation due to the former being the termination used by proponents of principled negotiation and because of the emphasis, in this case, on settlement of issues and outcome advocacy (see chapter 1, p. 42).

CHAPTER 4

INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE IN CONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a Quaker organization, established in 1917, for the express purpose of functioning in what Quakers call international conciliation. The initial vision of Quaker "embassies," with resident "ambassadors" in the capitals of the world, proved unrealistic. However, AFSC in Philadelphia, and its London counterpart, the Friends Service Council, oversaw the formation of Quaker "centers" in many cities, especially in Europe.¹ The individuals involved in this work were initially referred to as Quaker representatives and received the official title "Quaker International Affairs Representative" (QIAR) in 1953. These people, usually academics, sometimes businessmen, were given special missions² during times of conflict in a country or region. Given a call to a ministry of reconciliation, they focused on clarifying perceptions on each side of the conflict. Following World War II, AFSC started a complementary program in order to maximize leverage upon world leaders. They developed Conferences for Diplomats, bringing together groups of young foreign service officers who would later

rise to leadership positions within their respective countries. These conferences, held in both Europe and America, were designed as informal contexts in which cultural, national, and ideological barriers might be lowered and psychological/sociological insights of conflict resolution explored. Between 1952-1977 nearly 2000 diplomats participated in these conferences, including representatives from most socialist countries.³

The most important and best known Quaker effort at East-West conciliation took place through the QIAR assigned to Berlin. Between 1962-1973 QIARs attempted to facilitate communication between the two Germanies and, to a lesser extent, between East and West blocks. They engaged in a variety of activities - from listening, to message-carrying, to assessment, to proposal making, and even to advocacy. The initial functions very much parallel the methodology of principled negotiation, while the last again raises the central issue of third party neutrality, a factor which led some Quakers to question whether it represented a departure from the role of conciliation.⁴ Furthermore, the setting is comparable, on many levels, to the Harvard case presented in chapter 3 (with regard to the "factors affecting intervention," as presented in chapter 1). Both were uninvited, nongovernmental interveners, dependent on an ascribed identity, in what was mostly a pre-negotiation process. The similarity between Fisher's

principled negotiation and AFSC methodology may not be complete coincidence. During the period of QIAR activity in Berlin, Fisher acted as a consultant member of an AFSC group which travelled to the Middle East, exploring peace possibilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Such a relationship may well have introduced some of Fisher's ideas into Quaker circles even if his work had no direct influence on the QIARs in Berlin. Cross-fertilization of ideas between Fisher and AFSC can definitely be seen today, for example in negotiation workshop training materials used by the AFSC Regional Office in New York. Consequently QIAR involvement in Berlin becomes an excellent test case for the application of principled negotiation to the role of religious intermediaries in East-West conflict.

History

The end of World War II found a diminished German nation divided into American, British, French, and Soviet zones. In 1949, the three western zones united to form the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, or the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), while the eastern zone became the Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In addition, nearly one quarter of former German territory, to the east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, was to be administered by Poland and the Soviet Union. This resulted in the mass resettlement of German people from these territories.

A similar process happened concurrently in the City of Berlin, with the western sectors joining together and linking themselves to the FRG and the eastern sector becoming the capital of the GDR. The communist challenge to this relationship of West Berlin to the FRG was at the heart of one of the two most critical events in the Cold War. The application of West Germany's currency reform to West Berlin in 1948 led to Soviet and German Communist leadership closing the land access to the city and an⁸ eleven month western airlift.

A second critical event, the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, was an act to plug the only opening left after the 1952 sealing of East Germany's borders. According to an eastern perspective, the "anti-fascist protective wall" was necessary to prevent infiltration and subversion by the FRG. The latter's intentions to wrench the GDR from the Soviet sphere and isolate it from its allies were made clear by the FRG's policy of nonrecognition of the GDR and by the Hallstein Doctrine of severing diplomatic relations with any other country which recognized it. Furthermore, the FRG transacted all its "Eastern Zone" business with the Soviet Union, which it considered the legitimate authority long after the Soviet High Commission was withdrawn. This led to the GDR charge of revanchism -- a claim that the FRG wished to acquire the territory of other states in a manner similar to the Third Reich. The charge of revanchism also extended to the FRG's

claims to the territories administered by Poland and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the GDR denounced the FRG for imperialism, revanchism, unwillingness to negotiate, and neo-Nazism. In similar vein, the FRG denounced the GDR for being tools of Soviet occupation, imprisoning its own population, and preventing free elections and formal German unification.

After the erection of the Wall, AFSC accepted a long standing invitation from German Quakers to send a QIAR to Berlin. Although they worked with many political entities in both Germanies, as well as other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the most influential relationships forged were with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the FRG. The relationship began with Willy Brandt and his aides and advisors when (in 1962) Brandt was the Lord Mayor of West Berlin.¹⁰ Their ability to influence perceptions and perspectives within the FRG increased with Brandt's rise to the chairmanship of the SPD in 1964, and the positions of Foreign Minister of the FRG in 1966 and chancellor in 1969.¹¹ Brandt then presided over the implementation of his ost-politik policy with the negotiation of numerous treaties: treaties on the renunciation of force between the FRG-USSR and FRG-Poland in 1970, the four power agreement on Berlin in 1971, the Basic Treaty establishing diplomatic relationships between the FRG-GDR in 1972 (also accompanied by various traffic and telecommunication agreements), and the

renunciation of force treaty between FRG-CSSR (Czechoslova-
12
kia) in 1973. The Quakers played a significant role in
developing and nurturing the political context in which
these treaties arose, were negotiated, and ratified.

During the eleven year span of the work, there were
three QIAR representatives in Berlin, each in successive
terms of service, with a period of two years, autumn 1966
until autumn 1968, when there was no representative.
Although there was a general commonality of approach and
objective throughout the entire work, each term of service
made a unique contribution due to both changes in the
situation in Germany and differences of skill and approach
of the individual QIAR. Therefore, it seems most appro-
priate to examine the history of this period, and the
Quaker involvement in it, according to the terms of QIAR
service. These terms were as follows: Roland Warren (1962-
1964), Robert Reuman (1964-1966), and William Beittel
13
(1968-1973).

Roland Warren: Quaker Representative, 1962-1964

When Warren arrived in Berlin in the Spring of 1962 he
found a reservoir of goodwill toward the Quakers in light
of the prior forty years of their relief work and
reconciliation efforts in Germany. The most memorable of
these included a child feeding program after World War I,
assistance to Jewish and political refugees during the
early days of Nazi power, rehabilitation following World

War II to both East and West zones, and even assistance to suspected Nazi leaders in internment camps after the war. In the 1950's the focus of the work changed from rehabilitation to East-West mediation, with the German Quakers taking the leading role. When the wall restricted the movements of German Quakers, it became clear that an "outsider" presence could more easily work toward constructive contacts between the sides.¹⁴

To this situation of near complete communication breakdown, the first QIAR came with a background in sociology and expertise in conflict interaction. These credentials enabled Warren to develop a procedure of interviews with numerous high level German and foreign officials in West Berlin, the FRG and GDR, as well as many other influential people.¹⁵ In addition, he gave lectures and wrote papers/reports, circulating copies to officials within and outside the two Germanies. He often used them as discussion starters during his interviews, since they dealt with issues and presented perspectives the readers were not used to hearing.¹⁶

The most significant single event, especially in relation to the GDR, was the visit of an AFSC team, composed of Warren and seven others, to West Berlin and various locations in both FRG and GDR for three weeks in September, 1963. The purpose was to discuss viewpoints and common interests with government officials and others, encourage and support peaceful and conciliatory elements,

and communicate and interpret to the American public. The initial invitation to visit the GDR came from the East German Peace Council which arranged for them to have unlimited movement within the country. Dialogue with the Peace Council itself proved to be a kind of negotiation between¹⁷ third parties.

During the actual visit, the team not only listened, but asked pointed questions, conveyed information, corrected misunderstandings, passed suggestions for accommodation across the divide, and even made some small proposals. The issue they most pursued was the question of travel restrictions, imposed by both sides, which brought great hardship to many people. In the West, these restrictions were imposed by the Allied Travel Office (ATO). After the visit, the team sent a document, challenging ATO travel restrictions, to the German Affairs Office of the State Department in Washington, with a copy to the Office of East German Questions in the FRG Foreign Office. Discussion with three U.S. officials ended with American support for whatever Bonn would decide. An FRG official indicated that the memo had been taken very seriously, that he was trying to apply the policy with some flexibility, and that the policy was undergoing a process of change which he was unable to discuss. A few months later, in March 1964, restrictions were lifted for non-political groups. Warren was convinced that the Quaker team

played a significant part in this policy change, a conviction echoed by GDR, FRG, and American officials. In the East, during a visit with Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the GDR Council of State, the AFSC team offered a proposal to relax travel restrictions for certain categories of people in both the FRG and GDR. During the session, Ulbricht did not respond. Later, Warren drafted a letter outlining four specific measures. Although no policy change was announced, the actions called for were fulfilled over the course of time, on a case-by-case basis, through the Red Cross. Furthermore, there was great interest expressed by each side in the proposal sent to the opposite party. A U.S. spokesman said that if Ulbricht accepted the Quaker proposals, then the Allies should remove the ATO's restrictions. The East Germans, on the other side, expressed appreciation for the AFSC position on the ATO after relaxation of restrictions began. Finally, a report of the visit, written by the team, was distributed to all parties visited, resulting in wide press coverage. Despite criticism by some on both sides, the report provided another basis for discussion of issues covered in it -- especially the proposals about travel restrictions and the possibilities for negotiations regarding recognition of the

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GDR.

As mentioned earlier, the greatest influence the Quaker presence enjoyed was on Willy Brandt and his associates, who at Warren's time were in the city government of

West Berlin. This period has been described by one Brandt biographer as "marking time," a time of personal and professional reassessment for Brandt. Consequently, it is not surprising that, during 1962-63, Brandt, along with Mayor Heinrich Albertz and information officer, Egon Bahr, started to move slowly toward accommodation. It was in July 1963 that Bahr first enunciated a new approach to the GDR. In a speech given at the Evangelical Academy he presented the case for pursuing change through rapprochement rather than nonrecognition, and claimed that this must be arranged with the Soviet Union. This view was later echoed by Brandt as part of the growing climate of detente. The new policy finally began to have practical results with the negotiation of Christmas passes allowing West Berliners to visit East Berlin for eighteen days in December 1963. This¹⁹ suggestion, though not specifically proposed for Christmas, was one which Warren had previously made to high level²⁰ officials on both sides.

Warren was in touch with all three of these West Berlin leaders. However, the primary contact was Albertz, who was trained as a theologian and had served as a pastor before entering the government. When Warren first met him in 1962, he was Commissioner of the Interior Department, with responsibility for the police. In this capacity, he was very much concerned with incidents at the wall. However, despite his personal acknowledgement of some

credibility in the GDR position, he dispelled any hope for
negotiations at that time.²¹

During the next year, Warren was able to use two of his QIAR reports to facilitate creative discussion with Albertz. In "Background on the Berlin Wall," Warren outlined official views of both East and West in ways that were persuasive to the opposite number. He then suggested areas in which progress might be made. In "Possibilities for a Berlin Settlement," he analyzed statements by Brandt and Ulbricht on the stalemated relationship and developed a basis for negotiating a partial solution for Berlin.²² In discussing this with Albertz, the latter endorsed Warren's perspective, indicated that an attempt at negotiation was being made, and expressed interest in using Warren should an occasion for a direct third party role arise.²³

Warren has assessed the influence on Albertz, and through him Brandt, to be very strong, although recognizing that pinpointing causes of policy development is very difficult. Albertz has credited Warren as being the only person who supported them in thinking through alternatives on the hard issues, while Brandt has acknowledged the importance of the Quaker role throughout the process. When Brandt became Foreign Minister, and Albertz succeeded him as Lord Mayor, in 1966, the former implemented "all the things we had talked about," according to Warren.²⁴

Robert Reuman: Quaker Representative, 1964-1966

Reuman, like Warren, came with an academic background. However, while Warren brought skills in conflict interaction, Reuman's expertise was in moral and social philosophy. He utilized this background to examine the forces and values which underlaid the conflict. Therefore, during his tenure, QIAR efforts shifted focus from perception clarification to an attempt at extraction from positions, especially within FRG foreign policy. To accom-²⁵plish this, he continued much of the strategy adopted by Warren, including interviews, lectures, and projects. The central focus was still interviews with government officials, political officials, religious people, academics, and journalists. Increasingly, the interviews centered around Quaker projects or QIAR reports, written by Reuman to stimulate ideological, political, or philosophical dis-²⁶cussion.

The most significant single project of this period was a special conference for members of scholarly institutes of international affairs. Representatives of the foreign policy think tanks of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries met in equal numbers at Gars-am-Kamp, Austria in April 1966. Although they had read each others' papers for years, many of them met face-to-face for the first time. With two participants from West Germany and one from East Germany, it was also the first successful Quaker attempt to get formal, though non-diplomatic, representation from both

Germanies. Previous GDR representation at one of their conferences had been limited to the roles of guest or consultant. The Quaker role was to provide an atmosphere and facilitate a process whereby people could get to know one another and where new perspectives, or even options,²⁷ might emerge.

The process developed for this conference was quite relaxed and informal in order to maximize open communication, mutual understanding, and new thinking. This loose structure, led by sensitive leadership, was able, not only to keep participants from personal attacks, but resulted in what the conferees termed an "escalation of optimism." Remarkable areas of agreement were reached as participants even discussed a possible peace treaty proposed by a West German participant. So positive was the response that participants overwhelmingly recommended a²⁸ second conference.

This conference would have been insignificant, however, without Reuman's ongoing efforts to help move the FRG toward recognition of the GDR and prod the GDR toward a change in relation to its own people. In both of these endeavors, Reuman's QIAR reports made a significant contribution. Officials on both sides indicated that, while they could not raise many of the points made in these QIAR reports, this perspective needed to be heard. Some officials and journalists sought him out and distributed the reports. In other cases, Reuman initiated the distri-

bution and used them to steer conversation toward
substantive issues and to make proposals.

In his first report, "Attitudes in the DDR (East Germany)," written in June 1965, Reuman challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the FRG's nonrecognition policy. Reuman concluded that there was more support for the GDR government than acknowledged in the West, though less than purported in the East. He claimed that the majority of the people of the GDR had at least accommodated themselves to the realities and, furthermore, saw Western nonrecognition as detrimental to their welfare. This report was well received by many in the FRG who wanted to know what their fellow Germans were really thinking. The reception was also positive in the GDR where Reuman judged that it frequently served as a bridge between non-communicating groups and helped move conversations more rapidly beyond a superficial level.

In a second report, on the Hallstein Doctrine, written in November 1965, Reuman criticized western isolation of the GDR by questioning whether this policy had inhibited, rather than enhanced, the goal of reunification. He also noted the potential for diplomatic blackmail inherent within the Doctrine. Finally, Reuman challenged the GDR not to adopt a reverse Hallstein Doctrine, a policy which Ulbricht unsuccessfully tried to implement in 1967. This report, however, met with very little response, though it

was widely read in both East and West.

The third report, "Proposals on German Reunification," written in December 1965, was very valuable as a springboard for discussion on the kinds of action which might reduce tension. In this report, Reuman called upon both the FRG and the GDR to reduce the causes of fear on the other side, develop positive relationships with the other block, and treat each other as negotiating partners. Positive western response came from at least three organizations/parties: the SPD, which was developing similar ideas; the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which was soon to break its coalition government with the CDU over some of the issues Reuman raised; and an influential nongovernmental organization called Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland (KUD or Caretaker for Indivisible Germany), which was interested in unofficial East-West dialogue on similar issues. Although the West appreciated the proposals for their fresh approach to the perennial goal of reunification, the East was not so appreciative. GDR officials, as well as nongovernmental leaders, criticized the proposals for advocating meager steps instead of outright recognition of the GDR. Though they were positive toward changes proposed for the West, they tended to ignore calls for internal change in the East. Yet, Reuman concluded that they considered the changes proposed for their own society with more seriousness than they admitted. Despite GDR reservations, he was able to use the report to encourage

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them toward dialogue with the West.

The fourth report, "New Trends in West Germany," further confirmed the changes underway in FRG perspectives by the time Reuman left in August, 1966. Reuman mentioned numerous FRG personalities and organizations as now advocating various degrees of conciliation with the East. Though he cautioned that it was still far from being a new governmental policy, Reuman saw an increasing tendency to take eastern interests into account. In fact, there were great changes in FRG foreign policy immediately after Reuman left. The new CDU-SPD coalition government, which took power in December 1966, abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine and increased contact with the GDR government, fulfilling many of Reuman's suggestions. Meanwhile, the GDR also began to change in directions proposed by Reuman. Political, economic, and psychological stability increased. Political and cultural repression decreased. Consequently, in a retrospective assessment, Reuman concluded that the GDR government had acquired a greater degree of genuine support and even pride in certain accomplishments.

Finally, it is important to note the contacts developed with Soviets and Americans, as each of these nations influenced the incentive for their respective German allies to follow the pattern of detente. The most significant Soviet contacts were actually made by a nonofficial American Quaker who developed a relationship

with Yuli Kvitsinsky, the embassy official who later chaired the Soviet negotiating team in the Quadripartite Negotiations on Berlin. This "unofficial Quaker representative," as he called himself, also facilitated a meeting between Khrushchev and a West Berlin churchman, where they discussed the human difficulties caused by the Wall.⁴¹

The most significant American contact was a briefing and short visit to the GDR in 1964, coordinated by Reuman for U.S. Congressman Henry Reuss, a leading expert on Germany in the House of Representatives. Reuss met and spoke with both officials and ordinary citizens in an attempt to gain first hand impressions of the GDR, and criticisms of the U.S., which could better inform U.S. policy.⁴² At the end of the trip, Reuss gave a lecture to the West German SPD party convocation, at the invitation of Brandt. In addition to facilitating Reuss' contacts with Germans, this experience gave Reuman an excellent opportunity to discuss the German issue with an influential American congressman -- in fact, one who had developed a proposed peace treaty dealing with the question of recognition and other related issues.⁴³

William Beittel: Quaker Representative, 1968-1973

Beittel came after a two year hiatus, during which the QIAR work was sustained at a minimal level by a volunteer German Quaker, named Lore Horn, who had previously worked with both Warren and Reuman. Consequently, the final QIAR

came with the task of rebuilding, rather than just continuing, the work. Beittel brought with him, not only an academic background in political sociology, but also recent experience in Europe.⁴⁴ During his tenure Beittel engaged in much the same types of activity -- conversations, conferences, informal meetings, and written reports. However, for the first time, the most significant FRG contacts were now in positions of power, with the rise of Brandt to the positions of Foreign Minister and Chancellor.⁴⁵

Beittel's conversations with key FRG officials in early 1969, before Brandt was elected Chancellor, reflected greater openness to the east block, including the GDR, than either Warren or Reuman had detected. At the Ministry for All-German Questions, officials spoke of encouraging nonofficial contacts and even gradual movement toward mutual recognition in some form.⁴⁶ Bahr even told Beittel that he recommended negotiations with the GDR for extension of economic and cultural ties and access to West Berlin. However, over the question of recognition, he was still⁴⁷ adamantly opposed.

Beittel concentrated his early efforts on FRG officials in order to communicate accurately the change to GDR officials.⁴⁸ However, despite FRG openness, this new policy was interpreted, in the GDR, as simply a more clever expression of old policies. They feared that small improvements would benefit western politicians without affecting any substantial changes with respect to recognition.

furthermore, Bonn's overtures toward other east block countries appeared to be new attempts to isolate and undermine the GDR. The atmosphere of increased suspicion was notable even in the treatment of the QIAR, as demonstrated in the grilling he received during his first interview in the GDR Foreign Office. Beittel was warned against secretive or undercover behavior, told he should clear every activity in advance, and informed that he would be accompanied on his visits in the GDR.⁴⁹

In the spring of 1969, one particular confrontation threatened to end detente even before it began. The FRG's Federal Assembly planned to meet in West Berlin in March to elect a new FRG president. Although the previous three elections had been held there, the GDR decided to challenge the view that West Berlin was, de facto, a part of the FRG. They disrupted traffic, raising the spectre of another blockade. Beittel discovered that the West was not enthusiastic about holding the election in Berlin, but feared backing down to GDR demands. Various unsuccessful face-saving proposals were made by Ulbricht and the Soviet ambassador to cancel the election in exchange for border passes for West Berliners. Beittel visited all the parties, including U.S. and Soviet embassies, in order to interpret the proposals.⁵⁰ At one point he floated a possible tension reducing idea through the Soviet embassy, the U.S. Mission in Berlin, and former Lord Mayor Albertz.

Though finally discarded, the suggestion was seriously
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considered at the highest levels of government.

By the time Beittel came to Berlin, it was conceivable for U.S. officials to have informal contact with GDR officials and church leaders. Consequently, Beittel found himself in the position of facilitating such contacts. In addition, unsuccessful attempts were made to hold luncheons
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for numerous diplomats. However, the biggest breakthrough of this kind occurred in the context of the Conferences for Diplomats program. GDR diplomats were finally granted full participation in 1969 and FRG officials, after a one year boycott and election of a new government, finally accepted joint participation. Attendance at these conferences was an important step in the process of challenging the stereotypical thinking of GDR officials and opening them to the
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process of detente.

After Brandt became chancellor, in October 1969, he sought to pursue ostpolitik more openly. In his initial speech to the Bundestag, he acknowledged the existence of two German states as part of one nation, offered to discuss outstanding issues with the GDR and to negotiate nonaggression pacts with other East European states. FRG agencies now began a process of revising their image and mission. Within a year, it was widely, though privately, acknowledged that recognition of the GDR would come in a couple years when public opinion had changed. This atmosphere created even better opportunities for Beittel to

share Quaker concerns with a new government and new⁵⁴ opposition, each learning new roles. At the same time, Beittel attempted to communicate to GDR officials how fast the FRG was changing. With the GDR still attached to old suspicions and well-worn demands, this was not an easy task. He dialogued with GDR officials himself when there was no openness to contact with officials from the FRG. Plus he worked especially hard to keep GDR involvement in⁵⁵ the Conferences for Diplomats.

The first diplomatic thaw which occurred as part of Brandt's ostpolitik was in Soviet-FRG relations. In a conversation with Beittel, Bahr specifically targeted the Soviet Union as the focus of FRG foreign policy as early as⁵⁶ May of 1969. Overtures also came from the Soviets who were looking to ease tensions with the West at a time when they were heightening with China. By early 1970 there had been talks on exchange of technical and scientific information and agreements on trade. By May, there was an agreement to enter into negotiations on a nonaggression pact. In August, as a culmination of forty sessions between Bahr and Gromyko, the two countries signed the pact. However, at the FRG's insistence, the agreement could not be ratified until the four powers (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., and France) had formed a satisfactory agreement on the future of Ber-⁵⁷lin. Quaker involvement included quiet support for this process within the FRG and an unsuccessful attempt to

encourage greater expression of support for ostpolitik on
the part of the U.S. government.

A similar rapprochement developed between the FRG and Poland. Talks began in February, 1970 and concluded with a mutual nonaggression treaty signed in December. Again, there were trade agreements along the way and the same condition placed on ratification. Just prior to the start of these talks, Beittel went to Warsaw to explore Polish points of view, attitudes, and aspirations. There he encouraged the positive attitudes he found and was able to establish considerable rapport. Later, at a time when the FRG-Polish talks were at an impasse, two diplomats from the Polish Embassy at the Military Mission in West Berlin contacted Beittel to talk with him about any American responsibility for slowing things down.

In August 1970, Beittel began his one year partial leave from QIAR work. Consequently, during this period there was minimal Quaker involvement. Priority was given to maintaining contacts in East Berlin in preparation for the FRG-GDR negotiations which were certain to come. However, the primary development during this period was the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, or Four-power Agreement, in which neither Germany was a participant. The treaty, signed in September, 1971, determined a temporary status for Berlin and allowed limited access to the GDR by West Berlin citizens. Responsibility for implementation of the

agreement was given to the two Germanies.

When Beittel returned to full time QIAR work, the Four-power treaty was being signed and attention was now focused on FRG ratification of the Eastern Treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, which was necessary in order to put all three treaties into effect. The CDU opposition mounted a stiff campaign for non-ratification in early 1972, promising to renegotiate better terms should they be returned to power. Despite broad public support for ostpolitik and Soviet refusal to consider renegotiation, the CDU nearly succeeded in toppling the SPD government and did succeed in passing an interpretive resolution. After Moscow reluctantly accepted this codicil, the treaties were⁶⁵ finally ratified on May 17.

During the ratification process Beittel spent considerable time with sympathetic FRG officials in order to plan a strategy for advocacy of the treaties. He also contacted CDU Bundestag representatives who had expressed some openness. His quiet advocacy extended to embassy staff of Allied governments and to various officials in⁶⁶ Washington, New York, and London.

It is difficult to assess exactly how much influence Beittel had on the development or ratification of any treaties. However, by the time he left in the summer of 1973, it is quite clear that relations had improved greatly⁶⁷ between GDR officials and the Quakers. This led to an increase in opportunities for Beittel to function as chan-

nel for contact between GDR and western officials. These⁶⁸
face-to-face contacts were important, not only to rati-
fication of the Eastern Treaties, but also to the process
of direct FRG-GDR negotiations, culminating in the Basic
Treaty, signed in December, 1972 and ratified in June, 1973.⁶⁹

Analysis

I will now assess how the role played by the QIARs in
the two Germanies compares with the methodology of
principled negotiation. There will also be comparison with
the practice of principled negotiation, as seen in the
previous case study on the role of the Nuclear Negotiation
Project of Harvard University in the development of Nuclear
Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow. The
assessment will follow the main tenets of principled
negotiation, concluding with an evaluation of the specific
nature of third party functioning in the Quaker case.

Separation of Relational from Substantive Issues

The fact that the QIARs attempted to turn the
attention of all the parties toward joint problem solving
is distinctly evident. They continually endeavored to
bring East and West out of stereotypical enemy imaging and
into a partnership. Their efforts to bring together
officials from both sides, either in informal private
meetings or at Conferences for Diplomats (as documented
above), demonstrated their commitment to involve all the

parties. Gaining, in the end, the participation and cooperation of all parties, was a major achievement. It constituted one of the most significant accomplishments of the QIAR efforts, as it created a unique and necessary channel for dialogue.

The Quakers also made considerable effort to separate the people from the problem. In their final statement to officials in Bonn, at the end of the Quaker visit to the two Germanies in 1963, they wrote:

Quakers believe that there is that of God in every man and that we are commanded to speak to it in hope and love. This has been the starting point for our whole mission.⁷⁰

This hopeful Quaker perspective toward people informed, not only that particular endeavor, but also the attitude of QIARs during the whole of the eleven years. They consciously looked for that which they could affirm, even in rather hardened individuals. Reuman exemplified this attitude by looking beyond the "cold warrior" positions of a British diplomat to perceive a "quick, vigorous, keen mind,⁷¹ and ... a sufficiently original manner." Focusing on the problem rather than attacking the person can also be seen in some very difficult situations. In the midst of an attack on both the QIAR work and the stance of the U.S. government, it was pointed out to the GDR official involved that he should be talking with the U.S. government about the latter, an aim toward which the QIAR effort was directed.⁷² Beittel's persistent courting of this GDR offi-

cial, and the latter's final cooperative spirit, demonstrated the long-term value of this approach. At the same time, the QIARs did perceive certain attitudes to be at the heart of the problem. These problems had to be addressed, even if people were sensitive and aggressive.⁷³ Consequently, much of their efforts consisted in attempts to address people problems -- to give opportunity for appropriate ventilation of emotion, to facilitate communication, and to clarify, and hopefully alter, perceptions. This part of their work, then, was entirely consistent with principled negotiation.

As in the Harvard case, separation of substantive and relational issues was not achieved by constructing separate occasions for addressing people problems. Most of the Quaker contacts were one-on-one, a context where one could more easily shift gears to allow for emotional ventilation. Yet, even here, great care had to be taken not to place premature strains on a relationship. Warren showed special sensitivity to the emotional factor by refraining from highly inflammatory issues until he had established rapport and trust.⁷⁴ Quaker sensitivity to emotional dynamics was also present within group contexts. Following the rather negative first encounter with the GDR Peace Council in 1963, they concluded that "blowing off steam" was necessary before their hosts could enter into significant dialogue.⁷⁵ The second session proved them right. Finally, Quaker use of leisure activity to bring about bonding was a recogni-

tion of the importance of emotional factors. The Warrens and the Reumans frequently held social evenings in their homes in order to create a non-threatening atmosphere.⁷⁶ In the Conference for Diplomats at Gars, leisure outings did as much as any formal session to enable inclusion, even of hardliners, in constructive substantive dialogue.⁷⁷

It was quite clear that the personal relationships developed at these conferences were still valued long afterward. On many occasions, individuals expressed a desire to have contact even when it was prohibited by governments, as demonstrated by the desires of American diplomats to make contact with their fellow conference alumni from the GDR.⁷⁸ Until this direct communication could take place, the QIARs maintained indirect communication by functioning as a channel of information between a multitude of contacts on both sides of the wall, as has been documented throughout the case. Initially, each QIAR spent a great deal of time listening to a wide spectrum of views. Later this active listening was combined with efforts to present either the other side's, or their own, perspective.⁷⁹ Frequently, this presentation was done with great sensitivity to the viewpoint of the party with whom they were speaking, drawing, where possible, on statements made by the other. When Beittel went to Bonn to lobby for the Eastern Treaties, he spoke with a CDU Bundestag representative who had many sympathies for reconciliation with

poland, but could not support all the measures. Throughout the conversation Beittel incorporated the other man's suggested "next steps" in developing his rationale for ratification.⁸⁰

One primary purpose of the listening and presentation of Quaker concerns was the correction of misperception. Due to the very great amount of stereotypical thinking on both sides, there was constantly a need for translation and clarification of one side's views to the other. As the Quakers soon learned, this was a difficult process, frequently necessitating the adoption of language which was foreign to them.⁸¹ However, the work came to be appreciated by many who were hungry to know what their opposite numbers really thought and valued the insights of someone who had actually talked with "the enemy" in person. This work of clarification was sometimes done through the writing of background papers, an approach used especially by Reuman. However, all three QIARS saw this interpretive work as a basic purpose of their conversations. There were slight differences between their styles and emphases. Reuman would take more initiative in presenting the opposing viewpoint and would do so with some passion. In his own assessment, he concluded that he had leaned, perhaps too much, toward speaking for the other side. This led to the problem of each side tending to identify him with the other, despite his attempts to begin by establishing points of agreement.⁸² Warren, on the other hand, presented the opposite viewpoint

primarily in response to comments made by the other side. In his evaluation, he concluded that this quiet approach produced openness in places where one would not usually find it.⁸³ Finally, this interpretive function was not totally confined to inter-party communication. Within the FRG, the QIARs often were in the role of interpreting between the SPD and the CDU. On occasion they even interpreted between people within the same party, as illustrated in 1969 by Beittel's communication of Bahr's assessment of future possibilities for rapprochement with the GDR to the newly elected SPD president of the FRG.⁸⁴

Focus on Interests Rather than Positions

When dialoguing with the East German Peace Council in 1963, the Quaker team affirmed the need for "an understanding of vital interests and ground rules within which we could rely upon one another to respect those interests, and for a spirit within men that replaced indifference or hostility with mutual respect and concern."⁸⁵ This concern for mutual interests remained a central feature of the entire QIAR effort in Germany. Consequently, their efforts very much paralleled both theory and practice of principled negotiation. Furthermore, like the Harvard case, awareness of common and compatible interests increased dramatically, on both sides, at a point when the international climate changed significantly. Beittel credits the changed atmosphere to election of a new FRG government in 1969 and

the emergence of superpower detente.

Even before this period, there was limited government recognition of common and compatible interests. Warren reminded both East and West Berliners that they already cooperated on some basic interests, such as maintenance of a common sewage system, in order to get the authorities to consider other small steps. ⁸⁷ Reuman capitalized on compatible interests on the part of Congressman Reuss (who wanted to see what the GDR was really like) and GDR officials (who were desperate for any de facto recognition by an American official) in arranging for the unusual dialogue which took place in 1964. However, the big convergence of interests took place around the issues of German unification and mutual recognition. Initially, it was FRG concern for reunification that stood in direct conflict with GDR concern for recognition. It was only as the west, under Brandt, began to see these as possibly compatible that ostpolitik began. The FRG came to realize that the Hallstein Doctrine would never bring reunification. If it were ever to come, it would be the result of a cooperation which required recognition of the realities, including the existence of the GDR. The GDR, on its part, had to be convinced of the sincerity of Bonn and, therefore, be willing to acknowledge the validity of lesser FRG interests -- for example freedom of travel.

The QIAR presence in Germany helped build awareness of

common and compatible interests throughout the eleven year involvement. There were many instances where their attempts to nurture the emergence of common and compatible interests were rebuffed. However, they continued to encourage both parties to "create patterns of cooperation that interest our opposition as much as they do us."⁸⁸ This was done using various techniques recommended by principled negotiation. One method was simply to ask one party how they could meet the interests of the other. In 1969, for example, Beittel asked Lord Mayor Schutz what he could offer the GDR that would meet some of its interests. In response Schutz admitted that improved economic relations would help.⁸⁹ Such a question frequently had the effect of changing the focus from past to future, from complaints about the other side's prior activity to what one would now like to see happen. This was especially significant in a context where past disputes dominated so much of the political landscape. A typical illustration demonstrates the value of this approach. In 1969, Beittel asked an official from Bonn's Ministry for All-German Questions what steps they might take to move relations toward the desired reunification. The official responded by indicating the need to push for more and more contacts. At this point, Beittel used this interest in contacts to suggest that the prerequisite might be recognition.⁹⁰ Linking FRG interests in contacts with GDR interest in recognition was the very kind of process which eventually changed the policy of the FRG.

Another method used by the QIARs to build awareness of underlying interests was to raise with one party the reasons why the other had not made the choice which the former desired. Again contacts with the Ministry for All German Questions provide a good illustration. Ministry officials finally recognized that GDR flexibility in its relations with the FRG were dependent on the degree of support the former had from its own population. Therefore the Ministry would be most helpful if it did nothing to alienate the East German population from the GDR regime. This acceptance of GDR interests came after years of QIAR contacts with the Ministry during which questions were raised regarding reasons for GDR intransigence.⁹¹

In addition to building awareness of interests, the QIARs consciously attempted to extricate parties from their positions. Although, as previously noted, this task was given special emphasis by Reuman, each of the QIARs used many of the approaches advocated by principled negotiation to facilitate extrication. First, they frequently asked for advice and invited criticism. Second, they utilized positive statements within a party to ask for more movement, at the same time warning of the costs of intransigence. For example, in 1972, when an FRG official proposed making Berlin a center for the study of European security and environmental issues, Beittel pointed out that all such proposals depended on ratification of the Eastern Treaties.

The official, who opposed ratification at that time, agreed⁹² with Beittel's point. Third, they encouraged parties to find less threatening, and more effective, means by which to fulfill their interests. The Quaker team which visited the Germanies in 1963 wrote a letter to the U.S. State Department noting American interests in "a lessening of some of the more restrictive measures of Communist countries." In the letter they called upon the U.S. government to re-examine whether the present travel restrictions, as⁹³ administered through the ATO, helped or hindered this goal. Fourth, they challenged whether a given party's position had been harmful to its interests in the past. For example, in meeting with an official of the FRG Foreign Office in 1969, Beittel pointed out that policy toward the GDR had adversely affected the FRG's ability to develop any real opening of communication and cooperation with other socialist states. Despite his strong adherence to FRG policy,⁹⁴ the official agreed. Fifth, they asked parties whether their solutions addressed the complete problem. When speaking with an official of the GDR Foreign Office in late 1969, Beittel listened to the usual catalogue of demands directed at the FRG government. He agreed, in part, and then went on to develop them into general problem categories in which both the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the two Germanies, had interests and involvement.⁹⁵ Sixth, they tried to strengthen moderate factions within parties. Reuman repeatedly contacted the leader of

the Liberal Democrats in the GDR, presenting alternate perspectives and possibilities on a variety of issues, including value to the GDR of certain internal democratic changes. After the man finally agreed, at the end of 1965, Reuman observed changes in GDR policy regarding the access⁹⁶ of its pensioners to the west. Seventh, they interpreted commitment to present positions in ways that weakened it. Warren encountererd the same Liberal Democrat at an earlier period and listened to his claim that the GDR was only interested in peace and relaxation of tension. Warren, in turn, pointed out many things which they were doing which only strengthened the West's hawks and militated against relaxation of tensions. According to Warren, this was a⁹⁷ "light bulb experience" for this man. Eighth, they attempted to de-emphasize commitment so that parties could back down from positions. In 1964, a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn predicted that the Soviets would eventually remove their troops from the GDR and that the regime would have to reform, provided the West kept the pressure on through the Hallstein Doctrine. Reuman questioned him on whether there was any room being left for a⁹⁸ graceful capitulation to take place.

Finally, it is important to note one divergence from principled negotiation. Since they faced the opposition of official positions, the QIARs more frequently resorted to outright challenging of positions than did the principled

negotiators at Harvard. In the tension filled week before ratification of the Eastern Treaties, Beittel bluntly challenged the broad generalizations of one "wheeler-dealer" CDU Bundestag representative, even as he responded with great empathy for a relatively open CDU colleague.⁹⁹

Invent Options Before Making Commitments

There is clear evidence that the QIAR work was a catalyst for option creation. Beittel's job description states as one of the QIAR tasks -- "identifying and encouraging the individuals and organizations producing and promoting ideas and activities aimed at the reduction of East-West tensions."¹⁰⁰ A survey of Beittel's interviews indicates that he regularly performed this catalyst function for influential officials.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, facilitation of option creation did not begin with Beittel. At the very beginning of the QIAR effort, Warren was invited, by Albertz, to perform exactly this role when the latter expressed interest in any possibility for negotiation that Warren might discover or develop. Throughout his term, then, Warren assisted Albertz and others to think through alternatives.¹⁰²

Reuman, on the other hand, tended more toward presentation of his own options. He was engaged more in analysis and proposal making than in perception clarification. This more direct approach was still valued by many, as demonstrated by the interest generated by the International

Affairs Reports which he frequently used as the basis for
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discussion. To a lesser degree the other QIARs also
engaged in option presentation, even as Reuman facilitated
option creation. However, there was one major difference
between QIAR efforts and those of Harvard's Nuclear Nego-
tiation Project in the previous case. The Quakers
functioned much closer to the principles of principled
negotiation in that they produced numerous "yesable propo-
sitions," a suggestion made by Fisher in order to reduce
the chance that they would be perceived as positional
statements. International Affairs Reports by both Reuman
and Warren always contained a series of proposal on a
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variety of subjects. Reuman exemplified the Quaker atti-
tude of humility when he concluded that it was not his
place to determine whether one option was better than
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another.

Consequently, we can conclude that the QIAR effort
successfully avoided the obstacles of premature judgment or
closure and assumption of a fixed-pie, against which
principled negotiation warns. Furthermore, they frequently
made the inventing problem explicit, indicating the lack of
fair and credible solutions being presented by either side.
The biggest hindrance in their approach was the relatively
limited opportunity provided for group brainstorming, an
activity recommended by principled negotiation as an
excellent forum for option creation.

Still, there were some efforts to facilitate group

interaction. Regular Conferences for Diplomats, and the special conference at Gars for foreign policy specialists, provided significant opportunities for option creation within a mixed group setting. In preparation for these conferences, great care was taken to select plenary and small group leaders who were skilled in the facilitation of creative dialogue and would make sure that all ideas got expressed and all possibilities examined. However, there was no conscious brainstorming process.¹⁰⁶ In typical Quaker fashion, the structure was allowed to emerge, based on faith in the ability of people to discover a process which would lead to increased mutual understanding.¹⁰⁷ On occasion, specific proposals emerged, such as the previously mentioned peace treaty proposal discussed at Gars. Yet, even in the absence of such breakthroughs, conference participants valued the receipt of new insights and perspectives.¹⁰⁸

In pursuing the inventing process, the QIARs utilized most of the strategies proposed by principled negotiation. As with the Harvard case, they were unable to alter standard moves in a negotiating game since they were not functioning in an official third party capacity. However, they did influence the perception of the consequences, the nature of the decision being considered, and the nature of the game being played. One method of changing the perception of the consequences was to alter their

legitimacy or character. For example, Reuman suggested that the GDR could play down claims that any form of negotiation would constitute recognition of its legitimacy and sovereignty in exchange for all the practical benefits of being taken seriously.¹⁰⁹

The nature of the decision was altered by examining the scope, strength, and operational feasibility of an agreement. In order to change the scope, the QIARs frequently utilized the common Fisher technique of "fractionating" the conflict. For example, Warren's proposals for easing the situation at the Wall in 1962 included examining many small steps, such as removing one or more of the orders to shoot, prevention of dynamiting, and opening of check points on the transit system in exchange for greater access.¹¹⁰ Any one, or combination, of these and similar steps could be negotiated. The scope could then be broadened over time, as Reuman suggested in 1966. He affirmed the recently negotiated GDR pensioner travel passes as an excellent first and testing phase. He then proposed gradually and tentatively extending it to younger people, beginning with permission for students to study in the West. As an attempt to change the strength of the agreement, Reuman wrote that he was not so much proposing substantive solutions as procedural suggestions. For example, he suggested granting provisional diplomatic relations, contingent on guarantees for conducting reunification negotiations. Or in another variation, he advanced

the possibility that the four powers or the UN could give the two Germanies a mandate to work out plans for reunification or confederation over a limited number of years. Failing significant progress on this, the present borders would become final and both states would be accepted into UN membership. Considerations of operational feasibility influenced Reuman as he proposed to the FRG a possible option for the status of Berlin in 1966. He submitted the possibility that they treat West Berlin as a Bundesland (in keeping with their long-standing position), but in a special relationship to the FRG. He advised perceiving Berlin "as a bridge instead of a bridgehead," a center for contact¹¹¹ and negotiation instead of a pressure point. A second attempt at an operationally feasible proposal was based on concretizing a general suggestion passed on by Albertz in 1962, that the Americans favored negotiations over incidents at the Wall. Later that year, Warren put flesh on this idea by recommending an independent investigating unit composed of Germans, non-Germans, or some combination of¹¹² both.

The primary technique used to alter the nature of the game was to change the players or their roles. First, the QIARs focused their attention more on certain players than others, for example, the SPD party in the FRG. While it may have been questionable how significant this was in 1962, by the time Brandt came to power, it had considerable

significance. Second, the inclusion of the GDR diplomats in the Clarens Conference in 1969 altered, at least in a small way, the role that the GDR played in international diplomatic relations. There was a kind of recognition conferred on them by the Quaker action. Third, the QIARs proposed the inclusion of various third parties to perform a variety of supportive roles. In 1962, Warren suggested that the International Red Cross be utilized to rescue any injured person in incidents at the Wall.¹¹³ In 1963, he proposed that the UN peace keeping force might replace the Allied occupational forces in Germany.¹¹⁴ Fourth, Reuman spent considerable time proposing ways in which the GDR government might change the role of its own citizens. He called upon the government to make the concerns of its citizens for travel and information more of an active factor in its decision making. In similar fashion, he called upon the FRG government to accept the GDR as a legitimate player.¹¹⁵

Search for Objective Criteria

The process whereby the principal parties recognized common and compatible interests in the signing of the various treaties, was one which necessitated the acceptance of mutually acknowledged criteria for determining fairness. Certainly the Quakers did not have any direct say over final decisions regarding criteria adopted during negotiations. Yet, it is important to investigate the

degree to which the QIARs attempted to influence the selection of criteria prior to this point. For the influence of the pre-negotiation stage on the selection of final negotiating criteria cannot be overlooked. The development and use of criteria as a valid form of persuasion, in order to legitimize one's position or interests, is as significant in the exploratory phase of pre-negotiation as it is in the distributive phase of formal negotiation. However, as in the Harvard case, the primarily pre-negotiation context will limit the search for criteria to the discernment for standards for fair resolution of substantive issues. Discovery of criteria for negotiating procedures, one of the stated aims of principled negotiation, was irrelevant.

Prior to 1972, the Quakers, unlike Harvard's Nuclear Negotiation Project, were not trying to legitimize any particular proposal. However, during the ratification process, Beittel shifted the focus to presentation of a convincing rationale for the Eastern Treaties to the CDU party in the FRG, and to a lesser extent to the U.S. and other NATO governments. This stage might properly be called post-negotiation, as the East-West process had come to a tentative conclusion, at least as regards these treaties. Consequently, the search for fair criteria had two phases, a long stage of preparation for inter-party (East-West) negotiation and a short concluding stage of intra-party (primarily internal FRG) conflict. What then was the

Quaker role in formulating or suggesting conceptions of fairness or legitimacy during each of these phases?

When the first QIAR arrived in 1962, it was clearly evident that two separate value systems had formed divergent sets of "subjective" criteria for evaluating fairness. Observing the role of ideology within the conflict dynamic, Warren wrote:

The same situation, the same set of facts, becomes experienced and interpreted by each side through a process which selects and emphasizes only a part of the entire factual situation while neglecting other parts, and which casts these selected facts within the framework of a general ideological world view which gives them quite different meaning than the other side might give them.... these ideologies are the "notions" of the twentieth century, in the sense that [Quaker] George Fox asserted that the various theological systems were the "notions" of the seventeenth century.¹¹⁶

Warren rightly concluded that this ideological warp made it possible for two intelligent and sincere people to have dangerously different conceptions of reality and justification for behavior.

Each side in the East-West divide utilized many of the "objective" criteria, recommended by principled negotiation, to legitimize its own notions of justice. Fisher's preferred criterion of precedence was used by the GDR in its claim that the Wall was merely an expression of every state's right to protect its borders and control both emigration and immigration.¹¹⁷ Other criteria employed include those based on reciprocity, public opinion, equal treatment, unavoidable cost, efficiency, legal require-

ments, and moral standards. The GDR emphasized equal treatment to legitimize its call for recognition. The FRG focused on moral standards in legitimizing its opposition to what it considered a prison state. In both cases the legitimation process was buttressed by conflicting sets of legal norms.¹¹⁸

In this polarized context, the QIARs functioned more in accordance with principled negotiation than did Harvard's Nuclear Negotiation Project, which had more invested in its proposed solution and rationale. Warren, Reuman, and to a lesser extent Beittel, spent considerable effort communicating the criteria of each side to the other through their International Affairs Reports, as well as conversations. In the reports, they also interpreted the two sets of norms from the vantage point of their own perspective and values. They accepted some criteria, challenged others, and added some of their own.¹¹⁹ To state it in the language of principled negotiation, they functioned much like judges, weighing the merits of each suggestion and looking for a valid basis for decision. However, it is not quite accurate to call this a joint search for objective criteria, as advocated by principled negotiation. Due to the lack of direct contact between East and West, the QIARs had little opportunity to make this process a conscious one on the part of the principal parties. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the significance of the

QIAR role in assisting the emergence of new rationales.

Reuman, in particular, undertook the task of examining criteria for fairness. He did considerable personal research to validate his findings and utilized many of the criteria recommended by principled negotiation. In evaluating the FRG claim that public opinion in the GDR did not even support the government, he concluded there was more basis than granted by the FRG, but less than presumed by the GDR. This assessment was made after three weeks of interviews with over 200 people in the GDR.¹²⁰ In challenging the FRG government on the Hallstein Doctrine, he examined in detail all the arguments of legality, morality, and efficiency, concluding that the doctrine failed these tests despite FRG claims.¹²¹ In his proposals for unification, Reuman appealed for FRG recognition of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland on the basis of unavoidable cost, equal treatment, legal requirements, and moral standards. Likewise, he appealed for greater GDR respect for human rights and freedom, based on precedence and moral standards.¹²²

Evenhandedness in evaluation of both sides' criteria was characteristic of most of the QIAR effort. Beittel illustrated this when he acknowledged the legal rights of both parties regarding western access to West Berlin, yet also challenged each to recognize the rights of the other.¹²³ When challenging the criteria presented by one party, it was not uncommon for the QIAR to do so using the very criteria raised by that party. Reuman illustrated this in

a conversation about the legitimacy of the Hallstein Doctrine with an FRG official from the Ministry for All-German Questions. As he was to do later in his written report on the subject, Reuman responded in the context of the legal, moral, and efficacy issues raised by his conversation partner.¹²⁴ However, there was one point at which the QIARs may have deviated from the principled negotiation approach. One searches in vain for an example of disengagement from their own criteria. Though they granted the legitimacy of other criteria, they continually defended their own. On the other hand, when making proposals, they made it clear that theirs might well be questioned.¹²⁵ Perhaps such humility also accompanied the use of their own criteria. But, if so, it was not obvious.

As events moved toward ratification of the Eastern Treaties, however, Beittel's tactics changed considerably. Although he still asked the CDU opposition for their rationales, he was no longer the impassionate judge, weighing the evidence. He more frequently dismissed their "poorly founded" arguments as mere slogans and refrained from representing their perspective to the other side. He still affirmed some of their aspirations -- reunification, self-determination, reduction of Wall incidents, and expanded contacts with the East block, but argued vehemently, on the basis of efficiency (now his preferred criterion), that CDU policy would place these in jeopardy.¹²⁶

conclusions Regarding Nature of the Intervention

It is important to examine carefully the exact blend of advocacy/neutrality which the QIARs employed. As in the previous case, I will divide this question into three categories with respect to party, process, and outcome. First, it is very clear that party advocacy was rejected. Even the previously mentioned lobbying for the SPD position on ratification was more outcome, as opposed to party, advocacy. The attitude which characterized the eleven year effort was stated well by Warren when he reflected on the need to see both sides and not be captured by the "we
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against them" spirit. He repeatedly informed officials that he was neither a marxist sympathizer nor a U.S. State Department informer, either of which would have destroyed his credibility. The QIAR endeavor to be non-partisan was an extension of deeply held Quaker values and convictions. A belief in the presence of "that of God in every person" led to an affirmation of the worth of every party and sensitivity to the emergence of new possibilities from any
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source. Such a stance was not easy for Americans. Western officials tended to expect a sympathetic response from the QIAR and eastern officials initially responded with suspicion. Even the attempt of other Quakers, to gain advocacy on behalf of American Quakers imprisoned in the GDR, had to be resisted. However, with time, trust was developed with officials on both sides. They began to see the QIAR as a

friend, rather than an antagonist -- one with whom it was possible to disagree and from whom it was possible to receive judgment and learn. The extent to which the QIAR went to ensure this non-advocacy was illustrated by Warren's approach to conversations, where he very consciously carried the opposite party with him. Having someone "looking over his shoulder" was an antidote to one-sided thinking on his own part.¹²⁹ The universally acknowledged credibility and legitimation of the QIARs testifies to their success in not taking sides.

In complete consistency with principled negotiation, the QIAR effort was an illustration of process advocacy. They not only practiced a conciliatory approach themselves, but actively advocated tension reduction steps to the principal parties. Albertz acknowledged them as one of the few influences which encouraged contact with the other side and suggested concrete steps to move the process along. In particular, he credited them with being one out of two parties which carried messages and reported on the perspective of the other side. This view was also corroborated by the accounts of East German officials.¹³⁰ Warren, while making a disclaimer to any official message carrying, has indicated that there was a kind of unofficial go-between process. He never communicated anything at the request of another party, but on his own initiative would communicate a sentiment such as, "If they did so and so, it

would be easier for us to do so and so."

The process which the QIARs practiced and advocated was, again, very much based in Quaker values and beliefs -- such as freedom and worth of the individual, mutual acceptance, friendship and community, peaceful relationships, "speaking the truth in love," inner light and guidance, addressing concerns, seeking clearness, building consensus, and bearing witness.¹³² These convictions had more affinity with western value systems. However, the personal integrity of the QIARs, and basic trust they placed in people, enabled them to gain, in turn, the trust of officials in the East. The specific religious content of these values was expressed openly, but deference was not expected from the other parties. For example, frequent periods of quiet worship were an important part of preparation for the Quaker team which visited the two Germanies in 1963. The Quakers valued such practice, whether corporate or individual, for the added dimension it brought to personal preparation. As a result they found themselves to be more courageous, more perceptive of inner conflicts (their own and others'), and more aware of personal limitation and failure. It was the combination of this religious dimension, with the insights of social scientific process, that formed the basis for their practical guidelines. According to the Quakers, when one believes that two persons in conversation stand under a higher authority and power, it follows that one will make every effort to acknowledge

truth wherever one finds it, make no attempt to hide anything, take great care not to misrepresent another, avoid self-righteousness, understand the difficulties of an official's role, avoid unnecessary explosive issues, and act with total consistency on both sides of the divide.¹³³ For example, due to a felt need for consistency, Warren determined that he would not concede a point on one side of the wall that he would not defend on the other. This was based on the religious conviction that, "Our yeas must be yeas¹³⁴ and our nays must be nays."

As has already been noted, the QIAR effort was not primarily one of outcome advocacy. There were no preconceived answers. They did not wed themselves to any political line until the ratification process. They did indicate their opinions and presented proposals in private, but the aim was not to gain passage of a particular treaty. However, the treaties negotiated in the early 1970's were a formulation of the mandated effort of the work -- to move toward detente, de-escalation, and reduction of tension. Moreover, Beittel's final move toward outcome advocacy for certain elements of the SPD position, would have been inappropriate and impossible at the beginning. But, by 1972, lobbying for ratification was simply a natural extension of prior QIAR efforts.¹³⁵ Against those who charged him with damaging the neutral image of the Quakers, Beittel replied that, although this image had a place, a plea for support,

coming from so many with whom they had worked for years, must be acknowledged. Although German Quakers were divided over this stance, he was supported by the AFSC home office.¹³⁶

Regarding the issue of advocacy, then, it is clear that the QIARs were not only process advocates, but also adopted a process remarkably close to that recommended by principled negotiation. Furthermore, like principled negotiation they were clearly not party advocates, and primarily not outcome advocates. It is a misnomer, however, to refer to their role as neutral. Reuman described it in one of his International Affairs Reports, as "... that of a person living between both sides, compassionately engaged with both...."¹³⁷ He later described the experience as one where:

Sometimes one feels as if he were trying to resolve German tensions by taking them into himself and carrying them there. This is ... unavoidable when you try to listen with compassionate concern and clear understanding to the people on both sides of the many walls of distrust and fear, ... and when you try to speak to and of the people on both sides with sympathy and respect.¹³⁸

Immersed in all of the struggles, QIARs can hardly be said to have been detached from the conflict in some neutral capacity.

In conclusion, it has been amply demonstrated, by now, that the strategy used in the QIAR effort in the two Germanies was very similar to the methodology of principled negotiation. Attention was generally given to both relational and substantive issues, though there were few

occasions in which the people issues were dealt with during separate sessions. Discovery of common and compatible interests was central to the effort, though this may not have been very visible during the ratification process at the very end. Facilitation of option creation resulted in many more "yesable propositions" than occurred in the Harvard case, despite the lack of use of formal brainstorming techniques. A search for objective criteria was certainly carried out by the QIARs through both development of their own criteria and communication/interpretation of others' criteria. This was true even if they were unable to make it a conscious search by the principal participants or disengage completely from their own rationales. Party advocacy was rejected, process advocacy affirmed, and outcome advocacy employed part of the time. Therefore, like the Harvard case, this one demonstrates the applicability of principled negotiation for intervention by an uninvited, nongovernmental third party in a pre-negotiation process.

Furthermore, this case shows the adaptability of principled negotiation to a much more difficult context. Here, the third party has no specific outcome in mind and is a religious organization, which is frequently perceived as having less access to power structures than is generally the case with academia. One of the principal parties, the GDR, has a weaker identity and less power, though this is tempered by the relative power stability of East and West blocks. The political landscape is dominated by entrenched

positions on old disputes, a factor which mitigates against easy resolution. Consequently, this case holds the potential for modeling a creative intervention role for other religious organizations, even when confronted by intractable conflicts within asymmetrical power relationships.

NOTES

1. C.H. Mike Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 23-29.

2. Adam Curle, True Justice: Quaker Peace Makers and Peace Making (London: Quaker Home Service, 1981), pp. 87-88; and

Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 46-49.

3. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 33-34, 40-43, and 48-49.

4. Ibid., pp. 91 and 136-137.

5. For documentation of the relationship, between Fisher and AFSC, see:

Roger Fisher, Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs: A Working Approach to Peace (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972),

p. 4; and

Philip C. Jessup, "Foreword" to Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs: A Working Approach to Peace, by Roger Fisher (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. vii.

However, Berlin QIAR Roland Warren has indicated that he was totally unaware of Fisher's methodology, at the time he was involved in this case (Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to this author, April 25, 1991, p. 1).

6. Jenny Knight [staff member of AFSC Regional Office in New York], "Negotiations That Work: An Exploration in Positive Peacemaking," March 4, 1989 (unpublished presentation during workshop titled "Peace Making Workshops: A Comparison of Three Models," held during the North American Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution, sponsored by The National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution and The Network: Interaction for Conflict Resolution, in Montreal, Canada, February 28 - March 5, 1989);

Jenny Knight and Jack Patterson [staff members of AFSC Regional Office in New York], private interview, Montreal, Canada, March 4, 1989; and

Jon Ebersole [staff member of AFSC Regional Office in New York], unpublished letter to this author, June 20,

1989,
p. 2.

7. Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., The Two Germanies Since 1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 9-12.

8. In 1948, the Soviets withdrew from the Allied Kommandatura and forbade elections for, or meetings of, the City Assembly in its sector. The other three allied powers continued to exercise the powers of the Kommandatura within the three sectors they controlled. However, they still considered it a quadripartite organ for administration of the entire city, operating under limited jurisdiction until such time as the Soviets returned to the body. As events continued to unfold, in 1950, the GDR declared East Berlin its capital, while the FRG declared the entire city as one of its lands, pending the termination of its occupation. While continuing to retain this official status in West Berlin until the present, the three western powers relinquished most of the control to the city authorities in 1955. Furthermore, the FRG maintained a legislative relationship with West Berlin through the city's decision to apply most federal laws to itself. Consequently, West Berlin has been included in most of the legal, economic, and foreign treaty arrangements of the FRG and has housed various governmental bodies of the FRG (Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Berlin Settlement: The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the Supplementary Arrangements [Wiesbaden: Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1972], pp. 117-137).

9. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 55-58.

10. Ibid., pp. 63-66.

11. Terence Prittie, Willy Brandt: Portrait of a Statesman (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), pp. 181, 195, and 223.

12. Turner, The Two Germanies, pp. 150-161; and Roger Morgan, "The Ostpolitik and West Germany's External Relations," in The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany, ed. by Roger Tilford (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants, England: Saxon House; and Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1975), p. 97.

13. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 90-92.

14. Ibid., pp. 60-65.

15. During the two years he held a total of 245 conversations with 151 different people, approximately equally divided between West Berlin, the FRG and the GDR. Of these conversations, 153 were with officials and all but nine at least touched on political issues (Roland L. Warren, "The Conflict Intersystem and the Change Agent," Journal of Conflict resolution, VIII, No. 3 [1964], 331). Contacts with FRG and West Berlin officials included the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry for All-German Questions, the Ministry for Development Aid, and the commissioner of the West Berlin Interior Department (which includes the police). In addition contact was made in the West with leaders of national organizations, members of the western alliance diplomatic community, university professors and other academics, journalists, leading officials of the Evangelical Church, and Quakers. In the GDR, official contacts included the general Secretaries of the two principal non-Communist parties, president and members of the Volkskammer (Parliament), the State Secretary for Church Affairs and his deputies, officials in the Foreign Office, members of the Warsaw Pact diplomatic community, mayors, local commissioners, and local officials of the Secretariat for Church Affairs. Unofficial contacts were made with bishops and a number of other officials of the Evangelical Church, Quakers, director of an Evangelical school, university professors, members of the Academy of Sciences, and businessmen (Roland L. Warren, "Quaker Peace Work In A Tense International Situation: QIAR Activities and Problems in East and West Germany," International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, X, No. 1, January, 1963 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1963], pp. 1-2; Roland [L.] Warren and Margaret Warren, "Impressions from Two Weeks in the German Democratic Republic, November-December, 1962" [unpublished report, n.d., American Friends Service Committee Archives], p. 1; Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Sidonie [Schafer] [AFSC staff person in Philadelphia], July 4, 1962 [personal files of Robert E. Reuman, Waterville, Maine], pp. 1-6; Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Sidonie [Schafer], No. GER-P 14, 24 October, 1962 [AFSC Archives], pp. 2-3, 6 and 8; Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Irene Krueger [AFSC staff person in Philadelphia], No. GER-P 35, November 25, 1963 [personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York], p. 6; and Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Irene Krueger, No. GER-P 38, January 10, 1964 [personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York], p. 2-4).

16. Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Clarence E. Pickett (AFSC executive secretary emeritus in Philadelphia), January 14, 1964 (personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York), p. 1;

Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Irene Krueger, No. GER-P 34, November 4, 1963 (personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York), p. 2; and
Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Irene Krueger, No. GER-P 45, March 16, 1964 (personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York), p. 1.

The most notable lectures were at the Evangelical Academies in both East and West Berlin and at Humbolt University in East Berlin (Roland L. Warren, unpublished letter to Sidonie [Schafer], No. GER-P 11, September 8, 1962 [personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York], pp. 3-4; and Warren, letter to Krueger, March 16, 1964, p. 3). One of his most significant papers was "Effects of Recognition of the German Democratic Republic: A Preliminary Listing of Some of the Dimensions" [unpublished mimeographed paper, June, 1964, personal files of Roland L. Warren, Andover, New York]. Finally, there were three International Affairs Reports from Quaker workers, published in both English and German, titled "Background on the Berlin Wall" (International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, IX, No. 15, November, 1962 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1962]), "Quaker Peace Work in a Tense International Situation: QIAR Activities and Problems in East and West Germany," and "Possibilities for a Berlin Settlement" (International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, X, No. 3, June, 1963 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1963]).

17. The team made visits to many high level officials in both Germanies, involving twenty seven German officials and eleven foreign diplomats. In West Berlin this included the Mayor and Lord Mayor and Chief of the U.S. Mission. In East Berlin it included the Chairman of the State Council (Walter Ulbricht, the head of government in the GDR), President of the Volkskammer, Foreign Minister, and State Secretary for Church Affairs. In Bonn it included the Minister for All-German Affairs, leader of the Christian Democratic Party representatives in the Bundestag, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. ambassador (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 73 and 77; and Journey Through a Wall: A Quaker Mission to a Divided Germany, September 8-30, 1963 [n.p.: American Friends Service Committee, February, 1964], pp. 3-5).

18. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 76-90;

Warren, letter to Krueger, November 4, 1963, p. 2;
Roland L. Warren, "Some Considerations Regarding Travel Restrictions on East Germans by the Allied Travel Office," in Journey Through a Wall: A Quaker Mission to a

Divided Germany, September 8-30, 1963 (n.p.: American Friends Service Committee, February, 1964), pp. 65-69; and Roland L. Warren, letter to Walter Ulbricht, November 12, 1963, in Journey Through a Wall: A Quaker Mission to a Divided Germany, September 8-30, 1963 (n.p.: American Friends Service Committee, February, 1964), pp. 70-71.

19. Prittie, Willy Brandt, pp. 167-179.

20. Roland L. Warren, private interview, Andover, New York, March 9, 1989.

21. Warren, report of interview with Innensenator [Heinrich] Albertz, in letter to Sidonie, July 4, 1962, pp. 2-3.

22. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," pp. 1-7; and Warren, "Possibilities for a Berlin Settlement," pp. 1-8.

23. Warren, letter to Sidonie, 24 October, 1962, p. 6.

24. Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989.

25. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 91 and 104-105.

26. Reuman estimates that he conducted 300-400 interviews, with greater emphasis than Warren on contacts in Bonn and East Berlin. The projects, which contributed to about one fourth of the conversations, included German-American work-study and school affiliation projects plus a variety of German-German projects. Reuman continued efforts begun by Warren to sponsor a Conference for Intellectuals, but in the end it was rejected by the GDR. Reuman also made initial explorations for a dialogue between an influential West German non-governmental organization -- the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland (Caretaker for Indivisible Germany) -- and the East German State Secretary for All-German Questions, an effort which later proved successful during the tenure of William Beittel. Some of the more successful projects during Reuman's time were held under the auspices of the European Quaker Conferences for Diplomats, organized by the Quaker office in Geneva (Robert [E.] Reuman, "Reichenschaft und Ausblick" [unpublished paper, August, 1966, personal files of Robert E. Reuman, Waterville, Maine], pp. 2-6; and Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 94, and 112-118). As for lectures, one of the more significant ones was later published and distributed (Robert E. Reuman, Walls, Pendle Hill Pamphlet No. 147 [Lebanon, Pennsylvania: Sowers Printing Company, June

1966]; see also Irene Krueger, unpublished memorandum to QIAR-Centers Committee on gleanings from Bob [Robert E.] Reuman's letters and reports, June 15, 1966 [personal files of Robert E. Reuman, Waterville, Maine], p. 1). Finally, Reuman authored four International Affairs Reports from Quaker workers, published in both English and German, which will be examined subsequently in the main text.

27. The participants were chosen by the institutes themselves. However, Quaker advice was followed in selecting people who could represent the hardline positions of the respective governments, while personally remaining open to building mutual understanding and searching for a breakthrough. Furthermore, neither Reuman nor conference director, Franklin Wallin, led any of the sessions. However, the public policy professionals selected for this role were people who held a Quaker perspective, in addition to being experts in political and economic analysis (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 117; and Robert E. Reuman, in private interview with Robert E. Reuman and Paul Cates [an American Quaker working in Berlin with the German Evangelical Church's youth exchange program from 1960-69], Colby College, Waterville, Maine, March 14, 1989).

28. At Gars, room was made for formal participant input by encouraging submission of papers in advance, most of which were read and entered naturally into the conversation. In place of numerous presentations, representing the large range of political and ideological perspectives, the primary focus was on discussion groups. These were designed to bring together eight to twelve individuals with mutual professional interests, but divergent viewpoints. - Furthermore, each group was allowed to develop its own structure and direction (Franklin Wallin, unpublished letter to Nora Booth [AFSC staff person in Philadelphia], April 29, 1966 [AFSC Archives], p. 1; Franklin Wallin, unpublished letter to Nora Booth, No. SI 31, June 14, 1966 [AFSC Archives], pp. 1-3; and Dennis W. Allen [Assistant Director of Quaker International Conferences and Seminars, operating out of the Quaker office in Geneva], unpublished letter to Nora Booth, No. GCS-4, October 11, 1966 [AFSC Archives], p. 1).

29. Reuman, "Rechenschaft und Ausblick," p. 3; and Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 104-106.

30. This report followed a three week visit, where Reuman interviewed over 200 East Germans (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 105-106; and Robert [E.] Reuman, "Attitudes in the DDR (East Germany)," International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, XII, No.

6, June 30, 1965 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1965], pp. 1-10).

31. For example, an executive assistant to one of Brandt's deputies quoted from the report, stated that it confirmed other studies he had seen, and invited Reuman to do some research on the boundary question for the SPD (Krueger, memorandum on gleanings from Reuman's letters and reports, June 15, 1966, p. 1).

32. The chairperson of one of the small parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LPD) even admitted the existence of dissatisfaction among the populace, as stated by Reuman, thereby necessitating internal changes (Bob [Robert E.] Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Manfred Gerlach [chairperson of the LPD] and Dr. Muller [LPD expert on foreign affairs], December 29, 1965 [AFSC Archives], pp. 1-2; and Reuman, "Rechenschaft und Ausblick," p. 6).

33. The potential for diplomatic blackmail was demonstrated by the 1965 Egyptian threat to exchange diplomatic relations with the FRG for the GDR, unless Bonn changed its foreign policy toward Israel (Robert E. Reuman, "The Hallstein Doctrine," International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, XII, No. 9, November, 1965 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1965], pp. 1-9; Peter H. Merkl, German Foreign Politics, West & East: On the Threshold of a New European Era, Studies in International and Comparative Politics, ed. by Peter H. Merkl [Santa Barbara, California: Clio Press, Inc., 1974; and Oxford, England: Clio Press, Ltd., 1974], p. 123; and Reuman, "Rechenschaft und Ausblick," p. 6).

34. Robert [E.] Reuman, "Proposals on German Unification," International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, XIII, No. 2, March, 1966 [German edition: December, 1965] (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1965), pp. 1-14; and

Reuman, "Rechenschaft und Ausblick," p. 6.

35. Egon Bahr, of the SPD, asked to discuss the proposals, indicating that they were very similar to ideas he was developing in what would become detente. Reuman also met with Brandt to discuss the issues raised in his proposals (Reuman, ; and Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 106-107). In addition, the FDP leader, Erich Mende, who was also Deputy Chancellor and Minister of All-German Questions, received this and previous papers in December 1965 (Robert [E.] Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Erich Mende, December

29, 1965 [AFSC Archives], p. 2). Within a year, the party broke its coalition government with the CDU, leading to new elections and the advancement of Brandt to the Foreign Office. One of the issues of contention which led to the coalition's collapse -- support for all-German technical commissions -- was specifically recommended by Reuman in his proposals on reunification. A second issue -- support for diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe -- was a natural outgrowth of his recommendations (Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," p. 9; and Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West & East, pp. 120-121). Finally, it was in response to reading these reunification proposals that Wilhelm Schutz, the leader of the KUD, proposed to Reuman the possibility of opening a dialogue between that organization and an appropriate GDR body (Robert [E.] Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Wilhelm Wolfgang Schutz, December 15, 1965 [personal files of Robert E. Reuman, Waterville, Maine], pp. 1-2).

36. Robert [E.] Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Hans Martin Geyer, January 28, 1966 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2; and

Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 106.

37. An official at the American Section of the GDR Foreign Office, who shared the general GDR reservations, nonetheless indicated that he had given the proposals to the Foreign Minister and would try to secure an interview for Reuman. Nonofficial groups also gave a mixed response. The Christian Peace Conference in Prague asked to discuss the proposals (Krueger, memorandum on gleanings from Reuman's letters and reports, June 15, 1966, pp. 2-3). But the GDR Peace Council, who had arranged the AFSC visit to the GDR during Warren's time, objected to the negative assessment of internal GDR matters. However, Reuman used the opportunity to raise the possibility of conversation with the KUD over similar issues. The Peace Council responded positively and Reuman saw this prospective dialogue as one of the most hopeful legacies of his period of service (Bob [Robert E.] Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Werner Rumpel [Chairman of the Peace Council], as well as Halker, Konig, and Moelke [Secretary], March 10, 1966 [AFSC Archives], pp. 1-2; and Reuman, "Re-chenschaft und Ausblick," p. 5).

38. Reuman noted that all four of the previously named FRG personalities -- Brandt, Bahr, Mende, and Schutz -- and their organizations -- SPD, FDP, and KUD began advocating conciliation with the GDR. In addition, he observed the beginnings of change even within the previously hardened CDU position (Robert [E.] Reuman, "New Trends in West Germany," International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers,

XIII, No. 4, August, 1966 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1966], pp. 1-8).

39. During the next two years, with Brandt as Foreign Minister, the FRG recognized Yugoslavia and Romania, eased trade and cultural exchanges with other East European countries, and attempted a German-German detente by proposing talks over smaller issues such as extending trade and pass agreements. Each of these had previously been proposed in Reuman's papers. Even though some of these changes were temporarily reversed following the Prague Spring of 1968, they had already changed the landscape of FRG foreign policy (Prittie, Willy Brandt, pp. 202-216).

40. Robert E. Reuman, "Reconciliation in Germany," reprinted from the Middlebury College News Letter, Summer, 1966 (personal files of Robert E. Reuman, Waterville, Maine), 3-4.

41. Paul Cates was working with the German Evangelical Church's youth exchange program from 1960-69. Though not officially a QIAR, he worked closely with official Quaker representatives during his stay in Berlin (Paul Cates, private interview with Reuman and Cates, March 14, 1989).

42. Robert [E.] Reuman, unpublished memorandum on trip with Congressman Henry Reuss, November 24, 1964 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2; and

Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 123.

Reuss actually invited an official of the Foreign Office to give him a statement of GDR concerns which could be presented to the U.S. government. In response, the GDR parliament drafted a statement encouraging conversations about potential commercial relationships, a communique delivered to Reuss via Reuman (Bob [Robert E.] Reuman, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Dr. [Hans Martin] Geyer and unnamed second person [at the Foreign Ministry, East Berlin], February 9, 1965 [AFSC Archives]).

43. Reuman, memorandum on trip with Reuss, November 24, 1964, pp. 2-3.

44. While involved in AFSC youth work in Paris, he had made many trips to Germany and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, his German wife played an active part, especially during the year (1970-71) when Beittel was on partial leave to complete a thesis. (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 91-92). Finally, he had experience living and studying in a socialist country, Yugoslavia ([William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Hans Martin Geyer [at the Foreign Ministry, East Ber-

lin], 10 February, 1969 [AFSC Archives]).

45. W[illiam F.] B[eittel], "International Affairs Associate -- Germany QIAR Program" (unpublished one page memorandum, 28 January, 1969 [AFSC Archives]); and

Lore Horn, in private interview with William F. Beittel and Lore Horn, West Berlin, September 7, 1989.

Beittel estimated that he conducted between 700-800 interviews (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 94). Those contacted included government officials, diplomats, academicians, and clergy (William F. Beittel, "American Friends Service Committee -- Germany QIAR Program: 1968-1969 Report" [unpublished report, 30 September, 1969 {AFSC Archives}]). He attended Quaker Conferences for Diplomats in Switzerland, Austria, and Poland (Quaker International Conferences Participants Directory -- Programs in Asia, Europe and U.S.A.: 1952-1976 [Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1976], inside front cover and p. 62). The informal meetings included numerous occasions where Beittel facilitated contact between eastern and western officials. The two written reports were completed at the beginning of Beittel's sabbatical leave and just after his return to full-time QIAR work. They appear not to have had great influence on his contacts.

46. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Heinz Gefaeller (head of the Berlin Office of the Ministry of All-German Questions), 13 January, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Heinz Gefaeller, 18 April, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2; and

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Hermann Kreuzer, 6 May, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2.

47. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Egon Bahr, 6 May, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2.

48. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Klaus Schutz (Lord Mayor of West Berlin), 6 June, 1969 (AFSC Archives), p. 3.

49. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 108-109, and 131-133;

Beittel, interview with Geyer, 10 February, 1969, pp. 1-5;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Gunther Urban (GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 10 February, 1969 (AFSC Archives); and

Steve [Stephen] Thiermann (director of Quaker Conferences and Seminars Program in Geneva, who attended the above interviews with Geyer and Urban), "Berlin Trip Report - February 7-12, 1969" (unpublished report, February 17, 1969, personal files of Stephen Thiermann, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania), pp. 6-7.

50. W[illiam] F[.] B[eittel], "The Right to Provoke: How Not To Negotiate" (unpublished paper, 1 May, 1969, AFSC files), pp. 1-4; and

Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 109-110.

51. It was suggested that the Soviet Ambassador invite President Nixon for a cup of tea, during the latter's visit to Berlin in February. The Soviet's wanted to know if the Americans were interested and suggested AFSC contact the Nixon administration. The contact within the U.S. Mission, an alumnus of a Quaker conference for diplomats, fed the idea to the State Department. Although, the situation was not deemed serious enough for such measures, the suggestion had gone immediately to the highest levels of the State Department in Washington (William F. Beittel, in private interview with William F. Beittel and Lore Horn, West Berlin, September 7, 1989; [William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with First Secretary Gremitskich [Soviet Embassy, East Berlin], 26 March, 1969 [AFSC Archives]; [William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Political Officer, U.S. Mission, Berlin, 21 February, 1969 [AFSC Archives]; and [William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Heinrich Albertz, 21 February, 1969 [AFSC Archives]).

52. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 123-124;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with David Anderson (U.S. Mission, Berlin), 8 November, 1968 (AFSC Archives);

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on interview with Joseph R. Hayes (U.S. Mission, Berlin), 14 January, 1969 (AFSC Archives);

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Gunther Urban (GDR Foreign Ministry), 16 January, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with David Anderson, 24 January, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Joseph [R.] Hayes and unnamed colleague, March 11, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2; and

William [F.] Beittel, "Diplomatic Luncheons in Berlin" (unpublished one page memorandum, 30 April, 1969,

53. Although annual conferences had been held at Clarens, Switzerland since 1952, GDR participants had only been invited as guests or consultants. In 1969, an invitation for official participation was delivered to the GDR Foreign Office in the midst of Beittel's initial grilling. However, the FRG was not so pleased. Diplomatic recognition of the GDR by Iraq and Cambodia, together with coming FRG elections, made the FRG conclude that their diplomats could not have contact with GDR diplomats in a context where matters of the recognition and status of Germany may be discussed. Though many former Clarens alumni expressed disappointment, the FRG government organized a boycott of the conference on the part of all NATO country participants, with the exception of Norway and the Netherlands. Other NATO countries limited their delegations to non-diplomats, making the conference imbalanced, but still a significant meeting of influential persons from all countries on either side of the East-West divide. After the FRG elections, however, the atmosphere changed dramatically. In January 1970, a high official in Chancellor Brandt's office indicated that FRG diplomats would attend the 1970 conference (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 118-122; Quaker International Conferences Participants Directory, inside front cover; and [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with David Gladstone [First Secretary, British Embassy in Bonn], 8 May, 1969 [AFSC Archives], pp. 1-3).

54. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 110-111;

William [F.] Beittel, unpublished letter to Irene Krueger, No. BP-1, 5 January, 1970 (AFSC Archives), p. 1; and

William [F.] Beittel, "Correcting Bismark," International Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, XVII, No. 5, September, 1970 (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee International Centers Office; and London: Friends Service Council, 1970), p. 7.

For example, in the autumn of 1969, the Ministry for All-German Questions became the Ministry for Inner-German Relations, reflecting a change from the "sole representative of Germany" stance previously adopted by the FRG (William [F.] Beittel, "The Coming Moscow Pilgrimage" [unpublished memorandum, 29 October, 1969, AFSC Archives], pp. 1-2). An official from this ministry discussed with Beittel the new role of the ministry and asked him to interpret it to GDR officials and communicate the FRG's intention not to encourage the exodus of GDR residents ([William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Ministerialdirigent [Hermann] Kreuzer, 9 September, 1969 [AFSC Ar-

chives], pp. 1-3). In the spring of 1970, Brandt and GDR Prime Minister, Willie Stoph, agreed to two historic meetings, first in the GDR, then in the FRG (Prittie, Willy Brandt, pp. 239-245). By the summer of 1970, a Foreign Office official was convinced that the GDR had already been "recognized," but must now go through the learning process by which this could be made formal. The same official decried the fact that he was still barred from visiting the GDR by his own superiors (William [F.] Beittel, "Bericht Aus Bonn: 15-19 June, 1970" [unpublished report, 26 June, 1970, AFSC Archives], pp. 1-2).

55. Beittel, "The Coming Moscow Pilgrimage," p. 2;
Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 111;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Gunther Urban, 11 December, 1969 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-3;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Wolf Siemens (GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 17 February, 1970 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2;

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Wolf Siemens and Hellfried Schlesinger (GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 20 May, 1970 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2; and

[William F.] Beittel, unpublished one page memorandum on telephone interview with Wolf Siemens, 25 June, 1970 (AFSC Archives).

56. Beittel, interview with Bahr, 6 May, 1969, pp. 2-3.

57. Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West & East, pp. 132-137; and

Prittie, Willy Brandt, pp. 246-250.

58. Quaker service bodies sent a group to Moscow to discuss Soviet and Warsaw Pact views of the German situation (Beittel, "The Coming Moscow Pilgrimage," p. 2). Meanwhile, Beittel met fortnightly with a Soviet journalist from Pravda in order to talk about the FRG's relations with the U.S.S.R. and other east block countries (Beittel, private interview with Beittel and Horn, September 7, 1989). He also made contact with members of both the FRG negotiating team and parliament, some of whom requested help from him in gaining more support from FRG's allies for the entire ostpolitik policy. Beittel took this request to the U.S. Mission, but received a rather cool response (Beittel, "Bericht Aus Bonn: 15-19 June, 1970," pp. 4-8).

59. Turner, The Two Germanies Since 1945, pp. 150-152; and

Prittie, Willy Brandt, pp. 251-255.

60. Beittel met with officials in the ministry of Foreign Affairs (one of whom had attended Quaker conferences), the Sejm (parliament), U.S. Embassy, various academic and church organizations. Furthermore, he met with two members of the Polish delegation to the upcoming negotiations, including the head of the delegation. He found Polish officials surprisingly critical of the GDR, open to the developing relationship with the FRG, willing to contradict their own government's official line, and very appreciative of the Quaker presence. Two Foreign Ministry officials actually suggested the Quakers do a study on European security and offered to contribute articles (Bill [William F.] Beittel, "Poland Trip Report [25-30 January, 1970]" [unpublished report, 4 February, 1970, AFSC Archives], pp. 1-10).

61. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Jirzy Makosa (First Secretary of Polish Embassy at the Military Mission in West Berlin) and Boleslaw Kulski (Second Secretary), 9 April, 1970 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2.

62. William F. Beittel, "American Friends Service Committee -- Germany QIAR Program: Report 1969-70" (unpublished one page report, 7 October, 1970 [AFSC Archives]).

63. William F. Beittel, "American Friends Service Committee -- Germany QIAR Program: Report 1970-71" (unpublished one page report, 30 September, 1971 [AFSC Archives]).

64. Turner, The Two Germanies Since 1945, pp. 153-155.

65. Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West & East, pp. 165-173.

66. In separate meetings, during March, with former Mayor Albertz, a former SPD Bundestag representative, and a GDR official from the Foreign office, Beittel heard urgent requests for official statements of support from the U.S. government. Plans were discussed to contact leading foreign newspapers, the Secretary General's Office at the UN, U.S. State Department officials, Congressmen and especially certain sympathetic Senators. Beittel went to Washington, New York, and London in April to lobby for greater allied support of the treaties (Bill [William F.] Beittel, "Die Ost-Vertrage" [unpublished memorandum, 17 March, 1972, AFSC Archives], pp. 1-3; Bill [William F.] Beittel, "Die Ost-Vertrage (for the third time)" [unpublished memorandum, 22 March, 1972, AFSC Archives], pp. 1-3; and [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Hans [Martin] Geyer, 21 March, 1972 [AFSC Archives], pp. 2-3).

Subsequent trips, in May, by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers to Bonn and President Nixon to Moscow, to talk about East-West relations, unequivocally stated American support for the treaties as part of detente (Merkl, 171). Beittel then focused attention on Bonn where the vote on ratification was fast approaching. From May 2-10, he visited government officials from the Chancellor's Office and Foreign Office, CDU Bundestag representatives, and diplomats at the American, British, and French embassies. Beittel, especially struck by the weakness of CDU arguments, concluded they had really not developed a concrete alternative and, furthermore, knew that themselves. Consequently, unless attacked, he was careful to refrain from pushing his position too much (Bill [William F.] Beittel, "Bonn Trip Report: 2-10 May, 1972" [unpublished report, 20 June, 1972, AFSC Archives], pp. 1-8; and Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 112-113).

67. Numerous GDR officials were considerably more friendly, as they realized the value that Quakers could be in helping them prepare for the onslaught of recognition ([William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Gunther Urban, 10 February, 1972 [AFSC Archives], pp. 1-2). For example, the same GDR official who had given Beittel the grilling in 1969, was pleasant and relaxed in 1972 as they discussed how to gain U.S. support for the Eastern Treaties (Beittel, interview with Geyer, 21 March, 1972, pp. 1-3; and Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 133-134).

68. In 1972, Beittel was finally able to set up a dialogue partner in East Berlin for the KUD. He also set up talks between lower level GDR officials and U.S. diplomats in 1971. Furthermore, the Quaker sponsored Washington International Affairs Seminar arranged a meeting in 1972 between U.S. officials and a group of GDR scholars from an institute closely associated with the Foreign Office. (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 113 and 123-124; Beittel, private interview with Beittel and Horn, September 7, 1989; and William [F.] Beittel, "American Friends Service Committee -- Germany QIAR Program: Report 1971-72" [unpublished report, 6 October, 1972 [AFSC Archives], p. 1).

69. This treaty included a nonaggression pact and a level of recognition just short of full diplomatic relations. It followed a number of smaller treaties regarding traffic, telecommunications, and trade. All of these were negotiated between November 1971-December 1972 by Egon Bahr of the FRG and State Secretary Michael Kohl of the GDR (Morgan, "The Ostpolitik and West Germany's External Relations," p. 97; and Geoffrey K. Roberts, "The Ostpolitik and Relations Between the Two Germany's," in The Ostpolitik and

Political Change in Germany, ed. by Roger Tilford (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants, England: Saxon House; and Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1975), pp. 82-84.

70. Journey Through a Wall, p. 61.

71. R[obert] E. Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with E.E. Tomkins (at British Embassy in Bonn), December 1, 1964 (AFSC Archives), p. 1.

72. Beittel, interview with Geyer, 10 February, 1969, p. 4.

73. One example of this is an interview Reuman had with the chairman and other members of the East German Peace Council (Reuman, interview with Rumble, Halker, Konig, and Moelke, March 10, 1966, p. 1).

74. Roland L. Warren, "American Friends Service Committee Mediation Efforts in Germany and Korea," in Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, ed. by John W. McDonald, Jr. and Diane B. Bendahmane (Washington: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), p. 30.

75. Journey Through a Wall, p. 51.

76. Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989; and Cates, private interview with Reuman and Cates, March 14, 1989.

77. Franklin Wallin, unpublished letter to Nora Booth, 24 April, 1966 (AFSC Archives), p. 1;
Wallin, letter to Booth, April 29, 1966, p. 1; and
Wallin, letter to Booth, June 14, 1966, p. 4.

78. Beittel, interview with Anderson, 8 November, 1968.

79. Often, presenting the Quakers' own perspective meant reaffirming the need for communication and demonstrating the problems which arose with miscommunication, as demonstrated by one of Beittel's interviews with a GDR official (Beittel, interview with Urban, 16 January, 1969, p. 1). However, another example of this careful listening, followed by presentation of the Quaker perspective on a more substantive issue, was the team presentation to Ulbricht, President of the GDR State Council, during the 1963 visit. After listening to a very long monologue, they expressed their belief in the peaceful intention of the FRG government and people (Journey Through A Wall, p. 57).

80. Beittel, "Bonn Trip Report: 2-10 May, 1972," pp. 3-4.

81. Journey Through A Wall, pp. 57-58.

82. Reuman, "Rechenschaft und Ausblick," p. 2.

83. One illustration where this quiet approach had the intended effect was in a conversation Warren had with the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in the GDR. After Warren presented the way the West perceived a certain issue, the man told Warren that if anyone else had said those things, he would have thrown the person out of his office. Instead, he carefully responded point by point to Warren's presentation of western perspectives (Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989; and Warren, "The Conflict Inter-system and the Change Agent," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII, No. 3 [1964], 237-239).

84. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Gustav Heinemann, 8 May, 1969 (AFSC Archives), p. 1.

85. Journey Through A Wall, p. 45.

86. Beittel, "Germany QIAR Program: Report 1971-72," p. 1.

87. Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989.

88. Journey Through A Wall, p. 60.

89. Beittel, interview with K. Schutz, 9 June, 1969, p. 2.

90. Beittel, interview with Gefaeller, 13 January, 1969, p. 2.

91. In 1964, an official from the Ministry for All-German Questions indicated to Reuman that the goal of reunification would be met by keeping the pressure on the unpopular GDR regime until either the Ulbricht government broke down or the Russians decided the GDR was too great a liability. Reuman raised questions about the success of this approach to reunification and the accuracy of the assessment of internal support for the GDR regime (R[obert] E. Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Walther von Marshall, November 30, 1964 [AFSC Archives], p. 2). This conversation was then continued with the head of the Ministry who asked Reuman to find out more about the relationship between GDR government and citizens (R[obert] E. Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Dierck Onken, November 30, 1964 [AFSC Archives], pp. 1-2). Reuman

responded by researching, writing and distributing his first International Affairs Report on the subject. In it he concluded that there was more support for the GDR government than was believed in the west. Furthermore, GDR citizens felt that recognition would be a liberalizing influence on the GDR government and a prerequisite for any kind of reunification (Reuman, "Attitudes in the DDR," p. 10). By 1969, an official from this same Ministry repeatedly spoke of the need to facilitate conditions for the acceptance of the GDR regime by its own citizens in order to bolster its sense of security and willingness to cooperate (Beittel, interview with Kreuzer, 6 May, 1969, p. 2; and Beittel, interview with Kreuzer, 9 September, 1969, p. 2).

92. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Hermann Kreutzer, 13 March, 1972 (AFSC Archives), p. 2.

93. Warren, "Some Considerations Regarding Travel Restrictions on East Germans by the Allied Travel Office," pp. 65-66.

94. [William F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Hans Heinrich Noebel (official in the FRG Foreign Office), 5 May, 1969 (AFSC Archives), p. 3.

95. Beittel, interview with Urban, 11 December, 1969, p. 2.

96. Reuman, private interview with Reuman and Cates, March 14, 1989; and
Reuman, interview with Gerlach, December 29, 1965, pp. 1-2.

97. Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989.

98. R[obert] E. Reuman, unpublished memorandum on interview with Robert E. Davis, December 2, 1964 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2.

99. Beittel, "Bonn Trip Report: 2-10 May, 1972," pp. 3-5.

100. Beittel, "International Affairs Associate - Germany QIAR Program."

101. Beittel, interview with Gefaeller, 13 January, 1969, p. 2;
Beittel, interview with K. Schutz, 9 June, 1969, p. 1;
Beittel, interview with Bahr, 6 May, 1969, p. 2; and
Beittel, interview with Kreuzer, 13 March, 1972, p. 1.

102. Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989; and Warren, letter to Sidonie, July 4, 1962, p. 4.

103. According to Warren, Albertz used him as a sounding board and vehicle for option creation, saying, "Help me over that difficulty, if you can (Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 105)."

104. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," pp. 5-6; Warren, "Possibilities for a Berlin Settlement," pp. 4-8; and Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," pp. 7-12.

105. Reuman, private interview with Reuman and Cates, March 14, 1989.

106. Stephen Thiermann, private interview, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 7, 1989; Reuman, private interview with Reuman and Cates, March 14, 1989; and Beittel, private interview with Beittel and Horn, September 7, 1989.

107. Wallin, letter to Booth, June 14, 1966, pp. 2-3.

108. Beittel, interview with Anderson, 8 November, 1968.

109. Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," p. 11.

110. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," pp. 5-6.

111. Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," pp. 4, 9, 12, and 14.

112. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," p. 5; and Warren, letter to Sidonie, July 4, 1962, p. 3.

113. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," p. 5.

114. Warren, "Possibilities for a Berlin Settlement," p. 4.

115. Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," pp. 8-9 and 12.

116. Warren, "Quaker Peace Work in a Tense International Situation: QIAR Activities and Problems in East and West Germany," pp. 8-9.

117. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," p. 3.
118. Ibid., pp. 2-4;
Reuman, "The Hallstein Doctrine," pp. 2-6; and
Beittel, "Correcting Bismark," p. 5.
119. Warren, "Background on the Berlin Wall," pp. 2-7;
Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," pp.
8-12;
Reuman, "The Hallstein Doctrine," pp. 2-9; and
William [F.] Beittel, "Consequences," International
Affairs Reports from Quaker Workers, XVIII, No. 9, De-
cember, 1971 (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Com-
mittee International Affairs Division; and London: Friends
Service Council, 1971),
p. 5.
120. Reuman, "Attitudes in the DDR," pp. 1-10.
121. Reuman, "The Hallstein Doctrine," pp. 5-7.
122. Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," pp. 8
and 11-13.
123. Bill [William F.] Beittel, "The Right to Provoke"
(unpublished memorandum, 20 February, 1969, AFSC Archives),
pp. 1-2.
124. Reuman, interview with von Marshall, November 30,
1964, pp. 1-2.
125. Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," p. 7.
126. Beittel, interview with Kreuzer, 13 March, 1972,
p. 1;
Beittel, "Bonn Trip Report: 2-10 May, 1972," pp.
4-5;
Beittel, "Die Ost-Vertrage," p. 2; and
Beittel, "Die Ost-Vertrage (for the third time),"
p. 2.
127. Warren, "The Conflict Intersystem and the Change
Agent," p. 236.
128. Warren, "Quaker Peace Work in a Tense International
Situation: QIAR Activities and Problems in East and West
Germany," p. 4; and
Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989.
129. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Con-
ciliation, pp. 99-100, 127-128, and 135;
Warren, "The Conflict Intersystem and the Change
Agent," p. 238; and

Roland [L.] Warren, "Case Study III (East-West Relations) QIAR Activities in the Divided Germanies 1962-1973," from Appendix C in Document Arising From the Consultation on Quaker Experience of Political Mediation, held at Old Jordans, Buckinghamshire, 21-24 August, 1989 (London: Quaker Peace & Service, 1990), pp. 6-8.

130. William [F.] Beittel, unpublished memorandum on interview with Heinrich Albertz, December 22, 1972 (AFSC Archives), pp. 1-2; and
Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 140-142.

131. Warren, private interview, March 9, 1989.

132. Rather than examine these Quaker values here, I will do so at various points within the next three chapters. This will enable me to assess Quaker beliefs and values in the context of the broader theological issues with which I will deal. In chapter 5, some of these Quaker values help determine the major topics which will form a basis for a theology of conciliation. Since they are integral to my theological assessment, it is more appropriate that they be addressed there and simply mentioned here. Therefore the following Quaker beliefs and values will be examined as stated below: freedom and worth of the individual -- including belief about "that of God in everyone" (chapter 5, p. 311; and chapter 6, p. 361; also see earlier sections of this chapter, pp. 237 and 258-260); mutual acceptance (chapter 5, pp. 310-311 and footnote #45; and chapter 6, pp. 354-355 and 359); friendship and community (chapter 5, p. 300); peaceful relationships (chapter 5, pp. 292-293 and 311-312, and footnotes #9 and #36); "speaking the truth in love" (chapter 5, pp. 311-312 and 326, and footnote #36; and chapter 6, pp. 404-405, 428, and 431); inner light and guidance (chapter 6, p. 361); addressing concerns (chapter 5, p. 318; and chapter 6, pp. 396-397 and 434); seeking clearness (chapter 6, p. 434); and building consensus (chapter 5, p. 319, and chapter 6, pp. 396-397 and 434).

133. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, pp. 74, 100-103, and 128.

134. Warren, "Quaker Peace Work in a Tense International Situation: QIAR Activities and Problems in East and West Germany," p. 5.

135. Beittel, "Germany QIAR Program: Report 1971-72," p. 1.

136. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, p. 137.

137. Reuman, "Proposals on German Reunification," p. 6.

138. Reuman, "Reconciliation in Germany," p. 1.